IRLF 


WOODROW  WILSON'S 
ADMINISTRATION 
and  ACHIEVEMENTS 


&4mericanism 

OATRIOTISM  consists  in  some  very 
A  practical  things — practical  in  that 
they  belong  to  the  life  of  every  day,  that 
they  wear  no  extraordinary  distinction 
about  them,  that  they  are  connected 
with  commonplace  duty.  The  way  to  be 
patriotic  in  America  is  not  only  to  love 
America,  but  to  love  the  duty  that  lies 
nearest  to  our  hand  and  know  that  in 
performing  it  we  are  serving  our  coun 
try. — From  President  Wilson's  Address 
at  Independence  Hall,  Philadelphia, 
July  14,  1914. 


s 


^Administration  and  ^Achievements 


Being  a  Compilation  from  the  Newspaper 

Press  of  Eight  Years  of  the  World's 

Greatest  History  ^particularly  as 

Concerns  America^  Its 

People  and  their 

Affairs 


By 

FRANK  B.  LORD  and 
JAMES  WILLIAM  B&.YAN 


JAMES  WILLIAM  BRYAN  PRESS 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


COPVB1GHT,   1921 

BY 

Frank  B.  Lord  and  James  William  Bryan 

All  Rights  Reserved 


CONTENTS 


Page 
AMERICANISM — From  President  Wilson's  Independence  Hall 

Address,  Philadelphia,- July,  1914 2 

HISTORY'S  PROVING  GROUND 7—8 

PORTRAIT  in  typophotogravure  of  President  Wilson  at  Amer 
ica's  Entry  in  the  War — Charcoal  Sketch  by  Hattie  E. 
Eurdette 10 

WOODROW  WILSON'S  ADMINISTRATION — Eight  Years  of  the 
World's  Greatest  History — Courtesy  of  the  New  York 
Times 1 1—69 

EARLY  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  ADMINISTRATION 15 

FOREIGN  POLICIES,  1913-1914 22 

LANDMARKS  IN  MEXICAN  POLICY 23 

APPEALS  FOR  MEDIATION y> 

THE  EUROPEAN  WAR,  1914-1916 30 

FEDERAL   RESERVE-— From    President   Wilson's   Address   to 

Congress,  April,  1913 31 

TYPOPHOTOGRATURE  of  Governor  Woodrow  Wilson  and  Joseph 

P.  Tumulty  with  Newspaper  Men,  1912 32 

SENATOR  GLASS  ON  WOODROW  WILSON,  1921 — Courtesy  of  the 

New  York  Times 36 

PERSONAL  MESSAGES  TO  CONGRESS  from  President  Wilson's 

First  Address  to  Congress,  April  8,  1913 39 

TYPOPHOTOGRAVURE  of  President  Wilson  Reading  First  Mes 
sage  to  Congress,  April  8,  1913 40 

MEDIATION  EFFORTS,  1916-1917 43 

HAMILTON  HOLT'S  TRIBUTE 44 

UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  WAR 46 

RURAL  CREDITS  from  President  Wilson's  Remarks  on  Sign 
ing  Bill,  July,  1916 48 

TYPOPHOTOGRAVURE  of  the  President  in  1918 50 

THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS 58-59 

PEACE  CONFERENCE  AND  TREATY,  1919 61 

THE  CLOSING  YEAR,  1920-1921 66 

5 

/f  tr  A  /i  py  a? 


CARTOON — The    Founders  of    the   League    of    Nations,   by 

Ealdbridge  in  the  Stars  and  Stripes 70 

VERSE — Beware  of  Visons,  by  Alfred  Noyes 70 

POEM — In  Flanders  Fields,  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  John  McCrea.     71 

POEM — America's  Answer,  by  R.  W.  Lillard.     Courtesy  of  New 

York  Evening  Post 71 

SONNETS — Recessional  by  Richard  Linthicum — Courtesy  of  the 

New  York  World 72 

WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION — From  President  Wilson's  Speech 

of  Acceptance,  1916 73 

TYPOPHOTOGRAVURE  of  Portrait  of  President  Wilson  at  Peace 

Conference,  by  George  W.  Harris 74 

WOODROW  WILSON'S  PLAGE  IN  HISTORY — An  Appreciation 
by  General  The  Right  Honorable  Jan  Christian  Smuts, 
1921 75-79 

CARTOON — Without  the  Advice  or  Consent  of  the  Senate, 

by  Kirby  m  the  New  York  World 80 

WE  DIE  WITHOUT  DISTINCTION — From  the  President's  Ad 
dress  at  Swarthmore  College,  1913 80 

WOODROW  WTILSON — An  Interpretation — Courtesy  of  the  New 

York  World 81-93 

TYPOPHOTOGRAVURE  of  the  President  on  Board  Ship  Return 
ing  from  Peace  Conference 87 

THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  PEACE  TREATY. 87 

TYPOPHOTOGRAVURE  of  the  President  at  the  Last  Meeting 

with  his  Cabinet,  1921 88 

Two  PICTURES — From  Address  by  Joseph  P.  Tumulty 88 

THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 93-100 


HISTORY'S    PROVING    GROUND 


[HE  MODERN  NEWSPAPER  through  its  intensive, 
minute  and  zealous  activities  in  searching  out,  present 
ing  and  interpreting  each  day  the  news  of  the  entire 
world,  is  tracing  with  unerring  accuracy  the  true  and 
permanent  picture  of  the  present.  This  picture  will  endure  as 
undisputed  history  for  all  time. 

Let  us  concede  that  the  newspaper  writer  sometimes,  in  the 
passion  of  the  hour,  goes  far  afield.  'It  is  equally  true  that  no 
statement  of  importance  can  thus  be  made  that  is  not  immediately 
challenged,  answered  and  reanswered  until,  through  the  fierce 
fires  of  controversy  the  dross  is  burned  away  and  the  gold  of 
established  fact  remains.  Not  alone  the  fact  stands  out,  but  also 
the  world's  immediate  reaction  to  that  fact,  the  psychology  of  the 
event  and  the  man  dominating  the  cause  and  the  effect. 

The  modern  newspaper  is  the  proving  ground  of  history.  To 
illustrate  let  us  suppose  that  our  newspaper  press,  as  we  know  it 
today,  had  existed  in  Shakespeare's  time.  Would  there  now  be 
any  controversy  over  the  authorship  of  the  world's  greatest 
dramas? 

Could  the  staff  photographer  of  a  Sunday  supplement  as 
efficient  as  one  of  our  present  day  corps  have  snapped  Mohammed 
in  his  tent  and  a  keen  reporter  of  today's  type  questioned  him  as 
to  his  facts  and  data,  would  not  all  of  us  now  be  Mohammedans 
or  Mohammed  be  forgot?  Had  such  newspapers  as  ours  followed 
Washington  to  Valley  Forge  and  gone  with  him  to  meet  Corn- 
wallis,  would  the  father  of  his  country  be  most  intimately  remem 
bered  through  the  cherry  tree  episode?  Consider  the  enlighten 
ment  which  would  have  been  thrown  upon  the  pages  of  history 
had  a  corps  of  modern  newspaper  correspondents  reported  the 
meeting  of  John  and  the  Barons  at  Runnymeade  or  accompanied 
Columbus  on  his  voyages  of  discover/. 


Would  not  even  Lincoln  be  more  vivid  in  our  minds  and  what 
we  really  know  of  him  not  so  shrouded  in  anecdote  and  story? 

In  Washington's  time  America  became  a  Nation.  In  Lincoln's 
time  our  country  was  united  and  made  one.  In  Wilson's  time  our 
Nation  received  recognition  as  the  greatest  of  the  world  powers. 
It  remained,  however,  for  Wilson  alone  to  reach  the  highest 
pinnacle  of  international  prominence  in  the  face  of  the  pitiless 
cross  fires  of  today's  newspaper  press.  Yet  this  inquisition,  often 
more  than  cruel,  was  not  without  its  constructive  value,  for  it 
has  searched  out  every  fact  and  established  every  truth  beyond  the 
successful  attack  of  any  future  denial. 

This  little  volume — the  first  perhaps  of  its  kind  concerning  any 
man  or  event — presents  with  no  further  word  of  its  compilers  a 
summary  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  Administration  and  Achieve 
ments — eight  years  of  the  world's  greatest  history — taken  entirely 
from  the  newspaper  press. 

It  contains  not  one  statement  that  has  not  been  accurately 
weighed  in  the  critical  scales  of  controversy.  Its  object  is  simply 
to  present  the  truth  and  have  this  truth  early  in  the  field  so  that 
the  political  canard  which  was  so  shamelessly  indulged  in  during 
the  close  of  the  Wilson  Administration  may  not  be  crystalized  in 
the  public  mind  and  cloud  for  a  time  the  glorious  luster  of  his 
name. 

It  shall  be  as  Maximilian  Harden,  the  keenest  thinker  of  the 
defeated  Germans  said:  "Only  one  conqueror's  work  will  endure 
—Wilson's  thought." 

FRANK  B.  LORD  and 
JAMES  WILLIAM  BRYAN 


©  James  Wm.  Bryan 

March  5,   1916:   Portrait  of   Mr.  Wilson   drawn   in  charcoal  by   Miss 

Hattie   E.   Burdett,   and  considered   by   many  as   the   President's   best 

likeness  at  the  entrance  of  America  into  the  World  War 


Wilson  s 
Administration 


Sight  Tears  of  the  World's 
(greatest  History 


FJT7"OODROW  WILSON  took  the  oath  of  office  as  President 

rp        on  March  4,  1913,  after  one  of  the  most  sweeping  triumphs 

ever  known  in  Presidential  elections.     Factional  war  in 

the  Republican  Party  had  given  him  435  electoral  votes  in  the 

preceding  November,  to  Roosevelt's  88  and  Taft's  8;  and  though 

he  was  a  "minority  President,"  he  had  had  a  popular  plurality  of 

more  than  2,000,000  over  Roosevelt  and  nearly  3,000,000  over 

Taft. 

Moreover,  the  party  which  was  coming  back  into  control  of 
the  Government  after  sixteen  years  of  wandering  in  the  wilderness 
had  a  majority  of  five  in  the  Senate  and  held  more  than  two-thirds 
of  the  seats  in  the  lower  house.  With  the  opposition  divided  into 
two  wings,  which  hated  each  other  at  the  moment  more  than  they 
hated  the  Democrats,  the  party  seemed  to  have  a  fairly  clear  field 
for  the  enactment  of  those  sweeping  reforms  which  large  elements 
of  the  public  had  been  demanding  for  more  than  a  decade. 

With  this  liberalism,  which  was  not  disturbed  at  being  called 
radicalism,  Mr.  Wilson  in  his  public  career  had  been  consistently 
identified.  During  his  long  service  as  a  university  professor  and 
President  he  had  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  a  steadily 
growing  public  by  his  books  and  speeches  on  American  political 
problems,  in  which  he  had  spoken  the  thoughts  which  in  those^ 
years  were  in  the  minds  of  millions  of  Americans  on  the  need  for 
reforms  to  lessen  those  contacts  between  great  business  interests 
and  the  Government  which  had  existed,  now  weaker  and  now 
stronger,  ever  since  the  days  of  Mark  Hanna. 

11 


The  ideas  of  Mr-  Wilson  as  to  governmental  reform,  to  be  sure, 
went  further  :t*han  these ;  of  ;many  of  his  followers,  and  took  a 
different  direction,  from  tne  equally  radical  notions  of  others.  An 
avowed  admire']?  p£  the  system-  of  government  which  gives  to  the 
Cabinet  the  direction  of  legislation  and  makes  it  responsible  to 
the  Legislature  and  the  people  for  its  policies,  he  had  been  writing 
for  years  on  the  desirability  of  introducing  some  of  the  elements 
of  that  system  into  the  somewhat  rigid  framework  of  the  American 
Government,  and  in  his  brief  experience  in  politics  had  put  into 
practice  his  theory  that  the  Executive,  even  under  American 
constitutional  forms,  not  only  could  but  should  be  the  active 
director  of  the  policy  of  the  dominant  party  in  legislation  as  well. 
But  a  public  addicted  to  hero  worship,  little  concerned  with 
questions  of  governmental  machinery^ind  inclined  to  believe  that 
certain  parts, of  the  work  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  of 
1787  had  been  accomplished  under  divine  inspiration,  had  com 
paratively  little  interest  in  the  Wilson  concepts  of  reform  in 
political  methods.  They  regarded  him,  in  the  language  of  those 
days,  as  a  champion  of  the  "plain  people"  against  "  the  interests." 
They  had  seen  in  his  long  struggle  with  antagonistic  influences  in 
Princeton  University — a  struggle  from  which  he  retired  defeated, 
but  made  famous  and  prepared  for  wider  fields  by  the  publicity 
which  he  had  won  by  the  conflict — a  sort  of  miniature  repre 
sentation  of  this  antithesis  between  the  people  and  big  business 
and  they  had  learned  to  regard  Mr.  Wilson  as  a  fighter  for  demo 
cratic  principles  against  aristocratic  tendencies  and  the  money 
power. 

This  reputation  he  had  vastly  expanded  during  his  two  years  as 
Governor  of  New  Jersey.  His  term  had  been  distinguished  not 
only  by  the  passage  of  a  number  of  reform  measures  consonant 
with  the  liberal  ideas  of  the  period,  but  by  a  spectacular  struggle 
between  the  Governor  and  an  old-time  machine  of  his  own  party — 
the  very  machine  which  had  nominated  him.  In  this  fight,  as  in 
his  conflict  at  Princeton,  he  had  been  for  a  time  defeated,  but  here 
again  the  fight  itself  had  made  him  famous  and  won  him  a  hun 
dred  supporters  outside  of  his  own  State  for  every  one  he  lost  at 
home. 

At  the  very  outset  of  his  term,  he  had  entered,  against  all 
precedent,  into  the  fight  in  the  Legislature  over  a  Senatorial 
election.  Demanding  that  the  Legislature  keep  faith  with  the 
people,  who  in  a  preferential  primary  had  designated  a  candidate 
for  United  States  Senator  who  did  not  command  the  support  of 
the  organization,  he  had  won  his  fight  on  this  particular  issue  and 
set  himself  before  the  public  as  a  sort  of  tribune  of  the  people  who 
conceived  it  his  duty  to  interpose  his  influence  wherever  other 
officials  showed  a  tendency  to  disregard  the  popular  will. 

In  the  legislative  fight  for  the  enactment  of  reform  legislation, 
too,  the  Governor  had  continually  intervened  in  the  character  of 

12 


"lobbyist  for  the  people,"  and  while  the  opposition  of  the  old 
political  organization,  which  he  had  aroused  in  the  fight  for  the 
Senatorship,  had  partially  halted  the  progress  of  this  program, 
the  great  triumph  in  November,  1912,  had  returned  a  Legislature 
so  strong  in  support  of  the  Governor  that  before  he  left  Trenton 
for  Washington  practically  all  of  the  measures  included  in  his 
scheme  had  become  laws*  Mr.  Wilson,  then,  was  known  to  the 
country  not  only  as  a  reformer  but  as  a  successful  reformer;  and 
his  victories  over  the  professional  politicians  of  the  old  school  had 
removed  mos;t  of  the  latent  fear  of  the  ineffectuality  of  a  scholar 
in  politics.  ^lh  point  of  fact,  the  chief  interest  of  this  particular 
scholar  had  always  lain  in  politics,  and  it  was  partly  chance  and 
partly  economic  determinism  that  had  diverted  him  in  early  life 
from  the  practice  of  politics  to  the  teaching  of  its  principles  and 
history.  */ 

Abroad,  where  his  election  was  received  with  general  satis 
faction,  he  was  still  regarded  as  the  scholar  in  politics,  for  a  Europe 
always  inclined  to  exaggerate  the  turpitude  of  professional  politi 
cians  in  America  liked  to  see  in  him  the  first  fruits  of  them  that 
slept,  the  pioneer  of  the  better  classes  of  American  society  coming 
at  last  into  politics  to  clean  up  the  wreckage  made  by  ward  bosses 
and  financial  interests.  Scarcely  any  American  President  ever 
took  office  amid  so  much  approbation  from  the  leading  organs  of 
European  opinion. 

His  radicalism  caused  no  great  concern  abroad  and  was  re 
garded  with  apprehension  only  in  limited  circles  at  home — and 
even  here  the  apprehension  was  more  over  the  return  to  power  of 
the  Democratic  Party  than  on  account  of  specific  fears  based  on 
the  character  of  the  President-elect.  The  business  depression  of 
1913  and  1914  would  probably  have  been  inevitable  upon  the 
inauguration  of  any  Democratic  President,  particularly  one  pledged 
to  the  carrying  out  of  extensive  alterations  in  the  commercial 
system  of  the  country.  For  in  1912  W7ilson  had  been  in  effect  the 
middle-of-the-road  candidate,  the  conservative  liberal.  Most  of 
the  wild  men  had  followed  Roosevelt,  and  the  most  conservative 
business  circles  felt  at  least  some  relief  that  there  had  been  no 
re-entry  into  the  White  House  of  the  Rough  Rider,  with  a  gift 
for  stinging  phrases  and  a  cohort  of  followers  in  which  the  lunatic 
fringe  was  disproportionately  large  and  unusually  ragged. 

So  Woodrow  W7ilson  entered  the  Presidential  office  under  con 
ditions  which  in  some  respects  were  exceptionally  favorable.  His 
situation  v/as  in  reality,  however,  considerably  less  satisfactory 
than  it  seemed.  To  begin  with,  he  was,  in  spite  of  everything,  a 
minority  President  and  -the  representative  of  a  minority  party. 
He  had  even,  during  a  good  part  of  the  Baltimore  Convention, 
been  a  minority  candidate  for  the  nomination.  If  the  two  wings 
of  the  Republicans  should  during  the  ensuing  Administration 
succeed  in  burying  their  differences  and  coming  together  once 

13 


more,  the  odds  were  in  favor  of  their  success  in  1916.  Moreover, 
the  Democrats  were  definitely  expected  to  do  something.  Dis 
satisfaction  with  the  general  influence  of  financial  interests  in 
public  life,  a  dissatisfaction  which  had  gradually  concentrated  on 
the  protective  tariff  as  the  chief  weapon  of  those  interests,  had 
been  growing  for  years  past.  In  1908  a  public  aroused  by  Roose 
velt  but  afraid  of  Bryan  had  decided  to  trust  the  Republican 
Party  to  undo  its  own  work,  and  the  answer  of  the  party  had  been 
the  Payne-Aldrich  tariff.  That  tariff  broke  the  Republican  Party 
in  two  and  paved  the  way  for  the  return  of  Roosevelt;  it  had  also, 
in  1910,  given  the  Democrats  the  control  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives. 

Now,  at  last  the  Democrats  had  full  control  of  both  Legislature 
and  Executive,  and  the  country  expected  them  to  do  something: 
unreasonably,  it  was  at  the  same  time  rather  afraid  that  they 
would  do  something.  To  do  something  but  not  too  much,  to  meet 
the  popular  demands  without  destroying  the  economic  well-being 
which  the  Republican  ascendency  had  undoubtedly  promoted,  to 
'•  insure  a  better  distribution  of  wealth  without  crippling  the  pro 
duction  of  wealth — this  was  the  problem  of  a  President  who  had 
had  only  two  years  in  public  life,  and  most  of  whose  assistants 
would  have  to  be  chosen  from  men  almost  without  executive 
experience. 

The  chief  peculiarity  of  President  Wilson's  political  position 
lay  in  a  theory  of  American  Government  which  had  first  come  to 
him  in  his  undergraduate  days  at  Princeton  and  which  had  been 
steadily  developing  ever  since.  That  theory,  briefly,  was  that  the 
American  Constitution  permitted,  and  the  practical  development 
of  American  politics  should  have  compelled,  the  President  to  act 
not  only  as  Chief  of  State  but  as  Premier — as  the  active  head  of 
the  majority  party,  personally  responsible  to  the  people  for  the 
execution  of  the  program  of  legislation  laid  down  in  that  party's 
platform.  Fanciful  as  it  had  seemed  when  first  put  forward  by 
him  many  years  before,  that  concept  of  the  Presidency  was  now, 
perhaps  for  the  first  time,  within  the  reach  of  practical  realization. 

Dissatisfaction  with  the  general  secrecy  and  irresponsibility 
of  Congressional  committees  which  had  charge  of  the  direction  of 
legislation,  in  so  far  as  there  was  any  direction,  had  been  growing 
for  years;  and  an  incident  of  the  revolt  against  the  Payne-Aldrich 
tariff  and  the  break  in  the  Republican  Party  had  been  the  internal 
revolution  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  taking  away  from  the 
Speaker  the  power  of  controlling  legislation  which  he  had  for 
some  time  enjoyed,  and  which  would  have  been  a  serious  obstacle 
to  Presidential  leadership  such  as  Wilson  had  in  mind.  Moreover, 
the  activity  of  Cleveland  and  Roosevelt  had  shown  the  public 
that  even  in  time  of  peace  an  energetic  President  had  a  much  wider 
field  of  action  than  most  Presidents  had  attempted  to  cover,  and 
the  more  recent  example  of  Taft  had  increased  the  demand'  for  a 

14 


Early  Accomplishments  of  Administration 

Underwood-Simmons  tariff *,  establishing  the  lowest  average  of 
duties  in  seventy -five  years,  enacted  October  j,  1913. 

Federal  Reserve  act,  organizing  the  banking  system  and  stabiliz 
ing  the  currency,  December  23,  /p/J. 

Clayton  Anti-Trust  law. 

Creation  of  Federal  Trade  Commission. 

Repeal  of  Panama  Canal  tolls -exemption. 

End  of  dollar  diplomacy. 

Negotiation  of  a  treaty  (never  ratified]  with  Colombia  to  satisfy 
the  Colombian  claim  in  Panama* 


President  who  would  act,  would  not  leave  action  to  those  men 
around  him  who  "knew  exactly  what  they  wanted." 

*  There  were,  however,  two  great  obstacles  to  the  operation  of 
Mr.  Wilson's  theory.  The  first  was  constitutional./  In  Europe 
the  Premier  who  directs  the  legislative  policy  of  the  Government 
is  answerable  not  only  in  Parliament  but  to  the  people  whenever 
his  policy  has  ceased,  orseems  to  have  ceased,  to  command  public 
confidence.  The  ^^tilJM  of  the  United  States  finishes  out  his 
term,  no  matter  '^Hj  BE  his  relations  with  Congress  or  how 
general  his  unpopulan^^mong  the  people.  The  check  upon  his 
leadership,  as  Mr.  Wil<ftn  presently  realized,  could  come  only  at 
the  end  of  his  term,  when  the  President  as  a  candidate  fop  re 
election  came  before  the  public  for  approval  or  rejection.  So, 
/even  before  his  first  inauguration,  Mr.  Wilson  had  written  to 
A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  then  *  Congressman,  expressing  disapproval, 
quite  aside  from  any  personal  connection  with  the  issue,  of  the 
proposal  to  restrict  die  President  to  a  single  term.  That  had  been 
a  plank  in  the  De«pratic  platform  of  the  year  before;  already 
it  was  apparent  thW  this  phase  of  the  party's  program  would 
have  to  be  sacrificed  in  order  to  make  the  party  leader  responsible 
in  the  true  sense  for  the  program  as  a  whole.  But  that  plank  had 
not  been  seriously  intended,  and  by  1916  the  march  of  events 
had  made  it  a  dead  letter./' 

/  A  more  serious  di^Mty,  in  March,  1913,  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  President  was  no^BRe  party  leader.  There  was  an  enormous 
amount  of  Wrilson  sentiment  over  the  country,  and  there  were 
many  enthusiastic  Wilson  men;  but  a  good  many  of  these  were 
of  the  old  mugwump  type,  or  men  who  had  hitherto  held  aloof 
from  politics.  In  1912,  as  later  in  1917  and  1918,  there  was  seen 
the  anomaly  of  a  leader  who  was  himself  an  orthodox  and  often 
narrow  partisan,  yet  drew  most  of  his  support  from  independent 
elements  or  even  from  the  less  firmly  organized  portions  of  the 

15 


opposition.  And  not  only  were  most  of  the  Wilson  men  inde 
pendents  or  political  amateurs;  a  still  greater  stumbling  block  lay 
in  the  fact  that  very  few  of  them  had  been  elected  to  office.  In 
the  great  Democratic  landslide  of  1912  the  Democrats  who  had 
got  on  the  payroll  were  mostly  the  old  party  wheel-horses  who  had 
been  lingering  in  the  outer  darkness  of  opposition  for  sixteen  years 
past,  or  more  or  less  permanent  representatives  of  the  Solid  South. 
'In  so  far  as  the  party  had  a  leader  at  that  time,  it  was  Bryan./* 
Bryan  had  played  the  leading  part  in  the  Baltimore  Convention. 
If  he  had  not  exactly  nominated  Wilson,  he  had  at  least  done  more 
than  anybody  else  to  destroy  Wilson's  chief  competitors.  There 
were  not  enough  Bryan  men  in  the  country  to  elect  Bryan,  not 
even  enough  Bryan  men  in  the  party  to  nominate  Bryan  a  fourth 
time;  but  there  were  enough  Bryan  Democrats  to  ruin  the  policy 
of  the  incoming  President  if  he  did  not  conciliate  Bryan  with 
extreme  care. 

So  the  first  efforts  of  the  new  Administration  had  to  be  a  com 
promise  between  what  Wilson  wanted  and  what  Bryan  would 
permit.  This  was  seen  first  of  all  in  the  composition  of  the  Cabinet, 
which  Bryan  himself  headed  as  Secretary  of  State.  Josephus 
Daniels,  who  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  to  be  one  of  the  prin 
cipal  targets  of  criticism  for  the  next  eight  years,  was  also  a  Bryan 
man.  Of  the  "Wilson  men"  of  the  camr^^m,  William  G.  McAdoo 
was  chosen  as  Secretary  of  the  TreasuJMMJkwithout  some  grave 
misgivings  as  to  his  ability,  which  wer^Mpibsequently  justified 
by  his  conduct  of  the  office.  The  rest  or  the  Cabinet  was  notable 
chiefly  for  the  presence  of  three  men  from  Texas,  a  State  whose 
prominence  reflected  not  only  its  growing  importance  and  its 
fidelity  to  the  party  but  also  the  influence  of  Colonel  Edward 
Mandell  House,  a  private  citizen  who  had  risen  from  making 
Governors  at  Austin  to  take  a  prominent  part  in  the  making  of  a 
President  in  1912.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Administration  and 
throughout  almost  all  of  President  Wilson^  tenure  of  office  he 
was  the  President's  most  influential  advjBp,  a  sort  of  super- 
Minister  and  Ambassador  in  general;  and  his  position  from  the 
first  caused  a  certain  amount  of  heartburning  among  the  poli 
ticians  who  resented  this  prominence  of  an  outsider  who  had  never 
held  office. 

/Perhaps  because  many  of  his  official  ajds  and  assistants  were 
more  or  less  imposed  upon  him,  the  Pr^feent  showed  from  the 
first  a  tendency  to  rely  on  personal  agent^%nd  unofficial  advisers. 
And  this  was  to  become  more  prominent  as  the  years  passed,  as 
new  issues  arose  of  which  no  one  would  have  dreamed  in  the 
Spring  of  1913,  issues  for  which  the  ordinary  machinery  and 
practice  of  American  Government  were  but  little  prepared. 

For  the  eight  years  which  began  on  Mnrch  4.  1913,  were  to  be 
wholly  unlike  any  previous  period  in  Arrerkan  history.  An 
Administration  chosen  wholly  in  view  of  domestic  problems  was 

16 


to  find  itself  chiefly  engaged  with  foreign  relations  of  unexampled 
complexity  and  importance.  The  passionate  issues  of  1912  were 
soon  to  be  forgotten.  Generally  speaking,  the  dominant  questions 
before  the  American  people  in  1912  and  1913  were  about  the  same 
as  in  1908,  or  1904,  or  even  earlier.  But  from  1914  on  every  year 
brought  a  changed  situation  in  which  the  issues  of  the  previous 
year  had  already  been  crowded  out  of  attention  by  new  and  more- 
pressing  problems. 

'  No  American  President  except  Lincoln  had  ever  been  concerned 
with  matters  of  such  vital  importance  to  the  nation;  and  not 
even  Lincoln  had  had  to  deal  with  a  world  so  complex  and  so 
closely  interrelated  with  the  United  States.  Washington,  Jeffer 
son  and  Madison  had  to  guide  the  country  through  the  complica 
tions  caused  by  a  great  world  war;  but  the  nation  which  they  led 
was  small  and  obscure,  concerned  only  in  keeping  out  of  trouble 
as  long  as  it  could.  The  nation  which  Wilson  ruled  was  a  powerfuls 
State  whose  attitude  from  the  very  first  was  of  supreme  importance 
to  both  sides.  And  the  issues  raised  by  the  war  pushed  into  the 
background  questions  which  had  seemed  important  in  1913 — and 
which,  when  the  war  was  over,  became  important  once  more. 

None  of  this,  of  course,  could  have  been  predicted  on  March 
4,  1913.  A  new  man  with  a  new  method  had  been  elected  Presi 
dent  and  intrusted  with  the  meeting  of  certain  pressing  domestic 
problems.  At  the  moment  the  public  was  more  interested  in  the 
man  than  in  his  method;  and  not  till  the  crisis  had  been  success 
fully  passed  did  popular  attention  concentrate  on  the  manner  of 
accomplishment  rather  than  on  the  things  accomplished. 

^Problems  at  Home,  1913-1914 

ONE  of  the  passages  of  President  Wilson's  inaugural  address 
contained  a  list  of  "the  things  that  ought   to  be  altered./ 
which  included: 

A  tariff  which  cuts  us  off  from  our  proper  part  in  the  commerce  of  the  world* 
violates  the  just  principles  of  taxation,  and  makes  the  Government  a  facile  instru 
ment  in  the  hands  of  private  interests;  a  banking  and  currency  system  based  upon 
the  necessity  of  the  Government  to  sell  its  bonds  fifty  years  ago  and  perfectly 
adapted  to  concentrating  cash  and  restricting  credits;  an  industrial  system  which, 
take  it  on  all  sides,  financial  as  well  as  administrative,  holds  capital  in  leading 
strings,  restricts  the  liberties  and  limits  the  opportunities  of  labor,  and  exploits 
without  renewing  or  conserving  the  natural  resources  of  the  country;  a  body  of 
agricultural  activities  never  yet  given  the  efficiency  of  great  business  undertakings  or 
served  as  it  should  be  through  the  instrumentality  of  science  taken  directly  to  the 
farm,  or  afforded  the  facilities  of  credit  best  suited  to  its  practical  needs. 

The  items  had  been  set  down  in  the  order  of  their  immediate 
importance.  First  came  the  tariff,  for  the  tariff  had  come  to  be 
in  the  minds  of  many  Americans  a  symbol  of  the  struggle  between 
the  "plain  people"  and  "the  interests."  The  Payne-Aldnch 
tariff,  enacted  by  a  party  pledged  to  tariff  revision,  had  been  not 

17 


only  an  injury  but  an  insult,  and  if  any  American  Presidential 
election  could  ever  be  interpreted  as  a  popular  referendum  on 
any  specific  policy  the  election  of  1912  meant  that  the  Payne- 
Aldrich  tariff  must  be  revised.  At  the  time  of  the  enactment  of 
that  bill  Mr.  Wilson  had  written  a  critical  article  in  The  North 
American  Review  which  expressed  a  widespread  popular  senti 
ment  in  its  criticism  of  "the  policy  of  silence  and  secrecy"  prev 
alent  in  the  committee  rooms  when  this  and  other  tariffs 
had  been  drawn  up  and  a  demand  for  procedure  in  the  open  where 
the  public  could  find  out  exactly  who  wanted  what  and  why. 
Joined  with  this  objection  to  the  methods  of  tariff  making  were 
some  observations  by  Mr.  Wilson  on  the  principles  of  tariff  revi 
sion.  He  saw  and  said  that  a  complete  return  to  a  purely  revenue 
tariff  was  not  then  possible  even  if  desirable,  and  that  the  im 
mediate  objective  of  tariff  reform  should  be  the  adjustment  of 
rates  so  as  to  permit  competition  and  thereby  necessitate  effi 
ciency  of  operation. 

/The  ideas  which  in  March,  1909,  were  merely  the  criticism  of  a 
college  professor  had  become  in  March,  1913,  the  program  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  the  leader  of  the  majority  party, 
determined  to  get  his  program  enacted  into  law^  Congress  was 
convened  in  special  session  on  April  7,  and  the  President  delivered 
a  message  on  the  one  topic  of  the  tariff. "'  Going  back  to  the  prec 
edent  of  Washington  and  Adams,  broken  by  Jefferson  and  never 
resumed  again,  he  read  his  message  in  person  to  the  Congress  as 
if  to  emphasize  the  intimate  connection  between  the  Executive 
and  legislation  which  was  to  be  a  feature  of  the  new  Administra 
tion.  The  principle  of  tariff,  reform  laid  down  in  that  bill  was  a 
practical  and  not  a  theoretical  consideration/ the  need  of  ending 
an  industrial  situation  fostered  by  high  tariffs  wherein  "nothing  is 
obliged  to  stand  the  tests  of  efficiency  and  economy  in  our  world 
of  big  business,  but  everything  thrives  by  concerted  agreement. 
.  .  .  The  object  of  the  tariff  duties  henceforth  laid  must  be 
effective  competition,  the  whetting  of  American  wits  by  contest 
with  the  wits  of  the  world. " 

The  measure  which  Democratic  leaders  had  already  prepared 
for  that  purpose  and  which  eventually  became  known  as  the 
Underwood-Simmons  Act  was  intended  to  accomplish  its  end  only 
gradually.  Notoriously  outrageous  schedules  of  the  Payne-Aldrich 
Act,  such  as  that  dealing  with  wool,  were  heavily  reduced,  and  the 
general  purport  of  the  bill  is  perhaps  expressed  in  the  phrase  of 
Professor  Taussig,  that  it*was  "the  beginning  of  a  policy  of  much 
moderated  protection."  It  went  through  the  House  without 
much  difficulty,  passing  on  May  8,  and  then  it  struck  the  Senate 
committee  rooms,  from  which  no  tariff  bill  had  ever  emerged 
quite  as  innocent  as  it  entered.  The  usual  expeditionary  forces 
of  lobbyists  concentrated  in  Washington  and  the  Senate  talked 
it  over,  while  Summer  came  on  and  Washington  grew  hotter  and 

18 


xhbtter.  In  course  of  time  Senators  began  to  come  to  the  President 
and  tell  him  that  it  was  hopeless  to  get  the  bill  through  at  that 
session  and  that  Washington  was  getting  pretty  hot.  ;si- 

dent  replied  that  he  knew  it  was  hot,  but  that  Congress  would 
have  to  stay  there  till  that  bill  was  passed.    Already  he  had  given 
the  lower  house  something  to 'keep  it  busy  while 
wrestled  with  the  tariff.  .. 

As  for  the  lobby,  the  President  had  his  own  method  of  de 
with   that      On  May   26   he  issued   a  public  statement  cs 
attention  to  the  "extraordinary  exertions"  of  lobbyists  m  con 
nection  with  the  tariff.    ^Tjie_jiews£aj^^ 

said    "with  paid  advertisements  calculated  to  mislead  not  ciiy 
the  judgment  of  the  public  men,  but  also  the  public  opinion  of 
the  country  itself.    There  is  every  evidence  that  money  withai 
limit  is  being  spent  to  maintain  this  lobby.    ...    It  is  of 
interest  to  the  country  that  the  people  at  large  should  have  no 
lobby  and  be  voiceless  in  these  matters,  while  the  greai          ies  of 
astute  men  seek  to  create  an  artificial  opinion  and  to  overcome  tne 
interests  of  the  public  for  their  private  profit.' 
dignity  of  Senators  and  Representatives,  not  to  mention  lobbyists, 
/fose  to  protest  against  this  declaration.     A  Republican  Senator 
/even  declared  that  the  President,  who  had  been  actively  urging 
his  views  on  legislators  just  as  he  had  done  in  New  Jersey,  was 
himself  the  chief  lobbyist  in  connection  with  the   lariir  bill.     A 
Senate  Committee  was  appointed  to  find  out  if  there  had  been 
any  lobbying,  and  discovered  that  there  had.      Meanwhile 
'   bill  was  being  argued  out  in  the  Senate,  and  the  President  stood 
I  firm  against  any  substantial  modification.   It  was  finally  passed 

on  Oct.  3.  £  .,.,. 

It  was  a  vindication  of  the  platform  promise  and  a  tuiflllmen 
of  the  duty  with  which  the  party  had  been  charged  in  the  last 
election,  and  it  was  a  notable  triumph  for  the  personal  policy  of 
the  President-Premier,  who  more  than  anybody  else  had  literally 
forced  the  bill  through  Congress/  The  tariff  had  taken  such  a 
prominent  place  in  the  fight  against  business  influence  in  the 
Government  that  the  passage  of  a  bill  which  made  a  material 
reduction  in  rates  was  a  moral  victory  for  prgg£f.s.sivism  at  large, 
and  for  President  Wilson  in  particular./ 

The  actual  effect  of  the  tariff,  or  rather  the  actual  < 
it  might  have  had,  is  something  impossible  to  estimate  at  this 
time.    Before  it  had  been  in  operation  a  year,  before  the  country 
had  had  a  chance  to  study  the  new  conditions  brought  in  by  t 
legislation  of  the  first  year  of  the  Wilson  Administration,  the  war 
broke  out  in  Eurpoe.    The  conditions  which  had  prevailed  through 
half  a  century  of  tariff  making  had  ceased  to  exist.     They  have 
not  yet  returned.     A  subsidiary  feature  of  the  Underwood-Sim 
mons  Act,  however,  was  to  attain  enormous  importance  m  t 
course  of  the  Wilson  Administrations.    To  supply  the  deficiency 


19 


r  in  revenue  which  the  lowered  duties  might  be  expected  to  produce 

r   there  was  added  an  income  tax  law,  which  had  recently  been  per- 

V  mitted  by  constitutional  amendment.     Even  the  light  duties  of 

nhe  first  year,  with  their  $3,000  exemption,  were  denounced  by 

conservatives  as  a  rich  man's  tax;,but  within  four  years  more  the 

exemption  was  to  be  lowered  to  $1,000,  and  the  peak  of  the  tax 

raised  to  tenfold  its  original  height. 

So  long  as  the  Wilson  Administration  was  reducing  the  tariff, 
it  was  carrying  out  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Democratic  Party; 
but  the  next  task  which  the  President  laid  before  Congress  was 
much  more  delicate  and  much  more  important.  As  the  event 
showed,  the  result  was  to  be  of  infinitely  greater  benefit  to  the 
nation.  Reform  of  the  currency  had  long  been  an  evident  neces 
sity,  and  the  panic  of  1907  had  recently  called  attention  to  the 
dangers  of  the  system  based  on  emergency  measures  of  the  Civil 
War  period.  Mr.  Wilson  himself  had  said  much  of  the  necessity 
of  freeing  business  from  unnatural  restrictions,  among  which  the 
makeshift  currency  system  was  included.  During  the  previous 
Administration  Senator  Aldrich's  plan  for  a  centralized  reserve 
bank  had  been  widely  discussed,  and  innumerable  modifications 
had  been  suggested.  Democratic  leaders  were  akeady  working 
-~&ft  plans  fe^CLirrencyreform  when  the  new  Administration  came 
5  in,  and  on  June  26  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  by  Carter 
(^  Glass  and  in  the  Senate  by  Robert  L.  Owen. 

It  took  six  months  of  hard  work  to  get  this  adopted,  but  it  was 

a  marvelous  achievement  to  get  it  adopted  at  all.     For  a  large 

faction  of  the  Democratic  Party,  including  its  most  influential 

leader,  still  represented  the  old  hostility  to  the  ".money  power," 

which  regarded  the  overthrow  of  the  United  States  Bank  as  the 

great   triumph  of  the  American   Democracy.     The  Glass-Owen 

bilFcuflered  from  Senator  Aldrich's  scheme  largely  in  the  direction 

of  decentralization  and  giving  more  control  to  the  Government 

and  less  to  the  banks,  but,  even  so,  it  was  a  suspicious  document 

to.  those  numerous  Democrats  v/hose  economic  ideas  were  obtained 

^from  the  Greenback  and  Populist  Parties  of  former  years.     And 

(    it  was  not  satisfactory  to  the  majority  of  the  articulate  bankers  of 

}   the  country,  who  wanted  a  central  bank  instead  of  the  regional 

\   division  of  the  reserve  functions,  and  who  thought  that  the  banks 

/   should  have  a  good  deal  to  say  about  appointments  to  the  Federal 

Reserve  Board. 

As  late  as  the  beginning  of  December  there  were  still  three 
separate  bills  before  Congress,  but  the  party  organization  under 
the  President-Premier  held  together,  and  on  December  23  the 
Glass-Owen  Bill,  with  some  modifications  acquired  en  route,  was 
signed  by  the  President.  The  pressure  on  the  White  House 
during  that  struggle  was  perhaps  the  hardest  which  President 
Wilson  encountered  during  his  entire  eight  years.  Many  an 
honest  Democrat  thought  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  party 

20 


were  being  betrayed/and  many  a  Senator  or  Representative  who 
regarded  the  reserve  banks  with  profound  alarm  felt,  neverthe 
less,  that  if  the  iniquitous  things  were  going  to  be  established  there 
'ought  to  be  one  in  his  home  town.  When  Paul  M.  Warburg,  a 
Wall  Street  banker,  was  appointed  as  one  of  the  members  of _  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  there  were  more  protests  from  politicians 
who  professed  to  believe  that  the  nation  was  being  delivered  over 
to  tile  money  power,  while  the  complaints  of  bankers  who  thought 
that  the  banks  were  being  given  over  to  politicians  had  not  vet 
difid^down.  But  when  the  act  once  went  into  operation  criticism 
almost  disappeared;  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  months  the  un 
precedented  financial  strain  attendant  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  war  made  it  plain  to  almost  anybody  that  without  this 
timely  reform  of  the  banking  system  1914  would  have  seen  a 
disaster  far  worse  than  that  of  1907^^ 

The  work  of  "striking  the  shackles  off  business"  was  continued 
in  1914  by  the  introduction  of  bills  to  carry  out  the  President's 
recommendations  for  prohibiting  interlocking  directorates,  clarify 
ing  the  anti-trust  laws,  establishing  an  In^ersta^Ip^cre__Comrnis- 
sion,  and  supervising  the  issue  of  railroad  securities^  The  chief 
results  of  this  discussion  were  the  creation  of  the  Trade  Commis 
sion,  a  body  of  which  much  more  was  expected  at  the  time  than 
it  has  accomplished,  and  the  passage  of  the  Clayton  Anti-Trust 
Act,  which  exempted  farmers'  combinations  and  labor  unions  V 
from  the  anti-trust  laws,  and  wrote  into  the  statutes  the  declara 
tion  thnt  lnhr:r  is  not  a  r^mmHiry  The  La  Follette  Seamen's 
Bill,  drawn  by  Andrew  Furuseth  of  the  Seamen's  Union^  was 
introduced  in  1913  and  not  enacted  until  much  later.  Its  friends 
declared  that  it  would  at  least  establish  decent  living  conditions 
for  sailors,  and  its  opponents,  including  nearly  all  the  shipping 
interests,  asserted  that,  so  long  as  foreign  ship  owners^  were  not 
under  similar  restrictions,  the  bill  would  ruin  the  American  Mer 
chant  Marine.  Of  the  actual  workings  of  this  law  there  has  really 
been  no  fair  test,  as  conditions  which  arose  during  the  war  un 
settled  the  entire  shipping  situation. 

The  domestic  program  of  the  first  year  and  a  half^of  the  Wilson 
Administration  comprised,  then  a  long-needed  and  immeasurably 
valuable  reform  of  the  banking  and  currency  system,  a  revised 
tariff,  which  was  at  least  a  technical  victory  for  Democratic 
principles,  and  a  number  of  minor  measures  which  seem  less 
important  in  retrospect  than  they  did  at  the  time.  The  program 
neither  completely  unshackled  business  nor  opened  the  door  to  a 
new  era  of  cooperation  and  human  brotherhood,  but  it  was  a 
large  and  on  the  whole  decidedly  creditable  accomplishment,  and 
it  was  above  all  the  work  of  President  Wilson,  who  had  led  the 
fight  that  carried  the  Administration  measures  through  Congress, 
quite  as  any  Prime  Minister  might  have  done.  He  had  not  done 
it  without  exposing  himself  to  severe  criticism.  Ex-Senator  Win- 

21 


throp  Murray  Crane,  for  example,  declared  that  he  had  "virtually 
obliterated  Congress."  But  he  had  got  most  of  what  he  wanted, 
and  by  the  end  of  his  first  year  in  office  Mr.  Bryan  was  no  longer 
the  most  powerful  individual  in  the  Democratic  Party./ 

Foreign  *Polides>  1913-1914 

7"N  The  North  American  Review  for  March,  1913,  edited  by 
A  Colonel  George  Harvey,  the  original  Wilson  man,  who  had 
mentioned  Wilson  as  a  Presidential  possibility  back  in  1904, 
when  such  a  suggestion  was  regarded  as  only  a  playful  eccen 
tricity,  who  had  begun  to  work  hard  for  him  in  191 1,  and  who  had 
finally  been  asked  by  Wilson  himself  to  give  up  his  activity  be 
cause  the  connection  of  one  of  Harvey's  magazines  with  J.  P. 
Morgan  &  Co.  was  hurting  Wilson  in  the  West — there  appeared 
an  article  entitled  "Jefferson — Wilson:  A  Record  and  a  Forecast." 
It  consisted  of  eight  pages  of  quotations  from  Wilson's  "History 
of  the  American  People,"  dealing  with  the  beginning  of  Jefferson's 
Administration.  The  reader's  attention  was  arrested  by  the 
startling  parallel  between  the  division  in  the  Federalist  Party  and 
the  quarrel  between  Hamilton  and  Adams  that  facilitated  Jeffer 
son's  election,  and  the  situation  which  led  to  W7ilson's  victory  in 
November,  19^2.  Wilson,  writing  a  dozen  years  before  the  fight 
between  Taft  and  Roosevelt,  had  unconsciously  drawn  a  parallel 
closer  perhaps  than  the  facts  warranted;  and  the  reader  who  had 
been  attracted  by  this  similarity  read  on  into  Wilson's  characteri 
zation  of  Jefferson  an  introduction  to  the  achievements  of  his 
Administration  with  a  growing  hope — if  he  happened  to  be  a 
Wilson  man — that  after  as  before  election  Wilson's  record  would 
duplicate  Jefferson's. 

Colonel  Harvey  was  as  good  a  prophet  in  1913  as  in  1904. 
\Yi!son's  achievement  in  domestic  affairs  in  the  first  year  of  his 
Administration  was  not  likely  to  suffer  much  by  comparison  with 
Jefferson's.  But  it  could  not  have  crossed  anybody's  mind  in 
March,  1913,  that  complications  of  international  politics  such  as 
had  almost  ruined  the  country  under  Jefferson  would  in  the  latter 
part  of  Wilson's  first  term  expose  him  to  as  much  criticism  as 
Jefferson,  and  for  the  same  reasons. 

America  was  still  new  as  a  world  power,  but  was  beginning  to 
feel  more  at  home.  In  Taft's  Administration^  with  Philander  C. 
Knox  as  Secretary  of  State,  there  had  been  tor  the  first  time  the 
beginnings  of  what  might  fairly  be  called  a  consistent  foreign 
policy.  True,  it  was  not  a  very  lofty  policy,  nor  was  it  by  any 
means  generally  approved  in  America.  It  was  called  by  its 
friends  ".dollar  diplomacy"  meaning  tJbe^promotion  of  American  .. 
commerciajjnteresjs_jij^^  It  had  been  ex- 

pnncipally  in   Central  America,  where  its  operations 

22 


Landmarks  in  Wilson's  Mexican  Policy 

Program  for  armistice  and  elections  to  end  civil  war,  August, 


"Watchful  waiting"  1913-14. 

Capture  of  Vera  Cruz,  April  21  ', 

ABC  mediation,  April  25,  1914. 

Flight  of  Huerta,  July,  1914. 

Recognition  of  Carranza,  September,  /9/5- 

Villa  's    raid   on    Columbus    and   Pershing  s    expedition    into 

Mexico,  March,  1916. 
Flight  and  death  of  Carranza,  May,  1920. 


had  not  always  commanded  admiration,  and  in  China,  where 
Knox  had  made  a  well-intentioned  but  not  very  skillful  effort  to 
prevent  the  absorption  of  Manchuria  by  Russia  and  Japan. 

However  primitive  this  organization  of  foreign  policy,  none  the 
less  Taft  and  Knox  had  taken  a  great  step  forward  in  the 
improvement  of  American  diplomatic  machinery.  The  diplo 
matic  service  and  the  State  Department  were  beginning  to  be 
regarded  as  two  parts  of  the  same  agency,  and  for  the  first  time 
diplomacy  had  begun  to  be  a  career  with  possibilities.  The 
practice  of  promoting  able  young  secretaries  to  chiefs  of  legation, 
begun  by  Roosevelt,  had  been  widely  extended  by  Taft;  and 
though  the  highest  posts  were  still  filled  by  wealthy  amateurs  it 
seemed  that  at  last  the  American  diplomatic  service  offered  some 
attraction  to  an  ambitious  man.  It  was  the  general  expectation 
in  Europe  and  still  more  in  America  that  President  Wilson,  who 
by  training  and  inclination  might  be  expected  to  approve  of  the 
elevation  of  standards  in  the  diplomatic  service,  would  continue 
and  extend  this  work.  Instead  of  that,  he  undid  it,  or  rather  per 
mitted  it  to  be  undone. 

Mr.  Bryan  had  of  necessity  been  made  Secretary  of  State,  and 
it  may  be  supposed  that  there  was  equal  necessity  for  opening  up 
the  diplomatic  service  as  a  happy  hunting  ground  for  the  Bryan 
men — "deserving  Democrats,"  as  Mr.  Bryan  called  them  in  a 
famous  letter.  The  chief  European  posts,  to  which  the  Taft 
Administration  had  not  begun  to  apply  the  merit  system,  were 
filled  chiefly  by  Mr.  Wilson's  own  nominees.  These  included 
several  well-known  men  of  letters,  and  with  one  or  two  exceptions 
the  amateur  diplomats  serving  as  the  heads  of  the  missions  in 
Europe  did  satisfactory  and  even  brilliant  service  under  the  un 
precedented  strain  which  the  war  brought  on  them.  The  service 
in  Latin  America,  however,  which  Knox  had  almost  entirely 

23 


professionalized,  was  given  over  bodily  to  personal  followers  of 
Bryan.  In  what  was  in  1913  perhaps  the  most  important  of  our 
diplomatic  posts,  the  embassy  to  Mexico,  Mr.  Wilson  was  com 
pelled  to  rely  provisionally  on  Henry  Lane  Wilson,  a  holdover 
appointee  from  the  previous  Administration. 

It  was  soon  made  clear  that  there  was  to  be  no  more  dollar 
/  diplomacy.  The  Knox  policies  in  Central  America  were  dropped — 
although  American  troops  continued  to  dominate  ,  Nicaragua — 
and  in  1914  the  Administration  successfully  discouraged  American 
participation  in  a  six-power  loan  to  China.  The  Russo-Japanese 
absorption  of  Manchuria  was  to  be  treated  as  the  accomplished 
fact  that  it  was;  and  in  general  the  policy  of  the  new  Adminis 
tration  was  anything  but  aggressive.  It  would  not  use  diplomacy 
to  advance  American  commercial  interests,  nor  was  it  prepared  to 
accept  the  assistance  of  American  financiers  in  promoting  the 
policies  of  diplomacy. 

But  it  was  evident  from  the  outset  that  the  most  quiescent 
foreign  policy  could  not  prevent  foreign  complications.  Growing 
anti-Japanese  sentiment  in  California  led  to  the  passage  of  a  State 
lav/  against  Japanese  land  holdings.  There  was  much  resentment 
in  Japan,  and  protest  was  made  to  the  Federal  Government.  Mr. 
Bryan,  as  Secretary  of  State,  had  to  make  a  personal  trip  to 
Sacramento  to  intercede  with  the  Californians;  and  at  one  time 
(May,  1913)  military  men  appeared  to  feel  that  the  situation  was 
extremely  delicate.  But  the  crisis  passed  over,  the  Californians 
modified  the  law,  and  though  in  its  amended  form  it  suited  neither 
the  Californians  nor  the  Japanese,  the  issue  remained  in  the  back 
ground  during  the  more  urgent  years  of  the  war.  Toward  the 
very  end  of  the  Wilson  Administration  it  was  to  come  back  into 
prominence. 

Another  question  which  caused  much  disturbance  to  the  new 
Administration  was  the  question  of  Panama  Canal  tolls.  An  act 
passed  in  1912  had  exempted  American  coastwise  shipping  passing 
through  the  canal  from  the  tolls  assessed  on  other  vessel's,  and  the 
British  Government  had  protested  against  this  on  the  ground  that 
it  violated  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  which  had  stipu 
lated  that  the  canal  should  be  open  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations  "on 
terms  of  entire  equality."  Other  nations  than  England  had  an 
interest  in  this  question,  and  there  was  a  suspicion  that  some  of 
them  were  even  more  keenly  if  not  more  heavily  interested;  but 
England  took  the  initiative  and  the  struggle  to  save  the  exemption 
was  turned,  in  the  United  States,  into  a  demonstration  by  the 
Irish,  Germans  and  other  anti-British  elements.  Innate  hostility 
to  England,  the  coastwise  shipping  interests,  formed  the  back 
bone  of  the  opposition  to  any  repeal  of  this  exemption,  but  the 
Taft  Administration  had  held  that  the  exemption  did  not  conflict 
with  the  treaty  (on  the  ground  that  the  words  "all  nations" 
meant  all  nations  except  the  United  States),  and  British  oppo- 

24 


sition  to  the  fortification  of  the  canal,  as  well  as  the  attitude  of  a 
section  of  the  British  press  during  the  Canadian  elections^of  1911, 
had  created  a  distrust  of  British  motives  which  was  heightened 
by  the  conviction  of  many  that  the  Hay-Pauncefcte  treaty  had 
been  a  bad  bargain. 

It  was  understood  early  in  President  Wilson's  Administration 
that  he  believed  the  exemption  was  in  violation  of  the  treaty, 
but  not  until  October  did  he  make  formal  announcement  that  he 
intended  to  ask  Congress  to  repeal  it.  The  question  did  not 
come  into  the  foreground,  hov/ever,  until  March  5,  1914,  when  the 
President  addressed  this  request  to  Congress  in  ominous  language, 
which  to  this  day  remains  unexplained.  "No  communication  I 
addressed  to  Congress,"  he  said,  "has  carried  with  it  more  grave 
and  far-reaching  implications  to  the  interests  of  the_  country. " 
After  expressing  his  belief  that  the  law  as  it  stood  violated  the 
treaty  and  should  be  repealed  as  a  point  of  honor,  he  continued: 
"I  ask  this  of  you  in  support  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Ad 
ministration.  I  shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with  other  matters 
of  even  greater  delicacy  and  nearer  consequence  if  you  do  not 
grant  it  to  me  in  ungrudging  measure." 

It  has  been  most  plausibly  suggested  that  this  obscure  language 
had  reference  to  the  Mexican  situation,  which  a  few  weeks 
later  was  to  lead  to  the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz.  The  European 
powers  were  known  to  be  much  displeased  at  the  continuing  dis 
turbances  in  Mexico  and  the  American  policy  of  "watchful 
waiting,"  and  the  belief  has  been  expressed  that  repeal  of  the 
exemption  was  a  step  to  get  British  support  for  continued  for 
bearance  with  Mexico.  Other  critics  have  seen  a  reference  to  the 
unsettled  issues  with  Japan  and  a  fear  that  England  might  give 
more  aggressive  support  to  her  ally  if  the  tolls  question  were  left 
unsettled.  The  attempt  of  a  writer  of  biography  to  maintain 
that  even  in  March,  1914,  the  President  and  Colonel  House  fore 
saw  the  European  war  and  wanted  to  arrange  our  own  inter 
national  relations  by  way  of  precaution  has  been  generally 
received  with  polite  skepticism. 

At  any  rate,  the  President's  intervention  in  the  question,  against 
the  advice  of  his  most  trusted  political  counselors,  brought  down 
on  him  a  shower  of  personal  abuse  from  Irish  organs  and  from 
the  group  of  newspapers  which  presently  were  to  appear  as  the 
chief  supporters  of  Germany.  The  arguments  against  the  repeal 
were  unusually  bitter,  and  even  though  Elihu  Root  took^  his 
stand  beside  the  President  and  against  the  recent  Republican 
Administration,  partisan  criticism  seized  upon  the  opening. 
Nevertheless  the  tolls  exemption  was  repealed  in  June,  and  events 
of  July  and  August  gave  a  certain  satisfaction  to  those  who  had 
stood  for  the  sanctity,  of  treaties. 

As  a  part  of  what  might  be  called  the  general  deflation  of  over 
seas  entanglements,  the  new  Administration  brought  i:.bout  a 

25 


material  change  in  the  treatment  of  the  Philippines.  From  the 
beginning  great  changes  were  made  in  the  personnel  of  the  Philip 
pines  Commission  and  of  the  Administration  of  the  country. 
Many  American  officials  were  replaced  by  Filipinos,  but  the 
separatist  agitation  in  the  islands  was  not  much  allayed  by  the 
extension  of  self-government.  In  October,  1914,  the  Jones  Bill, 
which  practically  promised  independence  "as  soon  as  a  stable 
government  shall  have  been  established,"  was  passed  by  the  House 
of  Representatives,  but  Republican  opposition  was  strengthened 
by  those  who  remembered  Bryan's  anti-imperialism  in  1900  and 
by  the  supporters  of  a  strong  policy  in  the  Pacific.  This  issue,  like 
others  of  the  early  period,  came  back  into  greater  prominence  in 
the  last  years  of  the  second  Wilson  Administration,  when  war 
issues  were  temporarily  disposed  of. 

A  specially  conciliatory  policy  toward  Latin  America  was  one 
of  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  early  period  of  the  Administra 
tion.  At  the  Southern  Commercial  Congress  in  Mobile,  on 
October  27,  1913,  the  President  declared  that  "the  United  States 
will  never  seek  one  additional  foot  of  territory  by  conquest;" 
a  statement  which  was  understood  in  direct  relation  to  the  demand 
for  intervention  in  Mexico,  and  which  had  a  very  considerable 
effect  on  public  sentiment  in  Central,  and  South  America.  The 
passing  of  "dollar  diplomacy,"  too,  was  generally  satisfactory  to 
Latin  America,  and,  though  Mr.  Bryan's  inexperienced  diplomats 
made  a  good  many  blunders  and  could  not  help,  as  a  rule,  being 
compared  unfavorably  with  the  professionals  who  had  held  the 
Latin-American  posts  in  the  previous  Administration,  the  general 
rclicy  of  Wilson  created  much  more  confidence  in  the  other  two 
Americas  than  did  the  spasmodic  aggressiveness  of  Roosevelt  or 
the  commercialized  diplomacy  of  Taft. 

One  specific  attempt  was  made  to  heal  a  sore  spot  left  by  Roose 
velt  in  relations  with  Latin  America  by  the  new  Administration. 
Negotiations  with  Colombia  to  clear  up  the  strained  situation 
left  by  the  revolution  in  Panama  had  been  under  way  in  the  Taft 
Administration,  but  had  q^me  to  nothing.  Under  Wilson  they 
were  resumed,  and  on  Aprif  7,  1914,  a  treaty,  was  signed  by  which 
the  United  States  was  to  pay  to  Colombia  a  compensation  of 
$25,000,000  for  Colombian  interests  in  the  Isthmus.  The  treaty 
further  contained  a  declaration  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  expressed  its  "sincere  regret  for  anything  that  may 
have  happened  to  disturb  the  relations"  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  and  this  suggestion  of  an  apology  for  Roosevelt's  action  in 
1903  roused  the  violent  hostility  of  Republicans  and  Progressives. 
The  opposition  was  so  strong  that  in  spite  of  repeated  efforts  the 
Administration  could  never  get  the  treaty  ratified  by  the  Senate; 
but  the  undoubtedly  sincere  efforts  of  the  Executive  had  of 
themselves  a  considerable  effect  in  mollifying  the  suspicions  of 
Latin  America. 

26 


But  all  problems  south  of  the  Isthmus  were  insignificant  com 
pared  with  the  difficulties  in  Mexico  which  had  begun  with  the 
Madero  Revolution  against  Diaz  in  1910.  Just  at  the  close  of  the 
Taft  Administration  Madero  had  been  overthrown  and  killed  by 
Huerta,  who  then  ruled  in  Mexico  City  and  was  recognized  by 
England  and  Germany  in  the  Spring  of  1913.  Villa  and  Carranza 
were  in  arms  against  Huerta  in  the  north,  calling  themselves  the 
champions  of  the  Constitution;  Orozoco  and  Zapata  were  in  arms 
against  everybody  in  the  south;  foreign  life  and  property  were 
unsafe  everywhere  except  in  the  largest  cities.  The  demand  for 
intervention,  which  had  been  strong  ever  since  the  troubles  began, 
was  increasing  in  1913.  Huerta  professed  to  be  holding  office  only 
until  a  peaceful  election  could  determine  the  will  of  the  nation, 
but  the  date  of  that  peaceful  election  had  to  be  constantly  put 
off.  The  embargo  on  shipments  of  arms  from  the  United  States 
still  existed,  preventing  Huerta  from  supplying  his  troops;  but 
there  was  a  good  deal  of  smuggling  to  the  revolutionary  armies  in 
the  north.  Of  the  interventionists  some  wanted  intervention 
against  Huerta  and  some  wanted  intervention  for  Huerta;  and  the 
pressure  of  economic  interests  in  Mexico  v/as  complicating  all 
phases  of  the  situation. 

From  the  first  President  Wilson  had  expressed  his  disapproval 
of  the  methods  by  which  Huerta  had  attained  office.  Ambassador 
Wilson,  on  the  other  hand,  thought  that  Huerta  ought  to  be 
supported,  and  when  his  policy  did  not  commend  itself  to  the 
President  he  resigned  in  August,  1913.  But  already  the  President 
had  been  getting  information  •  about  Mexico  from  extra-official 
sources.  His  first  envoy  was  William  Bayard  Hale,  author  of 
one  of  his  campaign  biographies.  Ambassador  Wilson  ^  was  vir 
tually  replaced  in  August  by  another  special  representative,  John 
Lind,  who  carried  to  Huerta  the  proposals  of  President  Wilson 
for  solution  of  the  Mexican  problem.  They  included  a  definite 
armistice,  a  general  election  in  which  Huerta  should  not  be  a 
candidate,  and  the  agreement  of  all  parties  to  obey  the  Govern 
ment  chosen  by  this  election,  which  would  be  recognized  by  the 
United  States.  Huerta  refused  and  presently  dissolved  Congress. 
When  the  elections  were  finally  held  on  October  2  Huerta  won, 
and  there  was  no  doubt  that  he  would  have  won  no  matter  how 
the  voting  had  happened  to  go. 

The  President's  program  for  Mexican  reform,  it  may  be  said, 
was  not  as  evidently  impracticable  in  1913  as  it  seems  in  ret 
rospect.  It  was  widely  criticised  at  the  time,  and  the  phrase 
"wafchTui  waiting"  which  he  invented  as  a  description  of  his 
Mexican  Policy  was.  made  the  object  of  much  ridicule.  Through 
out  the  first  winter  of  the  new  Administration  the  American 
Government  was  apparently  waiting  for  something  to  happen  to 
Huerta  or  for  Huerta  to  reform,  and  President  Wilson  several 
times  sharply  criticised  the  actions  of  the  Mexican  dictator.  But 

27 


Huerta  did  not  reform  and  nothing  sufficient  happened  to  him; 
it  began  to  look  as  if  watchful  waiting  might  continue  indefinitely 
when  a  trivial  incident  furnished  the  last  straw. 

A  boatload  of  American  sailors  from  the  warships  anchored 
off  Tampico  to  protect  American  citizens  had  been  arrested  by 
the  Mexican  military  authorities.  They  were  released,  with 
apologies,  but  Admiral  Mayo  demanded  a  salute  to  the  American 
flag  by  way  of  additional  amends,  and  when  Huerta  showed  a 
disposition  to  argue  the  matter  the  Atlantic  Fleet  was  (April  14, 
1914)  ordered  to  Mexican  waters.  A  week  later,  as  negotiations 
had  failed  to  produce  the  salute,  the  President  asked  Congress  to 
give  him  authority  to  use  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States 
"against  Victoriano  Huerta."  There  was  much  criticism  of  the 
policy  which  had  endured  serious  material  injuries  for  more  than 
a  year  to  threaten  force  at  last  because  of  a  technical  point  of 
honor,  and  besides  those  who  did  not  want  war  at  all  the  President 
found  himself  opposed  by  many  Congressmen  who  thought  that 
the  personal  attack  on  Huerta  was  rather  undignified,  and  that 
the  President  should  have  asked  for  a  downright  declaration  of  war. 

While  Congress  was  debating  the  resolution  the  American 
naval  forces  (on  April  21)  seized  the  Vera  Cruz  Custom  House  to 
prevent  the  landing  of  a  munition  cargo  from  a  German  ship. 
This  led  to  sharp  fighting  and  the  occupation  of  the  entire  city, 
General  Funston  with  a  division  of  regulars  was  sent  to  relieve 
the  naval  landing  parties;  and  war  seemed  inevitable.  Even  the 
Mexican  revolutionaries  showed  a  tendency  to  prefer  Huerta  to 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States.  But  on  April  25  the  Govern- 
ments  of  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  proposed  mediation,  which 
Wilson  and  Huerta  promptly  accepted.  A  conference  met  at 
Niagara  Falls,  Ontario,  and  through  May  and  June  endeavored 
to  reach  a  settlement  not  only  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  but  between  the  various  Mexican  factions.  The  Presi- 
dent  was  still  attempting  to  carry  out  his  policy  of  August,  1913, 
and  the  chief  obstacle  was  not  Huerta,  but  Carranza,  who  had 
refused  to  consent  to  an  armistice  and  for  a  long  time  would  not 
send  delegates  to  Niagara  Falls.  Meanwhile  Huerta  made  one 
concession  after  another.  Watchful  waiting  had  indeed  ruined 
him;  for  President  \Vilson's  opposition  had  made  it  impossible 
for  him  to  get  any  money  in  Europe — and  in  the  early  part  of 
1914  some  European  nations  v/ould  still  have  considered  Mexico 
a  good  risk.  Moreover,  from  February  to  April  the  embargo  on 
arms  had  been  lifted,  and  the  Constitutionalists  armies Jg  the 
north,  munitioned  from  the  United  States,  were  steaaif|^con- 
quering  the  country.  On  July  15  Huerta  resigned,  and  soon  after 
ward  sailed  for  Spain;  and  on  August  20  Carranza  entered  Mexico 
City. 

Despite  the  criticism  that  had  been  heaped  on  the  President's 
handling  of  the  Tampico- Vera  Cruz  affair,  he  had  got  rid  of 

28 


Huerta  without  getting  into  war.  A  still  more  important  con 
sequence,  the  full  eftect  of  which  was  not  immediately  apparent, 
was  the  enormous  increase  in  the  confidence  felt  by  Latin  America 
in  the  good  intentions  o'f  the  Wilson  Administration.  The  ac 
ceptance  of  A-B-C  mediation  in  1914  made  possible  the  entry  of 
most  of  the  Latin-American  powers  into  the  European  War  in 
1917  as  allies  of  the  United  States.  And  for  a  time  it  was  to  appear 
as  if  this  had  been  about  the  only  tangible  profit  of  the  episode; 
for  Carranza  presently  proved  almost  as  troublesome  as  Huerta. 
The  Fall  of  1914  saw  the  outbreak  of  a  new  civil  war  between 
Villa  and  Carranza,  in  which  Zapata,  Villa's  ally,  for  a  long  time 
held  Mexico  City.  Obregon's  victories  in  1915  drove  Villa  back 
to  his  old  hunting  grounds.  / 

By  this  time  the  European  war  was  occupying  most 
attention  of  the  American  people,  but  Mexico  was  a  constant 
irritant.  Carranza  carried  the  Presidential  art  of  biting  the  hand 
that  fed  him  V>  an  undreamed-of  height.  Wilson,  Villa  and 
Obregon  had  enabled  him  to  displace  Huerta,  and  Obregon  had 
saved  him  from  Villa.  Yet  he  had  quarreled  with  Villa,  he  was 
eventually  to  quarrel  with  Obregon;  and  though  the  United  States 
and  the  "chief  Latin-American  powers  had  given  him  formal 
recognition  in  September,  1915,  his  policy  toward  W7ilson  con 
tinued  to  be  blended  of  insult  and  obstruction.  Henry  Prather 
Fletcher,  the  ablest  of  the  diplomats  accredited  to  Latin-American 
capitals,  had  been  called  back  from  Santiago  de  Chile  to  represent 
the  United  States  in  Mexico;  but  despite  his  skill,  despite  the 
infinite  forbearance  of  the  Administration,  Mexico  sank  deeper 
and  deeper  into  misery,  foreign  lives  and  property  were  unsafe 
throughout  most  of  the  country,  and  there  was  a  continuing 
succession  of  incidents  on  the  border. 

These  were  the  fault  of  bandits,  chiefly  of  Villa,  whose  repeated 
murders  of  American  citizens  led  to  futile  attempts  to  get  satis 
faction  out  of  Carranza.  The  culmination  of  these  outrages  came 
on  March  9,  1916,  when  Villa  raided  across  the  border,  surprised 
the  garrison  of  Columbus,  N.  M.,  and  killed  some  twenty  Ameri 
cans.  A  punitive  expedition  of  regulars  under  General  Pershmg 
was  promptly  organized.  It  pushed  about  200  miles  into  Mexico, 
destroyed  several  small  parties  of  Villistas,  and  wounded  Villa 
himself.  But  it  did  not  catch  him  nor  any  of  his  principal  leaders, 
and  in  April  outlying  parties  of  Americans  came  into  skirmishing 
with  Carranza  forces  at  Parral  and  Carrizal.  It  was  evident  that 
further  advance  meant  war  with  Carranza;  and  indeed  much 
American  sentiment  aroused  by  the  capture  of  American  soldiers 
by  Carranzistas,  demanded  war  already.  But  relations  with 
Germany  were  very  acute  at  the  moment,  so  Pershing  dug  in  and 
held  his  position  throughout  the  Summer  and  Fall.  In  May  the 
National  Guard  was  ordered  out  to  protect  the^  border,  and  re 
mained  in  position  for  months  without  taking  active  steps. 

29 


President  Wilson's  Appeals  for  Mediation 


Formal  offer  of  mediation  to  all  belligerents  August  5, 
German  proposal  of  peace  conference  ',  December  12, 
President's  appeal  to  the  belligerents  to  state  their  tet  ms,  Decem 

ber  18,  1916. 

German  refusal  to  state  terms,  December  26,  1916. 
Allied  statement  of  war  aims,  January  n,  1017. 
President's  "peace  without  victory"  speech,  January  22,  /p//. 
Notification  of  unrestricted  submarine  war,  January  jf,  I9I7- 
Diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  broken,  February  j,  I9I7- 
Declaration  of  war,  April  6,  /<?//. 


The  Mexican  policy  of  the  Administration  was  one  of  the  chief 
points  of  attack  during  the  campaign  of  1916,  but  the  re-election 
of  President  Wilson  and  the  progress  of  events  in  Europe  presently 
threw  the  issue  into  the  background.  In  February  and  March, 
1917,  when  war  with  Germany  seemed  inevitable,  the  expedition 
ary  force  under  Pershing  was  recalled. 

Carranza's  pro-Germanism,  or  rather  anti-Americanism,  was 
hardly  disguised  during  the  war,  and  the  confiscatory  policy  of 
his  Administration  in  dealing  with  foreign  oil  and  mineral  prop 
erties  threatened  to  do  much  damage  to  American  interests. 
When  the  war  in  Europe  had  ended,  the  question  of  Mexico  once 
more  came  back  to  the  foreground  of  attention.  Carranza's  Ad 
ministration  had  not  been  stained  by  so  much  guilt  as  Huerta's, 
and  the  opposition  to  it  was  on  the  scale  of  banditry  rather  than 
revolution;  but  Mexico  was  far  worse  off  after  years  of  the  war 
than  it  had  been  in  1913,  and  disregard  of  American  rights  was 
still  the  cardinal  policy  of  the  Government.  Carranza's  security, 
however,  was  illusory.  In  the  Spring  of  1920  Presidential  elec 
tions  were  announced  at  last,  and  Carranza'a  attempt  to  force 
Ygnacio  Bonillas,  his  Ambassador  in  Washington,  into  the  Presi 
dential  chair  led  to  a  revolt  which  eventually  attracted  the  leader 
ship  of  Obregon.  Carranza  fled  from  Mexico  City  and  was  murdered 
on  May  22,  1920,  and,  after  the  interim  Presidency  of  Adolfo  de 
la  Huerta,  Obregon  came  into  office  in  the  Fall. 

The  European  War,  1914-1916 


in  the  last  week  of  July,  1914,  a  war  of  unparalleled 
intensity  and  magnitude  suddenly  fell  upon  a  world  which 
for  forty  years  had  been  enjoying  unprecedented  well-being 
and  security,  the  practically  unanimous  sentiment  of  Americans 
was  gratitude  that  we  were  not  involved.    The  President's  first 


30 


Federal  ^Reserve 

WE  must  have  a  currency,  not  rigid 
as  now,  but  readily,  elastically 
responsive  to  sound  credit,  the  ex 
panding  and  contracting  credits  of 
everyday  transactions,  the  normal  ebb 
and  flow  of  personal  and  corporate 
dealings.  Our  banking  laws  must 
mobilize  reserves;  must  not  permit  the 
concentration  anywhere  in  a  few  hands 
of  the  monetary  resources  of  the  coun 
try  or  their  use  for  speculative  pur 
poses  in  such  volume  as  to  hinder  or 
impede  or  stand  in  the  way  of  other 
more  legitimate,  more  fruitful  uses.— 
From  the  President's  Address  to  Con 
gress,  April  23, 191 3. 


T    .        -      1010  Courtesy  New  York  Ti 

July   3,    1912:    Governor   Wilson    receiving   congratulations    from    newspaper 
correspondents  on  his  nomination   for  the  Presidency 


steps,  a  formal  proclamation  of  neutrality  and  equally  formal  tender 
of  mediation  to  the  belligerents,  "either  now  or  at  any  other 
time  that  might  be  thought  more  suitable,"  had  general  approval. 

But  a  sharp  division  of  sentiment  showed  itself  when,  on  August 
1 8,  he  issued  an  address  to  the  American  people  warning  against 
partisan  sympathies  and  asking  that  Americans  be  "  impartial  in 
thought  as  well  as  in  action,"  in  order  that  the  country  ^might  be 
"neutral  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name."  The  great  ^majority  of  the 
American  people,  or  of  such  part  of  it  as  held  opinions  on  public 
questions,  had  already  made  up  their  minds  about  the  war,  and 
most  of  the  others  were  in  process  of  being  convinced.  Some  of 
them  had  made  up  their  minds  from  racial  sympathies,  but  others 
had  thought  things  out.  And  among  these  last,  particularly, 
there  was  a  revolt  against  the  assumption  that  in  the  presence  of 
such  issues  any  impartiality  of  thought  was  possible. 

Moreover,  the  world-wide  extent  of  the  war?>  and  the  closer 
inter-relations  of  nations  which  had  grown  up  in  recent  years, 
made  almost  from  the  first  a  series  of  conflicts  between  the  in 
terests  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  one  or  the  other  set  of 
belligerents.  Preservation  of  neutrality  against  continual  petty 
infractions  was  hard,  and  was  rendered  harder  by  the  active 
sympathy  felt  for  the  different  belligerents  by  many  Americans. 
A  further  complication  came  from  the  growing  feeling  that  Amer 
ica's  military  and  naval  forces  were  far  from  adequate  for  pro 
tection  in  a  world  where  war  was  after  all  possible.  The  Autumn 
of  1914  saw  the  beginningfor  better  national  preparedness,  and 
counter  to  that  the  rise  of  organized  peace-at-any-price  sentiment 
which  from  the  first  drew  much  support  from  pro-German  circles. 

The  President  appeared  to  incline  toward  the  pacifists.  ^  He 
called  the  discussion  of  preparedness  "good  mental  exercise, "^ 
and  referred  to  some  of  its  advocates  as  "nervous  and  excitable," 
and  in  the  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1914,  he  took  the 
position  that  American  armaments  were  quite  sufficient  for 
American  needs.  In  this  it  was  apparent  that  he  was  opposed  by 
a  large  part  of  the  American  people;  how  large  no  one  could  yet 
say.  But  the  Congressional  elections  of  1914  had  conveyed  a 
warning  to  the  Democrats.  They  were  left  with  a  majority  in 
both  houses,  but  the  huge  preponderance  obtained  m  1912  had 
disappeared.  And  the  reason  was  even  more  alarming  than  the 
fact;  the  Progressive  Party  almost  faded  off  the  map  in  the 
election  of  1914.  Most  of  the  voters  who  had  been  Republicans 
before  the  Chicago  Convention  of  1912  were  Republicans  once/ 
again.  Of  the  Progressive  Party,  there  was  nothing  much  left  but 
the  leaders,  and  many  of  these  were  obviously  thinking  of  going 
back  to  the  old  home. 

The  Government  had  already  had  occasion  to  protest  against 
British  interference  with  allied  commerce  when,  on  February  4, 
1915,  the  Germans  proclaimed  the  waters  about  the  British  Isles 

33 


a  war  zone  open  to  submarine  activities.  The  President  promptly 
warned  the  German  Government  that  it  would  be  held  to  "strict 
accountability''  if  American  ships  were  sunk  or  American  lives 
lost  in  the  submarine  campaign.  Along  with  this  a  message  was 
sent  to  the  British  Government  protesting  against  British  restric 
tion  of  neutral  commerce.  There  was  good  ground  for  objection 
to  the  practices  of  both  Governments,  and  the  simultaneous 
protests  ^emphasized  the  neutral  attitude  of  the  United  States. 
Not  until  later  was  it  evident  that  to  the  Germans  this  policy 
seemed  to  indicate  the  possibility  of  putting  pressure  on  England 
through  America. 

"Strict  accountability"  seemed  to  be  a  popular  watchword, 
except  among  pacifists  and  German  sympathizers,  but  Americans 
soon  began  to  be  killed  by  the  submarines  without  provoking  the 
Government  to  action.  When  the  Lusitania  v/as  sunk  on  May  7, 
1915,  and  more  than  a  hundred  of  the  1,200  victims  were  Americans 
a  great  part  of  the  nation  which  had  been  growing  steadily  more 
exasperated  felt  that  now  the  issue  must  be  faced.  The  President 
was  the  personal  conductor  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Adminis 
tration;  Mr.  Bryan's  sole  interest  in  foreign  affairs  seemed  to  be 
the  conclusion  of  a  large  number  of  polite  and  valueless  treaties 
of  arbitration,  and  it  was  certain  that  with  Germany,  as  with 
Mexico,  the  President  would  deal  in  person.  In  the  few  days 
after  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  the  nation  waited  confidently 
for  the  President's  leadership,  and  public  sentiment  was  perhaps 
more  nearly  unanimous  than  it  had  been  for  eight  months  past, 
or  was  to  be  again  for  two  years  more. 

The  President's  note  on  May  13  met  with  general  approval. 
It  denied  any  justification  for  such  acts  as  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania,  and  warned  the  Germans  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  not  "omit  any  word  or  act"  to  defend  the 
rights  of  its  citizens.  But  some  of  the  effect  of  that  declaration 
had  already  been  destroyed  by  a  speech  the  President  had  made 
two  days  before,  in  which  he  had  said  that  "there  is  such  a  thing 
as  a  man  being  too  proud  to  fight,"  and  the  Germans,  it  was 
learned  presently,  had  been  still  further  reassured  by  a  declaration 
of  Mr.  Bryan  (entirely  on  his  own  authority)  to  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  that  the  note  was  intended  only  for  home  con 
sumption. 

At  any  rate,  the  note  was  not  followed  by  action.  Throughout 
the  whole  Summer  the  President  maintained  a  correspondence 
\vith  the  Germans,  distinguished  by  patient  reasoning  on  his  part 
and  continual  shiftings  and  equivocations  on  theirs.  Meanwhile 
nothing  was  done;  the  public  sentiment  of  the  first  days  after  the 
Lusitania  had  been  sunk  had  slackened;  division  and  dissension 
had  returned  and  redoubled.  Pacifism  was  more  active  than  ever 
and  German  agents  were  spreading  propaganda  and  setting  fire 
and  explosives  to  munition  plants.  Mr.  Bryan,  who  apparently 

34 


alone  in  the  country  was  fearful  that  the  President  might  need 
lessly  involve  the  nation  in  war,  resigned  as  Secretary  of  State  on 
June  8.  Aside  from  a  certain  relief,  the  public  almost  ignored  his 
passing;  the  man  who  had  been  the  strongest  leader  of  the  party 
in  March,  1913,  had  in  the  last  two  years  sunk  almost  into  ob 
scurity.  Attention  was  now  concentrated  on  the  policy  which 
the  President,  whose  new  Secretary  of  State,  Robert  Lansing, 
was  hardly  more  than  a  figurehead,  was  pursuing  toward  Germany. 

In  August  two  more  American  passengers  were  drowned  in  the 
sinking  of  the  liner  Arabic,  and  in  other  submarine  exploits  of 
the  Summer  a  number  of  American  seamen  lost  their  lives. 
President's  persistence  at  last  had  the  effect  of  getting  from  the  Ger 
mans,  on  September  i,  a  promise  to  sink  no  more  passenger  ^boats, 
and  on  October  5  they  made  a  formal  expression  of  regret  for  the 
Arabic  incident.  Meanwhile  some  of  the  acts  of  sabotage  against 
American  industries  had  been  traced  back  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Embassy,  and  the  Ambassador,  Dr.  Dumba,  was  sent  home 
in  September.  A  few  months  later  Papen  and  Boy-Ed,  the 
Military  and  Naval  Attaches  of  the  German  Embassy,  followed 
him  for  a  similar  reason. 

But  the  German  outrages  continued,  and  so  did  the  submarine 
sinkings,  though  these  were  now  transferred  to  the  Mediterranean 
and  Austria  was  put  forward  as  the  guilty  power.  Also,  nothing 
had  been  done  about  the  Lusitania.  The  country  had  apparently 
been  divided  by  internal  discords.  The  condition  which  the 
President  had  hoped  to  prevent  by  his  appeal  for  "impartiality 
in  thought  as  well  as  in  action"  had  come  about.  ^Alsp,  the 
danger  of  war  had  revealed  the  inadequacy  of  America's  military 
establishment,  and  a  private  organization,  whose  moving  spirit 
was  General  Leonard  Wood,  had  undertaken  to  supply  the  de 
iiciencies  of  the  Government  by  establishing  officers'  training 
camps.  Toward  Wood  and  his  enterprise  the  Government  seemed 
cold,  and  he  was  reprimanded  by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  per 
mitting  Colonel  Roosevelt  to  make  an  indiscreet  speech  at  the 
training  camp  at  Plattsburg.  But  when  Congress  assembled  m 
December  the  President  deplored  and  denounced  that  new  appear 
ance  in  American  public  life,  the  hyphenate,  and  urged  upon 
Congress  that  military  preparation  which  he  had  derided  a  year 
before. 

Congress,  it  was  soon  evident,  was  far  less  convinced  than  the 
President  that  anything  had  happened  during  1915.  In  December, 
1915,  and  in  January,  1916,  Mr.  Wilson  made  a  speaking  tour 
through  the  East  and  Middle  West  in  support  of  his  new  policy. 
His  demand  for  a  navy  "incomparably  the  most  adequate  in  the 
world,"  which  Mr.  Daniels  translated  into  the  biggest  navy  in  the 
world,  aroused  some  doubts  in  the  minds  of  the  public  as  to  where 
the  Administration  thought  the  chief  danger  lay,  and  German 
influences  did  their  best  during  the  Winter  to  stir  up  anti-British. 


35 


sentiment  in  Congress — the  more  easily  since  the  controversy  over 
British  interference  with  American  commerce  was  still  unsettled. 
Eventually,  and  largely  as  a  result  of  the  President's  speaking 
tour,  Congress  adopted  a  huge  naval  program,  which  was  destined 
to  remain  on  paper  for  some  years.  Military  reform,  however, 
had  a  different  fate.  The  President  had  supported  the  policy 
favored  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  Lindley  M.  Garrison,  of  supple 
menting  the  regular  line  by  a  federalized  "Continental  army"  of 
400,000  men.  The  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  led  by 
James  Hay,  would  not  hear  of  this  and  insisted  on  Federal  aid  to 


Senator  Glass  on  Woodrow  Wilson 

If  is  my  considered  judgment  that  Woodrow  Wilson  will  take  a 
place  in  history  among  the  very  foremost  of  the  great  men  who 
have  given  direction  to  the  fortunes  of  the  nation.  No  President  \ 
of  the  United  States,  from  the  beginning  of  the  Republic ',  ever 
excelled  him  in  essential  preparation  for  the  tasks  of  the  office. 
By  a  thorough  acquisition  of  abstract  knowledge,  by  clear  and 
convincing  precept  and  by  a  firm  and  diligent  practical  applica 
tion  of  the  outstanding  principles  of  statecraft,  no  occupant  of 
the  Executive  (hair  up  to  his  advent  was  better  furnished  for  a 
notable  administration  of  public  affairs.  And  Wilson  s  Ad-, 
ministration  has  been  notable.  Its  achievements,  in  enumera 
tion  and  importance,  have  never  been  surpassed;  and  it  may 
accurately  be  said  that  most  of  the  things  accomplished  were  of 
the  President's  own  initiative. 

Of  the  President's  personal  traits  and  characteristics  I  cannot 
as  confidently  speak  as  those  persons  whose  constant  and  inti 
mate  association  with  him  has  given  them  observation  of  his 
moods  and  habits.  To  me  he  always  has  been  the  soul  of 
courtesy  and  frankness.  Dignified,  but  reasonably  familiar; 
tenacious  when  sure  of  his  position,  but  not  hard  to  persuade  or 
to  convince  in  a  cause  having  merit,  I  have  good  reason  to  be 
incredulous  when  I  hear  persons  gabble  about  the  unwillingness 
of  President  Wilson  to  seek  counsel  or  accept  advice.  For  a 
really  great  man  who  must  be  measurably  conscious  of  his  own 
intellectual  power,  he  has  repeatedly  done  both  things  in  an 
astonishing  degree  during  his  Administration;  and  when  cer 
tain  of  a  man  s  downright  honesty,  I  have  never  known  any 
body  who  could  be  readier  to  confide  serious  matters  implicitly 
to  a  coadjutor  in  the  public  service. 

CARTER  GLASS 
Written  for  The  New  York  Times, 
February  18,  1921. 

36 


the  National  Guard.  The  President,  declaring  that  he  could  not 
tell  a  Congressional  committee  that  it  must  take  his  plan  or  none, 
appeared  to  be  ready  to  give  in  to  Hay,  and  Garrison  resigned  in 
protest.  Hay  had  his  way,  and  Garrison  was  succeeded _by  Newton 
D.  Baker,  previously  regarded  as  inclined  to  the  pacifist  side  of 
the  controversy. 

Meanwhile  the  submarine  issue  was  still  an  issue.  Little  satis 
faction  had  been  obtained  for  events  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  in 
March  the  Sussex,  a  cross-Channel  passenger  boat,  was  torpedoed 
in  plain  violation  of  the  German  promise  of  September  i.  There 
followed  another  interchange  of  notes,  but  the  usual  German 
efforts  to  deny  and  evade  were  somewhat  more  clumsy  than  usual. 
On  April  19  the  President  came  before  Congress  and  announced 
that  "  unless  the  Imperial  Government  should  now  immediately 
declare  and  effect  an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of 
submarine  warfare  against  passenger  and  freight  carrying  vessels" 
diplomatic  relations  would  be  broken  off.  The  threat  had  its 
effect;  the  Germans  yielded,  grudgingly  and  in  language  that 
aroused  much  irritation,  but  on  the  main  question  they  yielded 
none  the  less,  and  promised  to  sink  no  more  merchantmen  with 
out  warning. 

During  this  crisis  the  President  had  had  to  contend  with  a 
serious  revol  t  in  Congress,  which  took  the  form  of  the  Gore  Resolu 
tion  in  the  Senate  and  the  McLemore  resolution  in  the  House, 
warning  American  citizens  off  armed  merchantmen.  The  Presi 
dent  took  the  position  that  this  was  a  surrender  of  American 
rights,  and  upon  his  insistence  both  resolutions  were  brought  to  a 
vote  and  defeated.  The  Lusitania  question  was  still  unsettled, 
but  on  the  general  issue  of  submarine  war  the  Germans  had  at 
last  given  way  to  the  President's  demand,  and  through  most  of 
1916  the  submarine  issue  was  in  the  background.  _ 

During  the  year  there  was  a  continuation  of  diplomatic  action 
against  the  British  Government's  interference  with  neutral  com 
merce  and  with  neutral  mails.  But,  aside  from  the  comparative 
unimportance  of  these  issues  beside  the  submarine  assassinations,  , 
the  Lusitania  and  similar  episodes  had  stirred  up  so^  much  indig-  * 
nation  that  not  many  Americans  were  seriously  interested  in 
action  against  England  which  could  only  work  to  the  advantage 
of  Germany.  The  year  saw  the  institution  of  the  Shipping  Board, 
which  was  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  American  merchant 
marine  brought  into  being  by  the  war.  and  also  some  efforts  to 
extend  American  commerce  in  South  America.  Of  more  eventual 
importance  for  Latin-American  relations  was  the^  necessity  for 
virtually  superseding  the  Government  of  the  Dominican  Republic, 
which  had  become  involved  in  civil  war  and  financial  difficulties, 
by  an  American  Naval  Administration,  as  had  been  done  in  Haiti 
the  year  before. 

The  principal  domestic  event  of  the  year  was  the  threatened 

37 


railroad  strike,  which  came  at  the  end  of  the  Summer.  The 
President  summoned  the  heads  of  the  four  railroad  brotherhoods 
and  the  executives  of  the  railroad  lines  to  Washington  for  a  con 
ference  in  August,  and  attempted  without  success  to  bring  them 
to  an  agreement.  A  program  to  which  he  eventually  gave  his 
approval  provided  for  the  concession  by  the  employers  of  the 
basic  eight-hour  day,  with  other  issues  left  over  until  the  working 
of  this  proposal  could  be  studied.  The  railroad  executives  refused 
this,  and  while  the  negotiations  were  thus  at  a  deadlock  it  became 
known  that  the  brotherhoods  had  secretly  ordered  a  strike  begin 
ning  September  4.  To  avert  this  crisis  the  President  asked  Con 
gress  to  pass  a  series  of  laws  accepting  the  basic  eight-hour  day, 
providing  for  a  commission  of  investigation,  and  forbidding  further 
strikes  pending  Government  inquiry. 

None  of  these  proposals  except  the  eight-hour  day,  the  center 
of  the  whole  dispute,  met  the  approval  of  the  brotherhoods,  and 
none  of  them  except  the  eight-hour  day  and  the  commission  of 
investigation  was  adopted.  But,  with  A.  B.  Garreston,  of  the 
Brotherhood  of  Conductors,  holding  a  stopwatch  in  the  gallery, 
Congress  hastily  passed  these  laws  and  the  strike  was  called  off. 

The  eight-hour  issue  was  the  last  item  on  the  record  on  which 
President  Wilson  came  up  for  re-election  in  the  Fall  of  1916. 
Despite  the  single-term  plank  in  the  Democratic  platform  of 

1912,  it  had  been  evident  long  before  the  end  of  Mr.  Wilson's 
first  term  tha't  he  was  the  only  possible  candidate.     In  March, 

1913,  he  had  seemed  almost  like  an  outside  expert  called  in  for 
temporary  service  in  readjusting  some  of  the  problems  of  public 
life;  he  was  by  no  means  the  leader  of  the  party.    But  long  before 
Bryan  resigned  in  alarm  at  the  tendencies  of  a  foreign  policy  over 
which  the  Secretary  of  State  had  no  control  the  President  had  be 
come  the  leader  of  the  party,  and  by  1916  he  was  almost  the  only 
leader  of  prominence. 

In  the  record  on  which  the  electorate  was  to  express  its  judg 
ment  only  a  minor  place  was  taken  by  the  issues  which  had 
seemed  of  such  importance  in  1913.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act 
had  already  proved  its  value  so  well  that  it  was  being  taken  as  a 
matter  of  course,  and  people  were  forgetting  that  they  had  ever 
had  to  depend  on  a  currency  which  ran  for  cover  in  every  crisis 
and  on  a  banking  system  where  each  bank  was  a  source  of  weak 
ness  to  its  neighbors  instead  of  strength.  What  effect  the  Under 
wood-Simmons  Tariff  and  other  measures  of  the  first  year  might 
have  had  on  American  business  no  man  could  say,  for  conditions 
created  by  the  war  had  left  America  the  only  great  producer  in 
a  world  of  impatient  consumers  whose  wants  had  to  be  met  at 
any  price. 

Mexico,  which  had  provided  the  most  pressing  problem  in 
foreign  affairs  during  the  Taft  Administration,  was  still  an  un 
solved  problem  in  1916,  and  more  disturbing  than  ever.  The 

38 


I 

1 

i 

^ 

'•Personal  Messages  to  Congress 

I  AM  very  glad,  indeed,  to  have  this 

opportunity   to   address    the   two 

Houses  directly  and  to  verify  for  my 

self  the  impression  that  the  President 

of  the  United  States  is  a  person,  not  a 

mere  department  of  the  Government 

hailing  Congress  from  some    isolated 

island  of  jealous  power,  sending  mes 

sages,  not  speaking  naturally  and  with 

his  own  voice  —  that  he  is  a   human 

being  trying  to  cooperate  with  other 

human  beings  in  a  common  service 

After  this  pleasant  experience  I  shall 

feel  quite  normal  in  all  our  dealings 

with  one  another.  —  From  the  President's 

I 

First  Address  io  Congress,  April  8,  1913 

1 

jLj  L1L= 

I 

_j 

I 


ma 


President  had  indeed  avoided  war  with  Mexico,  but  had  become 
involved  in  two  invasions  of  the  country  and  in  an  expensive 
mobilization.  During  the  1916  election  the  nation  had  in  Mexico 
most  of  the  drawbacks  of  war  without  any  of  the  possible  benefits. 
In  forcing  out  Huerta  the  President  had  indeed  won  a  notable 
diplomatic  triumph,  but  he  had  not  succeeded  either  in  winning 
greater  security  for  American  life  and  property  or  in  getting  a 
Mexican  Government  more  disposed  to  good  relations  with  the 
United  States;  and  the  Republicans  maintained  that  war  had 
been  avoided  only  at  the  sacrifice  of  both  American  prestige  and 
American  interests. 

But  Mexico,  despite  the  emphasis  placed  upon  it  by  the  Republi 
cans,  was  a  secondary  issue  in  the  campaign  of  1916.  The  great 
issue  was  the  conduct  of  American  relations  with  Germany,  and 
the  ultimate  Republican  failure  in  the  election  may  be  laid  pri 
marily  to  the  inability  of  the  Republican  Party  to  decide  just 
where  it  stood  on  the  main  issue. 

The  President  had  in  this  field  also  won  a  diplomatic  victory. 
Like  his  victory  over  Huerta,  it  was  more  apparent  than  real,  for 
the  submarines  were  still  active,  and  even  during  the  campaign 
several  incidents  occurred  which  looked  very  much  like 
violations  of  the  German  promise  made  in  May.  The  most 
serious  incident,  that  of  the  Lusitania,  was  still  unsettled  and  the 
opponents  of  the  President  charged  him  with  having  bought  peace 
with  Germany,  like  peace  with  Mexico,  at  the  cost  of  national 
interest  and  honor.  Still  the  technical  victory  in  the  submarine 
negotiations  had  remained  with  the  President,  and  he  had  suc 
ceeded  in  winning  at  least  a  nominal  recognition  of  American  rights 
without  going  into  a  war  which,  as  every  one  realized,  would  be  a 
much  more  serious  enterprise  than  an  invasion  of  Mexico.  German 
propaganda  and  terrorist  outrages,  which  had  been  so  serious  in 
1915,  fell  off  materially  in  1916  largely  on  account  of  the  energetic 
work  of  the  Department  of  Justice,  which  had  sent  some  of  the 
most  prominent  conspirators  to  jail  and  driven  others  out  of  the 
country.  But  a  considerable  section  of  the  population  had  made 
up  its  mind  that  Germany  was  already  an  enemy  and  was  dis 
satisfied  with  the  President's  continual  efforts  to  preserve  impar 
tiality  of  thought  as  well  as  of  action. 

The  President  was  renominated  at  the  Democratic  Convention 
in  St.  Louis,  and  the  platform  expressed  a  blanket  endorsement 
of  the  achievements  of  his  Administration.  But  the  chief  incident 
of  that  convention  was  the  keynote  speech  of  Martin  H.  Glynn, 
which  was  based  on  the  text,  "He  kept  us  out  of  war."  His 
recital  of  the  long  list  of  past  occasions  in  American  history  when 
foreign  violations  of  American  rights  and  injuries  to  American 
interests  had  not  led  to  war  was  received  with  uproarious  enthu 
siasm  by  the  convention  and  completely  overturned  the  plans 
which  had  been  made  by  the  Administration  managers  to  empha- 

41 


size  the  firmness  of  the  President  in  defense  of  American  rights. 

But  the  Republicans  presently  gave  that  issue  back  to  them. 
The  party  passed  over  Colonel  Roosevelt;  the  memory  of  1912 
was  still  too  bitter  to  permit  the  old-line  leaders  to  accept  him. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Colonel  and  his  following  had  to  be  con 
ciliated,  so  the  Republican  Convention  nominated  Charles  E. 
Hughes,  who  had  viewed  the  party  conflict  of  1912  from  the 
neutrality  of  the  Supreme  Court  bench.  The  Progressive  Party 
duly  had  its  convention  and  nominated  Roosevelt;  and  when 
Roosevelt  announced  that  Hughes's  views  on  the  preservation  of 
American  interests  were  satisfactory  and  that  the  main  duty  was 
to  beat  Wilson,  a  good  many  Progressives  followed  the  Colonel 
back  into  camp.  A  rump  convention,  however,  nominated  a  Vice 
Presidential  candidate,  and  virtually  went  over  to  Wilson. 

Justice  Hughes's  views  on  public  issues  were  not  known  before 
he  was  nominated,  and  on  the  great  issue  of  the  campaign  they 
were  never  very  clearly  known  until  after  the  election,  when  it 
was  too  late.  He  had  strong  opinions  on  Democratic  misgovern- 
ment  and  maladministration  and  outspoken  opinions  on  Mexico, 
but  whenever  he  tried  to  say  anything  about  the  war  in  Europe 
he  used  up  most  of  his  energy  clearing  his  throat.  A  large  element 
in  the  American  people,  which  was  influential  out  of  proportion 
to  its  numbers  because  it  included  most  of  the  intelligent  classes 
and  most  of  the  organs  of  public  opinion,  felt  that  the  President 
had  been  too  weak  in  the  face  of  German  provocation.  To  this 
element,  chiefly  in  the  East,  Colonel  Roosevelt  appealed  with  his 
denunciation  of  German  aggression  and  of  the  President's  tem 
porizing  with  Germany;  but  Colonel  Roosevelt  was  not  running 
for  President.  There  was  another  minority,  considerably  smaller 
and  far  less  reputable,  which  consisted  of  bitter  partisans  of  the 
German  cause.  This  minority  was  fiercely  against  the  President 
because  he  had  dared  to  challenge  Germany  at  all;  and  though 
Mr.  Hughes  gave  it  no  particular  encouragement,  it  supported 
him  because  there  was  nobody  else  to  support. 

So,  in  the  Eastern  States,  where  anti-German  sentiment  was 
strongest,  the  Democrats  advocated  the  re-election  of  Wilson  as 
the  defender  of  American  rights  against  foreign  aggression, 
while  in  the  West  he  was  praised  as  the  man  who  had  endured 
innumerable  provocations  and  "kept  us  out  of  war."  When 
Hughes  swept  everything  in  the  East,  it  was  confidently  assumed 
on  election  night  that  Wrilson  had  been  repudiated  by  the  country; 
but  later  reports  showed  that  the  East  was  no  longer  symptomatic 
of  the  country's  sentiment.  For  three  days  the  election  was  in 
doubt.  It  was  finally  decided  by  California,  where  the  Republican 
Senator  whom  Hughes  had  snubbed  was  re-elected  by  300,000 
majority,  while  the  Democratic  electoral  ticket  won  by  a  narrow 
margin.  Wilson  had  carried  almost  everything  in  the  West. 


42 


Those  parts  of  the  country  which  lay  further  away  irom 
and  European  interests  had  re-elected  him  because  he  had 
us  out  of  War.'* 


^Mediation  Efforts, 

'T  T  has  been  stated  by  Count  von  Bernstorff  that,  if  Hughes 
JL    had  been  elected,  President  Wilson  would  immediately  hav< 
resigned,    along   with    the   Vice    President,    after    appointing 
Hughes  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  order  to  give  the  President-e 
an  opportunity  to  come  into  office  at  once  and  meet  the  urgent 
problems  already  pressing  on  the  Executive.    Whether  the  -Presi 
dent  actually  entertained  any  such  intention  or  not,  it  would  h; 
been  a  logical  development  of  his  theory  of  the  Chief  Executive  as 
Premier.  -'But  the  President-Premier  had  received  a  vote  of  confi 
dence,  and  was  free  to  deal  with  the  new  situation  created  by 
various  peace  proposals  of  the  Winter  of  1916-1917. 
tiations    which    followed    during    December    and    Januar     were 
obscure  at  the  time  and  are  by  no  means  clear  even  yet.  ^   J 
fullest  account  of  them  is  that  of  Bernstorff,  whose  personal  inter 
est  in  vindicating  himself  v/ould  make  him  a  somewhat  unreliable 
witness  even  if  there  were  nothing  else  against  him.     And  :it  tn 
time,  when  the  President's  motives  were  unknown  to  a  puplu 
which  had  not  his  advantage  of  information  as  to  what  was  going 
to  happen  in  Europe,  almost  every  step  which  he  took  was  miscon 
strued,  and  his  occasional  infelicities  of  language  aroused  suspi 
cions  which  later  events  have  shown  to  be  entirely  unjustified. 

Reports  of  American  diplomats  in  the  Fall  of  1916  mdu 
that  the  party  in  Germany  which  favored  unrestricted  submarine 
war  without  consideration  for  neutrals  was  growing  in  strength. 
It  was  opposed  by  most  of  the  civilian  officials  of  the  Government, 
including  the  Chancellor,  Bethmann  Hollweg;    Jagow  and  Zim- 
mermann,  the  successive  Foreign  Secretaries,  and  Bernstorii,  the 
Ambassador  in  Washington.    But  the  Admirals  who  supported  : 
were  gradually  winning  over  the  all-powerful  Generals  Hindenburg 
and  Ludendorff,  and  it  appeared  only  a  question  of  time  until  tJ 
promise  to  America  of  May,  1916,  should  be  broken.     And,  as 
Bernstorff  has  expressed  it,  the  President  realized  after  the  . 
note  there  could  be  no  more  notes;   any  future  German  aggression 
would  have  to  be  met  by  action  or  endured  with  meekness. 

In  these  circumstances  the  President  was  driven  to  seek  oppor-, 
tunity  for  the  mediation  which  he  had  been  ready  to  otter,  i 
asked,  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.    But  to  offer  mediation, 
so  long  as  the  war  was  undecided,  was  a  matter  of  extreme  delicacy. 
The  majority  of  intelligent  Americans  were  strong  partisans  c 
the  allied  cause  and  firmly  believed  that  tiiat  cause  was  bound  ' 
win  in  the  long  run.    There  was  a  minority  which  had  equal  sym 
pathy  for  Germany  and  equal  confidence  in  her  ultimate  success. 

43 


To  offer  mediation  while  the  war  was  still  undecided  would  have 
been  to  offend  both  of  these  elements,  as  well  as  the  warring 
nations  themselves,  all  of  which  were  still  confident  of  victory. 
Specifically,  to  offer  mediation  during  the  course  of  the  Presi 
dential  election  would  have  been  to  drive  over  to  Hughes  all  the 
pro-Ally  elements  in  America,  which  in  the  state  of  mind  of  1916 
would  have  seen  in  such  a  proposal  only  a  helping  hand  extended 
to  a  Germany  whose  cause  was  otherwise  hopeless. 

So,  though  during  1916  the  President  would  have  welcomed  a 
request  for  mediation,  he  did  not  dare  suggest  it  on  his  own 
account.  And  neither  side  dared  to  propose  it,  for  such  a  request 
would  have  been  taken  as  an  admission  of  defeat.  Nineteen 
hundred  and  sixteen  was  an  indecisive  year,  but  the  fortune  of 
war  gave  now  one  side  and  now  the  other  the  conviction  that  a 
few  months  more  would  bring  it  to  complete  victory.  In  such 
circumstances  the  losers  dared  not  make  a  proposal  which  would 
hearten  their  enemies  and  the  victors  would  not  suggest  the  stop 
ping  of  the  war  when  they  hoped  that  a  few  months  more  would 
see  them  in  a  much  more  favorable  position. 

But  by  December  Germany's  situation  was  more  fortunate 
than  at  any  time  since  the  early  Summer.  Rumania,  which  had 
come  into  the  war  three  months  before,  had  been  defeated  and 
overrun  in  a  spectacular  campaign  which  had  brought  new  pres- 


A  Sympathetic  Tribute 

Hamilton  Holt^head  of  a  delegation,  that  visited  the  White 
House  on  October  27,  1920,  in  connection  with  the  campaign 
advocating  our  entry  into  the  League  of  Nations,  said  in  the 
course  of  his  address  to  President  Wilson: 

"It  was  you  who  first  focused  the  heterogeneous  and  often 
diverse  aims  of  the  war  on  the  one  ideal  of  pure  Americanism, 
which  is  democracy.  It  was  you  who  suggested  the  basis  on 
which  peace  was  negotiated.  It  was  you,  more  than  any  man, 
who  translated  into  practical  statesmanship  the  age-old  dream 
of  the  poets,  the  prophets  and  the  philosophers  by  setting  up  a 
league  of  nations  to  the  end  that  cooperation  could  be  sub 
stituted  for  competition  in  international  affairs. 

"  These  acts  of  statesmanship  were  undoubtedly  the  chief 
factors  which  brought  about  that  victorious  peace  which  has 
•  shorn  Germany  of  her  power  to  subdue  her  neighbors,  has  com 
pelled  her  to  make  restitution  for  her  crimes,  has  freed  oppressed 
peoples,  has  restored  ravaged  territories,  has  created  new  democ 
racies  in  the  likeness  of  the  United  States,  and  above  all  has 
set  up  the  League  of  Nations!' 


44 


tige  to  the  German  armies.  The  triumph  was  of  more  value  in 
appearance  than  in  reality,  for  no  decision  had  been  reached  on 
the  main  fronts  and  none  of  the  chief  belligerents  was  willing  to 
give  up.  Germany  was  under  a  terrible  strain,  and  the  civilian 
Government  concluded  that  the  end  of  1916  offered  an  opportunity 
to  make  a  peace  proposal,  without  loss  of  prestige,  which  might 
lead  to  a  settlement  of  the  war  that  would  leave  Germany  sub 
stantially  the  victor.  For  it  was  known  that  unless  some  such 
decisive  result  were  soon  attained  the  military  party  ^  would  un 
loose  the  submarines  in  the  effort  to  win  a  complete  victory,  and 
thereby  bring  about  complications  too  serious  for  the  civilian 
officials-  to  contemplate  with  any  sense  of  security. 

So  on  Dec.  12  Bethmann  Hollweg  proposed  a  peace  conference. 
He  mentioned  no  terms  which  Germany  would  consider;  he  spoke 
in  the  arrogant  tones  of  a  victor;  and  the  total  effect  of  his  speech 
was  to  convince  the  world  that  he  was  trying  to  influence  the 
pacifist  elements  in  the  allied  countries  rather  than  to  bring  about 
an  end  of  the  war.  But  his  step  caused  profound  uneasiness  in 
Washington,  for  he  had  anticipated  the  action  which  the  President 
had  long  been  considering.  If  Mr.  Wilson  could  not  have  offered 
mediation  before  the  election,  he  might  have  tried  it  in  November 
had  not  the  German  deportation  of  Belgian  workingmen  just  then 
aroused  such  a  storm  of  anti-German  feeling  in  America  that  it 
would  hare  been  unsafe  to  take  a  step  which  public  opinion  would 
have  generally  regarded  as  favorable  to  Germany.  Now  that 
Bethmann  Hollweg  had  anticipated  him,  it  was  evident  that  any 
proposal  which  the  President  might  make  would  be  regarded  as  a 
sort  of  second  to  the  German  motion. 

Nevertheless,  the  situation  was  urgent,  and  the  President  seems 
to  have  felt  that  his  interposition  could  perhaps  accomplish  some 
thing  which  the  German  initiative  could  not.  Golonel  House  in 
the  last  tw@  years  had  made  a  number  of  trips  to  Europe  as  a  sort 
of  super-Ambassador  to  all  the  powers  in  the  endeavor  to  find  out 
what  their  Governments  regarded  as  suitable  terms^  of  peace. 
Mr.  Wilson's  own  interest  lay  first  of  all  in  the  establishment  of 
conditions  that  would  reduce — or,  as  men  would  have  said  in  1916, 

Erevent — the  possibility  of  future  wars.  On  May  27,  1916,  he 
ad  delivered  a  speech  before  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  in 
which  he  favored  the  formation  of  an  international  association- 
for  the  delay  or  prevention  of  wars  and  the  preservation  of  the 
freedom  of  the  seas.  Later  speeches  contained  doctrines  most  of 
which  were  eventually  written  into  the  League  covenant,  and  were 
based  on  the  central  theory  that  all  nations  must  act  together  to 
prevent  the  next  war,  as  otherwise  they  would  all  be  drawn  into  it. 
On  Oct.  26  he  had  declared  that  "this  is  the  last  war  the  United 
States  can  ever  keep  out  of." 

Yet  the  President  also  had  ideas  on  the  nature  of  the  ^peace 
terms  by  which  the  war  then  going  on  should  be  concluded, 

45 


The  United  States  in  the  War 

Declaration  of  war,  April  6,  /p/7- 

American  warships  in  European  waters ',  May  4, 

First  Liberty  Loan  offered,  May  14,  1917. 

Selective  Service  act  operative ',  May  18,  1917. 

First  American  troops  in  France,  July  i,  1917. 

Fourteen  Points  speech,  January  o,  1918. 

"Force  to  the  utmost"  speech,  April  6,  1918. 

Americans  in  action  at  Cantigny,  May  28,  1918. 

Chateau-Thierry ',  June  1-5,  1918. 

Marne-Aisne  offensive,  July  I  ^-August,  1918. 

St.  Mihiel  offensive,  September  12,  1918. 

Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  September  26-November  n,  1918, 

Austrian  peace  proposal,  September  75,  1918. 

First  German  peace  note,  October  4,  1918. 

Armistice  ending  the  war,  November  77, 


though  he  felt  that  no  good  could  be  obtained  by  the  proposal  of 
such  terms  from  a  neutral.  On  Dec.  18,  accordingly,  he  addressed 
the  belligerent  Governments  with  an  invitation  to  state  the  spe 
cific  conditions  which  each  of  them  regarded  as  essential  to  a  just 
peace,  in  the  hope  that  they  would  find  they  were  nearer  agree- 

J  ment  than  they  knew.  Unfortunately,  the  President  iade  the 
observation  that  the  objects  of  the  two  alliances,  "as  stated  in 
general  terms  to  their  own  people  and  the  world,"  were  "virtually 
the  same."  That  was  true;  each  side  had  said  that  it  was  fighting 
in  self-defense  in  order  to  preserve  international  justice,  the  rights 
of  nationalities,  and  a  number  of  other  worthy  interests.  But  the 
public,  both  in  America  and  in  the  allied  countries,  saw  in  this 
renewed  effort  at  "impartiality  of  thought  as  well  as  of  action"  an 
indication  that  the  President  saw  no  moral  difference  between 
the  two  sides.  From  that  moment  any  good  result  of  the  Presi- 

""*  dent's  suggestion,  in  America  or  in  the  allied  countries,  was  out  of 
the  question;  and  if  any  hope  had  remained,  the  Germans  pres 
ently  destroyed  it.  They  wanted  a  peace  conference  with  no 

I  terms  stated  beforehand,  where  they  could  play  on  the  divergent 
interests  of  the  allied  countries;  nor  did  they  want  the  President 
to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  making  of  peace,  lest,  as  Bethmann 
Hollweg  expressed  it  to  Bernstorff,  the  Germans  should  be  "robbed 
of  their  gains  by  neutral  pressure."  So  the  German  reply  on 
Dec.  26  politely  observed  that  a  direct  conference  between  the 
belligerents  would  seem  most  appropriate,  which  conference  the 
German  Government  proposed.  For  the  general  idea  of  a  League 
of  Nations  the  Germans  expressed  their  approval,  but  they 
wanted  peace  of  their  own  kind  first. 

46 


The  allied  reply  was  delayed  until  Jan.  n,  but  at  least  it  met 
the  President's  request  for  details.  It  laid  down  the  specifications 
of  what  the  allied  powers  would  regard  as  a  just  peace,  and  the 
bulk  of  that  program  was  eventually  to  be  written  into  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  But  at  the  time,  of  course,  it  was  evident  that  the 
belligerents  were  further  from  agreement  than  they  thought,  or 
at  any  rate  than  the  President  thought.  Of  such  terms  Germany 
would  hear  nothing;  nor  would  her  Government  give  to  the  Pres 
ident,  even  in  confidence,  its  own  idea  of  the  specifications  of  a  just 
peace. 

So  the  President,  determined  to  carry  out  his  program  in  spite  of 
all  obstacles,  finally  went  before  the  Senate  on  Jan.  22,  1917,  and 
laid  down  some  general  considerations  of  what  he  thought  a  just 
peace  should  be  like.  It  was  the  logical  next  step  in  his  effort  to 
stop  the  war  before  America  should  become  involved,  but  it  was 
taken  under  conditions  which  made  success  impossible.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Germans  had  already  decided  to  resume  the 
unrestricted  submarine  war;  the  decision  had  been  taken  on 
Jan.  9,  but  was  not  to  be  announced  till  Jan.  31.  Moreover,  in 
America  and  the  allied  countries  public  sentiment  was  unprepared 
for  anything  like  the  speech  of  Jan.  22.  Few  people  in  the  United 
States  realized  the  danger.  Mr.  Lansing  had  followed  upon  the 
December  note  with  a  statement  to  correspondents  that  if  the  war 
were  not  soon  stopped  America  might  be  drawn  into  it.  That  was 
the  fact,  but  it  depended  on  information  unknown  to  the  public; 
and  though  the  most  natural  inference  was  that  a  new  crisis  with 
Germany  was  at  hand  no  one  knew  exactly  how  to  take  it — par 
ticularly  as  Lansing,  on  orders  from  the  White  House,  hastened  to 
explain  that  he  had  been  misunderstood. 

Moreover,  the  President  was  still  desperately  striving  to  keep 
in  good  understanding  with  the  German  Government,  and  in 
pursuance  of  this  policy  James  W.  Gerard,  the  Ambassador  to 
Germany,  had  declared  at  a  dinner  in  Berlin  on  Jan.  6  that  the 
relations  between  America  and  Germany  had  never  been  better 
than  they  were  at  that  moment.  This,  also,  the  public  in  the 
United  States  found  it  hard  to  understand.  If  Lansing's  reference 
to  the  danger  of  war  had  meant  anything,  what  did  this  mean  ? 

So  the  President's  address  to  the  Senate  on  Jan.  22  did  not  and 
could  not  have  the  reception  that  he  hoped.  He  set  forth  his  idea 
of  the  necessity  of  a  League  of  Nations,  he  declared  that  the  peace 
must  be  based  on  democratic  principles  and  on  the  doctrine  that 
was  to  become  famous  before  long  under  the  name  of  self-determi 
nation.  There  must  be  no  more  forcible  conquests,  no  more  bar 
tering  of  unwilling  populations.  The  peace  that  ended  this  war, 
he  said,  must  be  guaranteed  by  a  League  of  Nations — of  all  nations; 
and  if  America  was  to  enter  that  League  she  must  be  assured  that 
the  peace  was  a  peace  worth  guaranteeing. 

So  far  every  one  might  have  followed  him,  in  America  at  least;, 

47 


but  the  President  called  such  a  peace  a  "peace  without  victory," 
and  to  the  supporters  of  the  Allies  in  America,  rendered  suspicious 
by  a  course  whose  motives  they  could  not  see,  that  meant  a  peace 
without  allied  victory  and  consequently  an  unjust  peace.  Few 
of  the  President's  public  addresses  have  been  more  unfavorably 
received. 

Wilson  had  stated  his  peace  terms — of  course,  only  in  general 
principles;  the  Allies  had  stated  theirs  in  detail.  Except  for  an 
article  in  a  New  York  evening  newspaper,  inspired  by  Bernstorff 
but  bearing  no  mark  of  authority,  the  German  terms  had  not  even 
been  suggested.  On  the  day  following  his  Senate  speech,  according 
to  Bernstorff,  the  President  volunteered  to  issue  a  call  for  an 
immediate  peace  conference  if  only  the  Germans  would  state  their 
terms.  But  they  did  not  state  them  until  the  29th,  when  a  note 
for  the  President's  private  information  detailed  a  program  which 
was  as  obviously  unacceptable  to  the  allied  powers  as  the  Allies' 
terms  were  to  the  Germans.  In  any  case  this  program  had  only 
an  academic  interest,  for  along  with  it  came  a  formal  notice  that 
unrestricted  submarine  war  would  begin  on  Feb.  i. 

The  German  Government  had  deliberately  broken  its  promises 
of  Sept.  i,  1915,  and  May  5,  1916.  Moreover,  that  Government, 
which  for  months  past  had  been  sending  the  President  private 
assurances  of  its  hearty  approval  of  his  efforts  toward  peace,  had 
by  its  intrusion  and  its  refusal  to  deal  openly  wrecked  those  efforts 
when  at  last  he  had  brought  them  to  a  head.  There  was  only  one 
thing  to  do,  and  the  President  did  it.  On  Feb.  3  he  announced  to 
Congress  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 

But  breaking  of  relations  did  not  mean  war.  The  President 
told  Congress  that  if  the  threat  against  American  lives  and  prop 
erty  conveyed  by  the  resumption  of  submarine  war  were  followed 
by  overt  acts  of  actual  injury  to  Americans  he  would  come  before 
Congress  once  more  and  ask  for  authority  to  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  protect  American  interests.  But  for  the  moment  he 
seems  to  have  felt  that  only  a  warning  was  necessary;  that  the 
Germans,  if  convinced  that  America  meant  business,  would 
reconsider  their  decision.  And  he  added,  "I  take  it  for  granted 
that  all  neutral  Governments  will  take  the  same  course."  Logically 
they  should  have  done  so,  since  the  proclamation  of  submarine 
war  was  virtually  a  declaration  of  war  on  all  neutrals;  but  the 
European  neutrals  did  not  dare  to  run  the  risk  even  if  they  had 
been  so  minded. 

The  submarines  set  to  work  and  more  ships  were  sunk,  some  of 
them  ships  with  American  passengers.  The  nation  began  to 
demand  war  to  end  an  impossible  situation.  For  the  moment  the 
President's  aspirations  were  more  moderate,  and  he  asked  Con 
gress  in  the  closing  days  of  his  first  term  for  authority  to  arm 
American  merchant  ships  for  defense  against  submarines.  The 
bill  readily  passed  the  House  and  commanded  the  support  of 

48 


9frra/  Credits 


"  I  "HE  farmers,  it  seems  to  me,  have 
occupied  hitherto  a  singular  posi 
tion  of  disadvantage.  They  have  not 
had  the  same  freedom  to  get  credit  on 
their  real  assets  that  others  have  had 
who  were  in  manufacturing  and  com 
mercial  enterprises,  and  while  they 
sustained  our  life,  they  did  not  in  the 
same  degree  with  some  others  share  in 
the  benefits  of  that  life. — From  Presi 
dent  Wilsons  remarks  on  signing  the 
Rural  Credits  Bill,  July  17,  1916. 


iJiHiiiimiiiiiimiNiiiiiimmiiimiiumiimiiiiiiimmimiiiiiiiimimiiiiiiiiiL: 


©  Paul  Thompson 

1918:    The   President  acknowledging  greetings   at 
a   militarv   review 


seven-eighths  of  the  Senate;  but  a  dozen  pacifists,  pro-Germans 
and  professional  obstructionists,  whom  the  President  denounced 
as  "a  little  group  of  willful  men,"  filibustered  it  to  death  in  the 
Senate  in  the  last  hours  of  the  session.  Almost  the  first  act  of  the 
President  after  his  inauguration,  however,  was  the  preparation  to 
arm  the  ships  by  Executive  authority. 

Meanwhile  secret  agents  had  discovered  an  attempt  by  the 
German  Foreign  Office  to  enlist  Mexican  and  Japanese  support  in 
the  prospective  war  against  America  by  promising  annexations  in 
the  Southwest  and  on  the  Pacific  Coast.  Publication  of  this  on 
March  i  converted  a  good  many  Americans  of  the  interior  who 
had  hitherto  been  slow  to  recognize  the  seriousness  of  the  German 
danger;  and  as  the  submarine  campaign  continued  and  no  Euro 
pean  neutrals  followed  the  American  example,  the  sentiment  in 
favor  of  declaration  of  war  grew  every  day. 

But  for  the  President  this  involved  considerable  logical  diffi 
culty.  From  the  first  he  had  striven  to  maintain  "impartiality  of 
thought,"  or  at  least  of  speech.  He  had  said  that  the  war  was  no 
concern  of  America's;  it  would  be  the  task  of  long  historical 
research  to  assign  the  responsibility  for  its  outbreak;  that  "with 
its  causes  and  objects  we  are  not  concerned.  The  obscure  founda 
tions  from  which  its  tremendous  flood  has  burst  forth  we  are  not 
interested  to  search  for  and  explore."  It  was  a  war  which  should 
be  ended  by  a  peace  without  a  victory.  Whatever  meaning  the 
President  attached  to  these  statements  when  he  made  them,  the 
meaning  attached  to  them  by  the  public  was  a  serious  obstacle* 
to  the  man  who  was  going  to  have  to  lead  the  nation  into  war.  But  : 
he  solved  the  dilemma  by  a  change  of  base  which  affected  the  whole 
political  complexion  of  the  war  thereafter,  which  introduced  a  new 
and  overriding  issue — an  issue  which,  addressing  Congress  on  April 
2,  he  introduced  to  the  world  in  his  most  famous  phrase  and  the 
most  effective  of  his  speeches.  America,  he  said,  had  no  quarrel  with 
the  German  people;  that^ people  had  not  made  the  war.  But  the 
Germans  were  ruled  by  an  autocratic  Government  which  had 
made  neutrality  impossible,  which  had  shown  itself  "the  natural 
foe  of  liberty."  That  Government  had  forced  America  to  take 
up  the  sword  for  the  freedom  of  peoples — of  all  peoples,  even  of 
the  German  people.  America  must  fight  "to  make  the  world  safe 
for  democracy."  On  April  6,  1917,  Congress  declared  war. 

^America  at  War,  iqiJ-igiS 

ONCE  committed  to  war,  the  President  found  behind  him  a 
nation  more  thoroughly  united  than  could  ever  have  been 
hoped  in  the  dark  days  of  1915. /  Again,  as  in  the  week  after 
the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  he  was  the  universally  trusted  leader* 
of  the  people;  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the  unity  of  the  nation 
at  the  entrance  into  war  could  be  traced  back  to  the  very  policies 

51 


of  delay  which  had  been  so  sharply  criticised.  The  people  who 
had  been  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  from  the  first  and  who  had  seen 
through  German  pretenses  long  before  were  now  solidly  behind 
the  President,  for  he  had  at  last  come  over  to  their  views.  But 
other  and  important  elements  which  might  have  been  hostile  two 
years  before  were  now  convinced  of  the  necessity  for  fighting  the 
Germans. 

And  the  President's  call  to  a  crusade  for  democracy  won  the 
support,  permanent  or  temporary,  of  many  of  those  liberals  who 
otherwise,  in  America  and  the  allied  countries,  were  inclined 
during  the  whole  war  to  see  in  the  Kaiser  and  Ludendorff  the 
natural  allies  of  liberalism.  There  was  a  feeling  of  great  ideas 
stirring  the  world  in  the  Spring  of  1917.  The  Russian  revolution 
had  just  overthrown  the  most  reactionary  and  apparently  the 
most  firmly  established  of  autocratic  Governments,  and  no  one  in 
Western  Europe  or  America  doubted  that  Russia  would  jump  in 
six  months  as  far  as  England,  France  and  America  had  painfully 
toiled  in  two  centuries,  and  become  and  remain  a  free  democracy. 
If  Russia  had  had  a  revolution,  might  not  Germany  have  a  revolu 
tion,  too?  Would  not  the  German  people,  whose  injuries  at  the 
hands  of  their  own  rulers  the  President  had  so  well  pointed  out, 
rise  up  and  overthrow  those  rulers  and  bring  about  a  just  and 
lasting  peace?.  Many  people  in  the  Spring  of  1917  expected 
exactly  that;  the  millennium  was  just  around  the  corner. 

Moreover,  it  seemed  that  perhaps  the  Allies  would  win  the  war 
in  the  field  before  America  could  get  into  it.  A  British  offensive 
in  Artois  had  important  initial  successes,  and  Nivelle's  bloody 
failure  on  the  Aisne  was  for  a  long  time  represented  to  the  world 
as  a  brilliant  victory.  War,  for  America,  might  involve  a  little 
expenditure  of  money,  but  hardly  any  serious  effort,  acccording  to 
the  view  widely  current  among  the  population  in  the  Spring  of 
1917;  it  was  more  than  anything  else  an  opportunity  for  the  display 
of  commendable  moral  sentiments,  and  for  enthusiastic  acclama 
tions  to  the  famous  allied  leaders  who  presently  began  to  come  to 
the  United  States  on  special  missions.  It  is  hardly  too  muchi* 
to  say  that  most  of  the  American  people  went  into  this  war  in  the 
triumphant  mood  usually  reserved  for  the  celebration  of  victory. 

It  may  some  day  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  chief  merits  of  the 
Wilson  Administration  that  it  was  not  affected  by  this  popular 
delusion.  While  a  large  part  of  the  people  seemed  to  expect  a 
cheap  and  speedy  victory  by  some  sort  of  white  magic,  the  Admin 
istration  was  getting  ready  to  work  for  victory.  And  thanks 
largely  to  the  unity  which  had  been  bought  by  the  President's 
caution  in  the  two  previous  years,  Congress  and  the  people  assented 
!/  to  measures  of  exertion  and  self-denial  such  as  no  man  could  have 
expected  America  to  undertake  until  compelled  by  bitter  experi 
ence. 

The/  first  step  was  the  dispatch  of  American  naval  forces  to  aid 


the  Allies  in  the  fight  against  the  submarines,  which  for  a  few 
months  were  to  come  dangerously  near  justifying  the  confidence 
that  had  been  placed  in  them.  The  process  of  naval  reinforcement 
was  slow,  and  not  till  1918  did  the  American  Navy  become  a 
really  important  factor  in  the  anti-submarine  campaign;  but 
every  destroyer  added  to  the  allied  forces  was  of  immediate  value. 
The  American  Treasury  was  opened  for  vast  credits  to  the  Allies,.*' 
who  by  their  enormous  purchases  of  war  materials  in  the  United 
States  had  created  the  abounding  prosperity  of  1916,  and  had 
pretty  nearly  exhausted  their  own  finances  in  doing  so.  More 
than  that,  the  Administration  began  at  once  to  prepare  for  the" 
organization  of  a  vast  army;  and  faced  with  this  most  important 
duty  of  the  conduct  of  the  war,  the  President  took  the  advice  of 
the  men  who  knew.  The  army  officers  knew  that  if  America  were 
to  take  a  serious  part  in  the  war  the  regular  army  and  the  National 
Guard  would  not  be  enough,  nor  even  Garrison's  Continental 
Army  v/hich  had  been  rejected  in  1916.  A  big  army  would  be 
needed,  and  the  right  way  to  raise  it  was  by  conscription. 

So  the  Selective  Service  act  was  introduced  in  Congress  and 
passed  in  May,  without  very  serious  opposition.  At  the  very  start 
the  American  people  had  accepted  a  principle  which  had  been 
adopted  in  the  crisis  of  the  Civil  War  only  after  two  years  of  disas 
ter  and  humiliation.  It  was  the  estimate  of  experts  that  this 
army  would  need  a  year  of  training  before  it  would  be  fit  for  the 
front  line,  and  a  huge  system  of  cantonments  was  hastily  con 
structed  to  house  the  troops,  while  the  nucleus  of  men  trained  in 
the  Plattsburg  camps  was  increased  by  the  extension  of  the 
Plattsburg  system  all  over  the  country. 

For  the  leadership  of  this  army  General  Pershing  was  selected, 
not  without  considerable  criticism  from  those  who  thought 
General  Wood  deserved  the  position.  The  reasons  which  led  to 
the  selection  of  Pershing  are  not  yet  officially  known  to  the  public, 
but  Pershing's  record  was  to  be  a  sufficient  justification  of  the 
appointment. 

But  military  and  naval  measures  were  only  a  part  of  the  work 
needed  to  win  this  war.  Allied  shipping  was  being  sunk  by  the 
submarines  at  an  alarming  rate,  and  new  ships  had  to  be  provided. 
An  enormous  American  program  was  laid  out,  and  General  Goe- 
thals,  in  whom  there  was  universal  confidence,  was  made  head  of 
the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  charged  with  its  execution. 
But  Goethals  could  not  get  along  with  William  Denman,  head  of 
the  Shipping  Board,  and  changes  of  personnel  were  constant 
through  the  year  until  in  1918  Charles  M.  Schwab  was  finally 
put  in  chief  control  of  the  shipbuilding  program. 
'  For  this  and  the  development  of  the  industrial  program  neces 
sary  for  military  efficiency  the  support  of  labor  was  essential. 
Mr.  Wilson  now  reaped  once  more  the  benefit  of  a  policy  which 
had  previously  brought  him  much  criticism.  His  retreat  before 


the^  railroad  brotherhoods  in  August  of  1916,  as  well  as  the  general 
policy  of  his  Administration,  had  won  him  the  invaluable  support 
of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  and  this  good  understanding, 
together  with  the  unprecedented  wage  scales  which  came  into 
operation  in  most  industries  with  the  war  emergency,  gave  to  the 
United  States  Government  much  more  firm  support  from  organized 
labor  than  most  of  the  allied  countries  had  been  able  to  obtain.^ 

But  this  war  touched  every  department  of  human  affairs.  The 
Allies  were  short  of  food,  and  one  of  the  first  achievements  of  the 
American  Government  was  the  institution  of  a  limited  food  con 
trol  in  the  United  States,  under  the  directorship  of  Herbert  Hoover. 
Saving  of  food  by  voluntary  effort  was  popularized,  and  increased 
production  and  reduced  consumption  prevented  the  appearance 
of  any  serious  food  crisis  in  the  allied  countries.  Later  a  fuel  con 
trol  was  instituted  under  Dr.  Harry  A.  Garfield,  and  the  principle 
of  voluntary  self-denial  established  by  the  Food  Administration 
was  carried  on  into  the  field  of  news,  where  the  newspapers  sub 
mitted  to  voluntary  restriction  of  the  publication  of  news  that 
might  unfavorably  affect  military  and  naval  movements^  The 
Committee  on  Public  Information,  headed  by  George  Creel,  was 
in  general  supervision  of  this  work,  and,  though  it  was,  on  the 
whole,  unpopular  and  accomplished  no  very  useful  purpose  at 
home,  it  developed  during  1918  a  service  of  European  propaganda 
which  was  of  immense  value  in  heartening  the  Allies,  informing 
the  neutrals  and  discouraging  the  enemy. 

For  all  this  money  was  needed,  and  in  May  and  June  the  first 
Liberty  Loan  of  $2,000,000,000  was  put  before  the  public  in  an 
intensive  campaign  of  publicity.  Mr.  McAdoo  proved  himself  an 
extremely  able  advertiser  of  the  public  finances,  and  with  the 
vigorous  cooperation  of  banks  and  business  men  the  loan  was  more 
than  50  per  cent  oversubscribed.  There  were  other  and  larger 
loans  later,  but  after  the  success  of  the  first  one  there  was  no 
doubt  that  they  would  be  taken;  the  first  great  accomplishment 
in  national  financing  was  almost  as  much  of  a  surprise  to  the 
public  as  the  ready  acceptance  of  the  draft. 

Early  in  April  the  railroads  were  put  in  charge  of  a  committee 
of  five  railroad  Presidents,  who  were  given  great  powers  in  the 
combination  of  facilities  for  better  service.  But  the  system  did 
not  work  well,  and  on  Dec.  26,  1917,  the  President  announced 
the  assumption  by  the  Government  of  control  of  the  railroads  for 
the  war  emergency,  with  Mr.  McAdoo  as  Director  General. 

Nineteen  hundred  and  seventeen,  then,  saw  the  Wilson  Admin 
istration  undertaking  far  heavier  burdens  than  any  previous 
Administration  had  attempted,  and  meeting  with  a  measure  of 
success  which  was  beyond  all  prediction.  The  most  powerful 
nation  in  the  world  was  getting  ready  for  war  on  an  enormous 
scale,  getting  ready  slowly,  to  be  sure,  but  with  a  surprising  ease 
and  a  surprising  harmony.  The  nation  which  had  re-elected  the 


s_L 


President  in  November  because  he  had  kept  it  out  of  war  was 
whole-heartedly  behind  him  from  April  on  as  he  led  it  into  war. 

But  great  as  was  the  President's  moral  authority  at  home,  it 
was  still  greater  abroad.  The  principles  proclaimed  in  his  address 
of  April  2,  and  repeated  and  elaborated  later  in  the  year,  became 
the  creed  of  almost  every  political  element  in  Europe  except  the 
German  military  party.  The  Russian  revolution  was  still  a 
liberalizing  influence,  in  the  early  part  of  the  year,  and  self-deter 
mination  began  to  be  proclaimed  over  all  Europe  as  the  central 
principle  of  any  satisfactory  peace  settlement.  In  the  allied 
countries,  where  Mr.  Wilson's  forbearance  toward  Germany  had 
been  heaped  with  ridicule  for  the  last  two  years,  he  became  over 
night  the  interpreter  of  the  ideals  for  which  the  democratic  peoples 
were  fighting.  Hereafter  in  any  negotiations  with  Germany  the 
President  by  general  consent  acted  as  the  spokesman  of  all  the 
allied  Governments,  and  the  peoples  of  the  allied  countries 
accepted  his  declarations  as  a  sort  of  codification  of  the  principles 
of  the  war.  It  must  be  left  for  the  historian  of  the  future  to  decide 
how  much  of  this  deference  was  due  to  appreciation  of  the  Presi 
dent's  service  in  clarifying  the  allied  ideals,  and  how  much  to  his 
position  as  head  of  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world,  whose 
intervention  was  expected  to  bring  victory  to  the  Allies. 

But  in  other  countries  as  well,  Wilson's  ideals  had  become  a 
dogma  to  which  everybody  professed  allegiance  no  matter  what 
his  views.  The  President's  principles,  as  publicly  expressed  in  his 
speeches,  had  been  in  effect  a  declaration  of  worthy  ends,  such 
as  all  right  thinking  persons  desired.  He  had  been  less  concerned 
with  the  means  to  those  ends,  and  consequently  all  who  agreed 
with  his  principles  were  inclined  to  assert  that  the  President's 
ideals  were  exemplified  by  their  own  practices.  In  1917  the  Pres 
ident  enjoyed  the  unusual  experience  of  seeing  American  liberals, 
British  Laborites,  three  or  four  kinds  of  Russian  Socialists,  neutral 
Socialists,  neutral  clericals,  neutral  pacifists  and  even  certain 
groups  in  the  enemy  countries  all  proclaiming  their  adherence  to 
the  ideals  of  President  Wilson. 

For  a  time,  indeed,  it  seemed  that  the  war  might  be  decided  by 
moral  force.  Beginning  to  take  alarm  at  the  activity  of  America, 
and  not  yet  certain  of  the  effect  of  the  Russian  revolution  (which 
was  having  grave  consequences  in  Austria-Hungary)  the  Germans 
inclined  during  the  Summer  of  1917  to  a  new  peace  offensive. 
Bethmann  Hollweg  was  dropped  on  July  14,  and  five  days  later 
a  majority  of  the  Reichstag  voted  for  a  peace  virtually  on  the 
basis  of  the  status  quo  ante.  In  August  the  Vatican  issued  a  peace 
proposal  suggesting  a  settlement  on  that  general  principle,  with 
territorial  and  racial  disputes  to  be  left  for  later  adjustment; 
and  the  Socialists  of  Europe  were  preparing  to  meet  at  Stockholm 
for  a  peace  conference  of  their  own  influenced  by  the  same  ideas. 

But  the  President  had  changed  his  opinion  that  America  had  no 

55 


concern  with  the  causes  and  the  objects  of  the  wai ;  he  had  had  to 
search  for  and  explore  the  obscure  foundations  from  which  the 
tremendous  flood  had  burst  forth.  His  Flag  Day  speech  on 
June  14  showed  that  he  was  now  thinking  of  the  political  and 
economic  aspects  of  the  German  drive  for  world  supremacy; 
and  when  the  allied  powers  intrusted  him  with  the  task  of  answer 
ing  the  Pope's  peace  suggestion  in  the  name  of  all  of  them,  he 
declared  that  "we  cannot  take  the  word  of  the  present  rulers  of 
Germany  as  a  guarantee  for  anything  that  is  to  endure."  The 
German  Government  could  not  be  trusted  with  a  peace  without 
victory. 

That  peace  offensive  died  out  in  early  Fall.  The  Germans  had 
lost  interest,  for  they  seemed  likely  to  reach  their  objective  in 
other  ways.  Things  were  going  badly  for  the  Allies.  The  offen 
sives  in  the  west  had  broken  down  and  France's  striking  powrer 
seemed  exhausted.  Italy  suffered  a  terrific  defeat  in  October. 
America  was  preparing,  but  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  the  chief 
result  of  the  Russian  revolution  had  been  the  collapse  of  the  eastern 
front.  When  in  November  the  Bolsheviki  overthrew  Kerensky 
and  prepared  to  make  peace  at  any  price,  it  was  evident  that  the 
German  armies  in  France  would  soon  be  enormously  reinforced 
So  the  Winter  of  1917—18  saw  a  new  peace  offensive,  but  this 
time  most  of  the  work  was  done  by  the  Allies,  and  the  object  was 
to  detach  Austria-Hungary  from  Germany. 

The  item  of  principal  interest  in  the  long-range  bombardment 
of  speeches  on  war  aims  by  which  the  statesmen  of  the  various 
powers  conducted  this  exchange  of  views  was  the  proclamation 
of  the  famous  Fourteen  Points,  in  which  the  President  for  the 
first  time  put  his  ideas  as  to  the  conditions  of  a  just  peace  into 
somewhat  specific  form.  The  origin  of  this  program,  which  was 
eventually  to  become  the  basis  of  the  peace  treaty,  is  still  a  matter 
of  conjecture.  Lloyd  George  on  Jan.  5,  1918,  had  stated  war  aims 
in  some  respects  identical  with  those  which  the  President  embod 
ied  in  the  Fourteen  Points  three  days  later.  A  good  deal  of  the 
program  had  been  included  in  the  allied  statement  of  Jan.  n,  1917, 
but  the  Fourteen  Points  were  somewrhat  more  moderate.  They 
seemed  to  be,  indeed,  a  rather  hasty  recension  of  old  programs  in 
the  effort  to  modify  allied  aspirations  so  that  Austria  would 
accept  them;  for  while  the  Fourteen  Points  professed  to  contain 
the  scheme  of  a  just  peace,  they  were  set  forth  as  a  step  in  the 
endeavor  to  persuade  Austria  to  desert  her  ally.  As  it  happened, 
Austria  could  not  have  deserted  Germany  even  if  she  had  desired; 
and,  in  any  event,  the  effort  to  compromise  was  quite  impracti 
cable.  The  section  referring  to  Austrian  internal  problems,  for 
instance,  proposed  a  solution  which  the  Austrian  Government 
had  rejected  only  a  few  weeks  before,  and  which  the  Austrian 
subject  nationalities  would  no  longer  have  been  willing  to  accept 

56 


Whatever^  the  origin  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  their  immediate 
effect  was  slight.  The  Austrians,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Ger 
mans,  professed  interest,  but  it  was  soon  apparent  that  the  Ger 
mans  at  least  were  not  ready  to  approach  the  allied  point  of  view. 
And  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  forced  upon  Russia  on  March  3, 
was  in  such  stark  contrast  with  the  benevolent  professions  of 
German  statesmen  that  the  President  realized  that  nothing  could 
be  gained  by  debate  and  compromise.  On  April  6,  in  a  speech 
at  Baltimore,  he  declared  that  only  one  argument  was  now  of  use 
against  the  Germans — "force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint 
or  limit."  The  process  of  conversion  from  the  viewpoint  of 
January,  1917,  was  complete. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  application  of  force  had  already 
begun.  On  March  21  Ludendorff  had  opened  his  great  offensive 
in  France  which  was  to  bring  the  war  to  a  German  victory,  and 
tor  the  next  few  months  Foch,  and  not  Wilson,  was  the  dominant 
personality  among  the  Allies.  And  for  a  time  it  seemed  that 
however  much  America  had  contributed  to  the  moral  struggle 
between  the  alliances,  she  would  be  able  to  furnish  comparatively 
little  force.  The  winter  of  1917-18  had  been  full  of  humiliations. 
The  railroad  disorganization  which  had  led  to  the  proclamation 
of  Government  control  at  the  end  of  December  was  being  cleared 
up  only  slowly.  The  Fuel  Administration  was  in  an  even  worse 
tangle,  and  in  January  business  and  industry  had  to  shut  down 
for  several  days  throughout  the  whole  Eastern  part  of  the  country 
in  order  to  find  coal  to  move  food  trairs  to  the  ports.  Great  sums 
of  money  and  enormous  volumes  of  boasting  had  been  expended 
on  airplane  construction  without  getting  any  airplanes.  Hundreds 
of  millions  had  been  poured  into  shipyards  and  ships  were  only 
beginning  to  come  from  the  ways.  The  richest  nation  in  the  world 
allowed  hundreds  of  its  soldiers  to  die  in  cantonment  hospitals 
because  of  insufficient  attention  and  inadequate  supplies.  Artil 
lery  regiments'  were  being  trained  with  wooden  guns  and  only 
150,000  Americans,  many  of  them  technical  troops,  were  in  France. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  called  before  a  Congressional  committee 
to  answer  questions  on  these  shortcomings,  had  created  the  im 
pression  that  he  either  did  not  know  that  anything  was  wrong 
or  did  not  care.  On  Jan.  19  Senator  Chamberlain,  Chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  declared  that  "the 
military  establishment  of  the  United  States  has  broken  down; 
it  has  almost  stopped  functioning,"  and  that  there  was  "ineffi 
ciency  in  every  bureau  and  department  of  the  Government." 
The  next  day  he  introduced  bills  for  a  War  Cabinet  and  a  Director 
of  Munitions,  which  would  practically  have  taken  the  military 
and  industrial  conduct  of  the  war  out  of  the  President's  hands. 

The  President  met  the  challenge  boldly  with  the  declaration 
that  Senator  Chamberlain's  statement  was  "an  astonishing  and 
unjustifiable  distortion  of  the  truth,"  and  must  have  been  due  to 


jFourtecn  ~poiats 


President  Wilson's  program  for  the  world's  peace  uxw  outlined  in  the 
Fourteen  Points,  which  constituted  part  of  an  address  delivered  befor-e  Con&ress 
January  8,  1918,  as  follows: 


No  Private  Understandings 

1  OPEN  COVENANTS  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after  which  tkcre 

be  no  private  international  understandings  of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall 
proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

Freedom  cf  th&  Seas 

2  ABSOLUTE  FREEDOM  of  navigation  upon  the  seas  outside  territorial 
waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole 
or  in  part  by  international   action   for  the  enforcement  of  international 
covenants. 

.  A7o  Economic  Barriers 

3  THE  REMOVAL,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barrier*  and  th« 
establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among  all  the  nations 
consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  it«  maintenance. 

Reduce  National  Armaments 

4  ADEQUATE  GUARANTEES  given  and  taken  that  national  armaments  will 
be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

Colonial  Claims 

5  A   FREE,  open  minded   and  absolutely  impartial   adjustment  of  all 
colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  principle  that  in 
determining  all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  popula 
tions  concerned  must  have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the 
government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

Russian  Territory 

($  THE  EVACUATION  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such  a  settlement  of 
a!)  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best  and  freest  cooperation 
of  the  other  nations  of  the  v/crld  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and 
unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the  independent  determination  cf  her  own 
political  development  and  national  policy  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  v/elcome 
into  the  society  of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  ov/n  choosing, 
and,  more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may  need 
and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her  sister 
nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good-will,  of 
their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished  fr^r.  their  own  interests 
and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 


58 


Restoration  of  Belgium 

7  BELGIUM,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacuated  and  restored 
without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common 
with  all  other  free  nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which  they  have  them 
selves  set  and  determined  for  the  government  of  their  relations  with  one 
anothen  Without  .this  healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of 
international  law  is  forever  impaired. 

Alsace-Lorraine  to  France 

S  ALL  FRENCH  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded  portions  restored 
and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years, 
should  be  righted  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure  in 
the  interest  of  all. 

New  Frontiers  for  Italy 

9  A  READJUSTMENT  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effected  along 
clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

Autonomy  in  Austria-Hungary 

10  THE  PEOPLES  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among  the  nations 
we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should  be  accorded  the  freest 
opportunity  of  autonomous  development. 

Rumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro 

11  RUMANIA,  SERBIA  and  MONTENEGRO  should  be  evacuated;  occupied 
territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and 
the  relations  of  the  several  Balkan  States  to  one  another  determined  by 
friendly  counsel  along  historically  established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nation 
ality;  and  international  guarantees  of  the  political  and  economic  independ 
ence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  States  should  be  entered 
into. 

Autonomy  in  Turkey 

12  THE  TURKISH  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire  should  be 
assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationalities  which  are  now 
under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured   an  undoubted   security  of  life   and 
an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  development,  and 
the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships 
and  commerce  of  all  nations  under  international  guarantees. 

For  an  Independent  Poland 

13  AN  INDEPENDENT  Polish  State  should  be  erected  which  should  include 
the  territory  inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish  populations,  which  should  be 
assured  a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea  and  whose  political  and  economic 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  should  be  guaranteed  by  internaticnal 
covenant. 

League  of  Nation 

14  A  GENERAL  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under  specific 
covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guaranties  of  political  inde 
pendence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small  Stares  a'jko. 


59 


disloyalty  to  the  Administration.  Chamberlain's  reply,  while 
admitting  that  he  might  have  overstated  his  case,  was  a  procla 
mation  of  loyalty  to  his  Commander-in-Chief  and  an  appeal  for 
getting  down  to  the  business  of  winning  the  war. 

But  the  war  did  not  go  on  into  1919.  If  America  could  contrib 
ute  no  aircraft  and  guns  to  the  campaign  of  1918,  she  could  at 
least  contribute  men.  The  emergency  of  March  and  April  brought 
forth  a  prodigious  effort,  and  soldiers  began  to  be  shipped  across 
the  Atlantic  by  hundreds  of  thousands.  By  July  4  there  were 
a  million,  before  the  end  of  the  year  over  2,000,000;  and  they 
could  fight.  At  the  end  of  the  Summer  the  Germans  realized 
that  the  war  was  lost;  and  realizing  it,  they  turned  back  to 
President  Wilson's  mediation  which  they  had  rejected  eighteen 
months  before,  and  to  the  Fourteen  Points  which  had  been  looked 
on  so  coldly  in  the  previous  Winter. 

The  first  move  was  made  by  the  Austrians,  who  on  Sept.  15 
proposed  a  conference  for  a  "preliminary  and  non-binding" 
discussion  of  war  aims.  The  President  refused  the  next  day, 
with  the  observation  that  America's  war  aims  had  been  stated 
so  often  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  what  they  were.  But  it  was 
evident  that  more  peace  proposals  would  follow,  and  on  Sept. 
27  the  President  delivered  an  address  in.  the  Metropolitan  Opera 
House  in  New  York  in  which  his  latest  conception  of  the  duties 
of  the  Peace  Conference  was  set  forth.  He  had  realized  that  peace 
without  victory  was  unsafe  in  view  of  the  character  of  the  Ger 
man  Government;  it  must  be  a  peace  with  guarantees,  for  nobody 
would  trust  the  Germans.  But  it  must  be  a  peace  of  impartial 
justice,  "involving  no  discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we 
wish  to  be  just  and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just," 
and  the  guarantee  must  be  provided  by  a  League  of  Nations 
which  the  Peace  Conference  itself — and  not  a  subsequent  general 
conference,  as  the  President  had  held  in  the  days  of  his  neutrality — 
must  organize.  The  development  was  logical;  nearly  all  the 
American  powers  had  entered  the  war,  and  neutrals  were  far  less 
numerous  than  in  1916.  And  he  argued  that  the  League  of 
Nations  must  be  formed  at  the  Peace  Conference,  to  be  "in  a 
sense  the  most  essential  part"  of  its  work,  because  it  was  not  likely 
that  it  could  be  formed  after  the  conference,  and  if  formed  during 
the  war  it  would  only  be  an  alliance  of  the  powers  associated 
against  Germany. 

The  Germans  apparently  thought  these  pronouncements 
offered  some  hope.  Their  Government  was  hastily  being  covered 
with  a  false  front  of  democratic  institutions  to  suit  his  insistence, 
and  on  Oct.  4  the  new  Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden,  appealed 
to  the  President  to  call  a  peace  conference  at  once,  the  basis  of 
peace  to  be  the  Fourteen  Points  and  conditions  set  forth  in  the 
President's  later  addresses,  specifically  that  of  Sept.  27.  There 
ensued  an  interchange  of  notes  lasting  throughout  an  entire 

60 


month,  in  which  the  President  acted  nominally  as  intermediary 
between  the  Germans  and  the  Allies,  though  actually  he  was  in 
constant  touch  with  allied  statesmen.  What  began  as  a  duel  of 
diplomatic  dexterity  presently  developed  into  a"  German  diplo 
matic  rout  as  the  German  armies,  retreating  everywhere,  drew 
nearer  and  nearer  German  soil.  Positions  which  the  German 
Government  had  hoped  to  defend  were  successively  abandoned; 
the  Germans  agreed  to  accept  without  argument  the  Fourteen 
Points,  with  discussion  at  the  conference  limited  only  to  details 
of  their  practical  application,  and  to  recognize  the  alterations 
which  had  been  made  in  some  of  them  by  subsequent  decisions  of 
the  American  Government.  They  accepted  the  President's 
insistence  that  a  peace  conference  must  be  conditional  on  an 
armistice  which  would  imply  complete  evacuation  of  allied  terri 
tory  and  the  assurance  of  "the  present  supremacy"  of  the  allied 
armies,  and  they  strove  desperately  to  convince  him  that  the 
democratization  of  the  German  Government  was  real.  Delegates 
went  to  Marshal  Foch  to  discuss  the  armistice  terms,  and  on 
Nov.  5  the  Allies  formally  notified  the  President  that  they  accepted 
the  Fourteen  Points,  with  the  reservation  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  and  subject  to  a  definition  of  the  restitution  which  the  Ger 
mans  must  make  for  damage  done. 

On  the  same  day  sailors  of  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet,  ordered 
out  to  die  fighting  in  a  last  thrust  at  the  British,  mutinied  and 
began  a  revolution  that  spread  all  over  the  empire.  From  the 
balcony  of  the  Imperial  Palace  in  Berlin  Karl  Liebknecht  pro 
claimed  the  republic;  the  Kaiser  fled  across  the  Dutch  border 
between  two  days;  and  on  Nov.  n  the  fighting  ended  and  the 
Germans  submitted  to  the  terms  imposed  by  Marshal  Foch. 

"Peace  Conference  and  Treaty,  I  QIC} 

OO  the  war  had  been  ended  by  the  military  defeat  of  the  Ger- 
O  mans.  In  arranging  the  preliminaries  of  peace  Mr.  Wilson's 
influence  had  been  dominant.  But  the  personal  aspect  of  his 
triumph  was  far  more  imposing  in  1918  than  it  could  possibly 
have  been  in  1916.  Had  his  mediation  ended  the  war  before 
America  entered  it  would  have  been  bitterly  resented  in  the  allied 
countries  and  by  American  sympathizers  of  the  Allies.  But  in 
the  interval  the  President  had  appeared  as  the  leader  of  the  nation 
which  furnished  the  decisive  addition  to  allied  strength  that 
brought  the  final  victory;  he  had  at  last  condemned  in  strong 
terms  the  German  Government,  toward  which  he  had  to  maintain 
a  neutral  attitude  earlier  in  the  war,  and  he  had  had  the  satisfac 
tion  of  seeing  that  Government  overthrown  at  last  when  the  Ger 
man  people  realized  that  it  had  cost  them  more  than  it  was  worth. 
So  now  the  war  was  ended  in  victory,  but  still  ended  by  Wilson's 
mediation,  and  moreover  on  terms  which  he  himself  had  laid 

61 


down — another  triumph  that  would  have  been  unthinkable  two 
y  years  earlier^' In  November,  1918,  Woodrow  Wilson  was  exalted 
in  ^the  estimation  of  the  world  more  highly  than  any  other  human 
being  for  a  century  past,  and  far  more  highly  than  any  other 
American  had  ever  been  raised  in  the  opinion  of  the  peoples  of 
Europe. 

But  he  had  just  suffered  a  surprising  defeat  at  home.    It  became 
evident  to  Democratic  leaders  in  the  early  Fall  of  1918  that  they 
were  likely  to  lose  the  Congressional  elections.    Democratic  lead 
ership  in  the  House  of  Representatives  had  been  so  notoriously 
<  incompetent  that  most  of  the  war  measures  had  had  to  be  carried 
I  through  under  the  leadership  of  Republicans,  and  there  was  grave 
!  dissatisfaction  with  some  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet.     The 
I  appeals  of  Democrats  in  danger  were  heard  sympathetically  at 
\  the  White  House,  and  on  Oct.  25  the  President  had  issued  a  state- 
1  ment  asking  the  people   to  vote  for  Democratic   Congressional 
candidates  "if  you  have  approved  of  my  leadership  and  wish  me 
to  continue  to  be  your  unembarrassed  spokesman  in  affairs  at 
home  and  abroad."    He  admitted  that  the  Republicans  in  Congress 
had  supported  the  war,  but  declared  that  they  had  been  against 
the  Administration  and  that  the  time  was  too  critical  for  divided 
leadership.    It  was  the  sort  of  appeal  that  any  European  Premier 
might  have  made  upon  "going  to  the  country,"  and  the  President 
ended  with  the. statement  that  "I  am  your  servant  and  will  accept 
your  judgment  without  cavil." 

If  this  statement  had  never  been  issued,  the  results  of  the  ensuing 
election  might  not  have  been  accepted  as  a  repudiation  of  the 
President.  But  he  had  made  it  a  "question  of  confidence,"  to  borrow 
a  term  from  European  politics,  and  the  result  was  disastrous. 
The  elections  gave  the  Republicans  a  majority  of  thirty-nine  in 
the  lower  house  and  a  majority  of  two  in  the  Senate,  which  by  a 
two-thirds  vote  would  have  to  ratify  the  peace  treaty  which  the 
Executive  would  negotiate.  In  such  a  situation  a  European  Pre 
mier  would.,  of  course,  have  had  to  resign,  but  the  President  of  the 
United  States  could  hardly  resign  just  as  the  war  was  coming  to 
an  end.  The  attempt  to  fit  the  parliamentary  system  into  the 
framework  of  the  American  Constitution  had  failed.  The  Presi 
dent  made  no  comment  on  the  outcome  of  the  election,  but  he 
continued  to  be  the  unembarrassed  spokesman  of  America  in  affairs 
at  home  and  particularly  abroad.  It  soon  became  known  that  he 
intended  to  go  to  the  Peace  Conference  in  person — at  the  request, 
it  was  intimated,  of  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George.  The  criticism 
of  this  plan  was  by  no  means  confined  to  Republicans,  but  the 
President  persisted  in  it.  There  was  a  widespread  demand  for  a 
non-partisan  Peace  Commission,  but  the  apparent  concession 
which  the  President  finally  made  to  this  sentiment — the  appoint 
ment  of  Henry  White,  long  out  of  the  diplomatic  service  and  never 
very  active  in  politics,  as  the  sole  Representative  on  a  commission 

62 


of  five — satisfied  the  bulk  of  Republican  sentiment  not  at  all. 
It  should  be  observed  however,  that  behind  the  five  official 
delegates  there  was  a  host  of  experts — military,  economic,  legal 
and  ethnological — some  of  whom  did  very  important  service  at 
the  conference;  and  in  the  selection  of  this  body  no  party  lines 
had  been  drawn. 

On  December  4  the  President  sailed  from  New  York  on  an 
army  transport,  accompanied  by  Mrs.  Wilson  and  by  a  whole 
caravan  of  savants  loaded  down  with  statistics  and  documents. 
He  left  a  nation  whose  sentiment  was  divided  between  sharp 
resentment  and  a  rather  apprehensive  hope  for  the  best,  but  he 
landed  on  a  continent  which  was  prepared  to  offer  to  Woodrow 
Wilson  a  triumphal  reception  such  as  European  history  had  never 
known.  The  six  weeks  between  his  landing  at  Brest  and  the 
opening  of  the  Peace  Conference  were  devoted  to  a  series  of  pro 
cessions  through  England,  France  and  Italy,  in  which  the  Govern 
ments  and  the  people  strove  to  outdo  each  other  in  expressing 
their  enthusiasm  for  the  leader  of  the  great  and  victorious  crusade 
for  justice  and  democracy.  Sovereigns  spiritual  and  temporal  and 
the  heads  of  Governments  heaped  him  with  all  the  honors  in  their 
power,  and  crowds  of  workingmen  stood  for  hours  in  the  rain  that 
they  might  see  him  for  a  moment  at  a  railroad  station.  Even 
from  neutral  Holland,  divided  Ireland  and  hostile  Germany  came 
invitations  to  the  President,  and  he  would  probably  have  been 
received  by  those  peoples  as  enthusiastically  as  by  British,  French 
and  Italians. 

-  For  the  war  had  been  ended  on  the  basis  of  the  ideals  of  Presi 
dent  Wilson.  Those  ideals  had  been  expressed  in  vague  and 
general  terms,  and  every  Government  thought  that  its  own  war 
aims  coincided  with  them.  Every  people,  suddenly  released  from 
the  long  and  terrible  strain  of  the  war,  thought  that  all  its  troubles 
were  suddenly -to  be  ended  by  the  principles  of  President  Wilson. 
Jugo-Slavs  and  Italians  claimed  Istria  and  Fiume,  and  each  felt 
itself  supported  by  the  principles  of  President  Wilson.  To  French 
men  those  principles  meant  that  Germany  must  pay  for  the  war 
forced  on  France,  and  to  Germans  they  meant  that  a  ruined 
France  and  an  uninvaded  Germany  could  start  again  on  the 
same  footing. 

The  Peace  conference  that  began  on  January  18  was  bound  to  v 
disillusion  a  great  many  people,  including  President  Wilson  him 
self.  Principles  had  to  be  translated  into  practice,  and  every 
effort  to  do  so  left  one  party  to  the  dispute,  if  not  both,  convinced 
that  the  principles  had  been  betrayed.  The  treaty  which  was 
eventually  produced  led  American  liberals  to  complain  that  the 
President  had  surrendered  to  European  imperialism,  and  brought 
from  such  Republicans  as  still  admired  the  Allies  the  complaint 
that  he  had  betrayed  allied  interests  at  the  promptings  of  pacifism. 
Equally  diverse  opinions  might  have  been  obtained  from  r.'ll  types 


of  extremists  in  Europe.  The  Fourteen  Points  were  susceptible 
of  varying  interpretations,  according  to  individual  interests;  and 
at  the  very  outset  the  American  delegates  found  some  of  the  allied 
leaders  contending  that  they  need  not  be  considered,  since  the 
Germans  had  surrendered,  not  because  they  regarded  the  prin 
ciples  of  President  Wilson  as  just,  but  because  they  had  been 
beaten.  There  was  undoubtedly  a  great  deal  of  truth  in  this 
contention,  but  the  American  delegates  succeeded  in  holding  the 
conference  to  the  position  that  having  accepted  the  German 
surrender  on  certain  terms  it  would  have  to  abide  by  those  terms. 
The  terms  had  to  be  interpreted,  however,  and  every  agreement 
on  the  details  led  to  a  protest  from  somebody  that  the  President 
had  abandoned  the  Fourteen  Points. 

All  this,  together  with  the  growing  Republican  opposition  at 
home  which  was  making  itself  heard  in  Europe,  led  to  a  rapid 
decline  in  the  President's  prestige.  So  long  as  it  was  a  question 
of  generalities  he  was  the  moral  leader  of  the  peoples  of  the  world, 
but  after  a  few  weeks  of  getting  down  to  particulars  he  was  only 
the  head  of  the  peace  delegation  of  a  single  State — and  a  State 
in  which  there  was  already  serious  opposition  to  his  policy.  This 
altered  standing  was  made  evident  toward  the  end  of  April,  when 
a  protracted  disagreement  with  the  Italian  delegation  over  the 
Adriatic  question  led  the  President  to  issue  a  declaration  of  his 
position  which  was  virtually  an  appeal  to  the  Italian  people  over 
the  heads  of  their  own  representatives.  Nowhere  had  the  Presi 
dent  been  received  with  more  enthusiasm  than  in  his  trip  through 
Italy  four  months  before;  but  now  Dr.  Orlando,  the  Italian 
Premier,  went  home  and  promptly  got  a  virtually  unanimous 
vote  of  confidence  from  his  Parliament,  which  was  supported  by 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people. 

The  treaty  was  finally  signed  on  June  28,  and  the  President 
left  at  once  for  home  to  take  up  the  fight  to  get  it  through  the 
Senate — a  fight  which,  it  was  already  apparent,  would  be  about 
as  hard  as  the  struggle  to  get  any  treaty  evolved  at  all  out  of  the 
conflicting  national  interests  in  Paris.  There  was  a  demonstration 
for  him  at  Brest  as  he  left  French  soil,  but  nothing  like  the  en 
thusiasm  that  had  greeted  his  arrival.  This  was  perhaps  the 
measure  of  his  inevitable  decline  in  the  estimation  of  Europe;  it 
remained  to  be  seen  how  he  stood  at  home.  As  early  as  January 
i,  before  the  Peace  Conference  met,  Senator  Lodge,  Republican 
leader  in  the  Senate,  had  declared  that  the  conference  ought  to 
confine  itself  to  the  Peace  Treaty  and  leave  the  League  of  Nations 
for  later  discussion. 

On  February  14,  after  the  first  reading  of  the  League  covenant, 
the  President  had  made  a  hurried  trip  home  to  talk  it  over  with 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations — a  committee  that 
had  been  loaded  up  with  enemies  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The 
members  of  the  committee  dined  v/ith  him  at  the  White  House 

64 


on  February  26,  and  the  covenant  was  discussed  for  several  hours. 
But  the  President  could  not  convert  the  doubters;  on  March  3 
Senator  Lodge  announced  that  thirty-seven  Republican  Senators 
were  opposed  to  the  League  in  its  present  form,  and  that  they 
regarded  a  demand  for  its  alteration  as  the  exercise  of  the  Senate  s 
constitutional  right  of  advice  on  treaties.  The  President  took  up 
the  challenge,  and  on  the  following  day,  just  before  sailing  back 
to  Paris,  he  declared  in  a  public  address  that  _  the  League  and 
treaty  were  inextricably  interwoven;  that  he  did  not  intend  to 
bring  back  "the  corpse  of  a  treaty,"  and  that  those  who  opposed 
the  League  must  be  deaf  to  the  demands  of  common  men  the 
world  over. 

The  fight  was  now  begun.  Some  modifications  were  made  in 
the  covenant  in  the  direction  of  meeting  criticisms  bv  Elihu  Root, 
but  it  was  adopted.  On  July  10  the  treaty  was  laid  before  the 
Senate  and  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
which  at  once  began  to  hear  opinions  on  it.  The  President  him 
self  appeared  before  the  committee  on  August  19.  Outside  the 
Senate  party  lines  were  breaking  up;  the  Irish  and  German  ele 
ments  who  had  come  into  line  during  the  war,  but  had  felt  that 
their  interpretation  of  President  Wilson's  ideals  had  been  violated 
by  the  treaty,  were  aligned  in  support  of  the  Republican  opposi 
tion;  and  a  certain  element  of  the  Democratic  Party  which 
inclined  to  admire  the  theory  of  traditional  isolation  found  itself 
in  harmony  with  the  Republicans.  On  the  other  hand,  many 
moderate  Republicans  supported  the  President,  chief  among  them; 
Mr.  Taft;  and  in  the  churches  and  colleges  support  of  the  League 
commanded  an  overwhelming  majority. 

Convinced  that  the  people  were  behind  him  against  the  Senate, 
or  would  be  behind  him  if  they  understood  the  issue,  the  Presi 
dent  left  Washington  on  September  3  for  another  appeal  to  the 
country.  Declaring  that  if  America  rejected  the  League  it  would 
"break  the  great  heart  of  the  world,"  he  went  to  the  Pacific  Coast 
on  a  long  and  arduous  speaking  tour,  another  request,  in  effect, 
for  a  vote  of  confidence  for  his  work  as  Premier.  The  effort  was 
too  much;  he  broke  down  at  Wichita,  Kan.,  on  September  26, 
and  was  hurried  back  to  the  White  House,  where  for  weeks  he 
lay  disabled  by  an  illness  whose  nature  and  seriousness  were  care 
fully  concealed  at  the  time,  and  even  yet  but  imperfectly  under 
stood.  Meanwhile  the  treaty  had  been  reported  out  of  committee, 
and  the  offering  of  a  multitude  of  amendments,  all  of  which  were 
defeated,  led  eventually  to  the  drawing  up  of  the  "Lodge  reserva 
tions,"  finally  adopted  on  November  16. 

Nobody  knew  how  sick  the  President  was,  but  Senator  Hitch 
cock,  who  had  led  the  fight  for  the  treaty  in  the  Senate,  ^saw  him 
on  November  18  and  was  told  that  in  the  President's  opinion  the 
Lodge  reservations  amounted  to  nullification  of  the  treaty.  So 
the  Democrats  voted  against  the  treaty.  Lodge's  refusal  to 

65 


accept  Wilson's  treaty  was  as  unshakable  as  Wilson's  refusal  to 
accept  Lodge's  treaty.  When  the  special  session  ended  and  the 
regular  session  began  the  President  eventually  yielded  a  little 
and  consented  to  interpretative  reservations  proposed  by  Senator 
Hitchcock.  But  this  would  not  satisfy  the  Republicans;  and  on 
March  20  the  rejected  treaty  was  finally  sent  back  to  the  White 
House.  ' 

The  Casing  Tear,  1920-1921 


rHE  President's  recovery  was  slow,  and  the  first  incidents  of 
his  return  to  the  management  of  public  affairs  were  rather 
startling,  in  view  of  the  abrupt  manner  with  which  he-  re 
sumed  the  direction  of  executive  policy.  During  his  illness  the 
Cabinet  had  met  from  time  to  time  and  in  a  fashion  had  carried 
on  the  routine  work  of  the  executive  department.  Had  it  not 
done  so,  had  the  gravity  of  the  President's  illness  been  generally 
known,  the  demand  which  was  heard  for  an  explanation  of  the 
constitutional  reference  to  the  "disability  of  tke  President"  and 
an  understanding  of  the  circumstances  under  which  the  Tice- 
President  might  assume  the  office  would  have  been  much  stronger. 
There  was  a  good  deal  of  apprehension,  therefore,  when  Secretary 
of  State  Lansing  resigned,  and  the  published  correspondence 
showed  that  the  President  had  regarded  his  action  in  calling  Cabi,-  ! 
net  meetings  as  a  usurpation  of  Presidential  authority.  It  was 
evident  from  the  correspondence  that  another  and  perhaps 
stronger  reason  for  the  President's  disapproval  had  been  th>e 
action  of  the  Secretary  in  conducting  a  Mexican  Policy  an  his 
own  initiative,  during  the  President's  illness,  which  showed-  con 
siderable  divergence  from  the  President's  own.  Nevertheless.,  the 
manner  of  the  action  caused  some  uneasiness  and  there  was  much 
surprise  when  Mr.  Lansing  was  replaced  by  Bainbridge  Colby^  a 
comparatively  recent  proselyte  from  the  Progressive  Party. 

There  was  still  further  uncertainty  as  to  the  condition  of  the 
President  when  he  re-entered  with  a  series  of  rather  sharp  notes 
into  the  Adriatic  controversy,  which  England,  France  and  Italy 
had  been  trying  to  settle,  without  consulting  the  Jugoslavs, 
during  his  illness;  and  a  letter  to  Senator  Hitchcock  on  March  8, 
asserting  that  the  militarist  party  was  at  that  time  in  control  of 
France,  aroused  grave  misgivings  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
These,  however,  were  unjustified;  the  President's  improvement, 
though  gradual,  continued.  But  the  work  of  the  Executive 
during  1920  was  far  less  important  than  in  previous  years,  for  the 
interest  of  the  country  was  concentrated  on  the  Presidential 
election. 

On  January  8  a  letter  from  the  President  had  been  read  at  the 
Jackson  Day  dinner  in  Washington,  in  which  he  refused  to  accept 
the  Senate's  decision  en  the  treaty  as  the  decision  of  che  nation. 

66 


"If  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  what  the  people  of  the  country  think 
about  the  matter,"  he  added,  "the  clear  and  single  way  out  is 
.  .  .  to  give  the  next  election  the  form  of  a  great  and  solemn 
referendum."  Once  more,  as  in  1918,  the  President  had  asked 
for  a  verdict  on  his  leadership.  There  was  some  perturbation 
among  the  Democratic  leaders,  for  into  a  Presidential  election  so 
many  issues  enter  that  it  would  be  difficult,  to  regard  it  as  a 
referendum  on  any  particular  issue.  It  might  have  been  so 
accepted  if  the  President  himself  had  come  forward  as  a  candidate 
for  a  third  term,  but  there  was  no  sign  from  the  White  House  as 
to  his  attitude  on  this  issue,  and  there  was  no  spontaneous  demand 
for  him  outside.  The  leading  candidate  during  the  pre-convention 
campaign  was  William  G.  McAdoo,  the  President's  son-in-law, 
who  had  resigned  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Director 
General  of  Railroads  after  making  a  successful  record  during  the 
war,  and  before  the  criticism  of  the  Wilson  Administration  as  a 
whole  had  become  acute.  McAdoo  had  the  powerful  support  of 
organized  labor  and  most  of  the  Federal  office-holders,  but  whether 
or  not  he  had  the  support  of  the  White  House  no  man  knew.  The 
Republicans  assumed  it  for  their  own  purposes,  and  Senator 
Lodge's  keynote  speech  at  the  Chicago  Convention  was  full  of 
denunciations  of  the  "Wilson  dynasty";  but  if  McAdoo  were 
Wilson's  candidate  the  President  showed  no  sign  of  knowing  it. 

That  McAdoo  was  not  nominated,  however,  can  be  ascribed 
very  largely  to  his  relationship  to  the  President  and  the  suspicion 
that  he  was  the  President's  candidate.  The  Democratic  Con 
vention  at  San  Francisco  adopted  a  platform  praising  and  in 
dorsing  the  President's  record  in  all  details.  The  convention  had 
to  do  that;  the  President's  record  was  the  party's  record.  Homer 
Cummings  as  Temporary  Chairman  kept  the  convention  cheered 
up  by  a  keynote  speech  of  eulogy  of  that  record,  which  moved 
the  assembled  Democrats  to  such  enthusiasm  that  Secretary  of 
State  Colby,  who  had  not  been  a  Democrat  long  enough  to  know 
much  about  the  behavior  of  the  species,  declared  that  at  any 
movement  that  day  the  rules  could  have  been  suspended  and  the 
President  renominated  by  acclamation.  But  when  the  convention 
came  down  to  the  work  of  nomination  the  President  was  not  con 
sidered,  and  the  delegates  devoted  themselves  to  finding  the  most 
available  man  who  had  not  had  any  connection  with  the  Ad 
ministration.  James  M.  Cox  was  finally  nominated  on  Woodrow 
Wilson's  record  and  sent  out  to  the  great  and  solemn  referendum. 

Aside  from  a  formal  proclamation  of  unity  of  ideals_  and  in 
tentions  with  the  candidate,  the  White  House  took  practically  no 
part  in  the  campaign.  Not  until  October,  when  a  delegation  of 
pro-League  Republicans  called  at  the  White  House,  was  it  known 
that  the  President's  health  had  temporarily  taken  a  turn  for  the 
worse  and  that  active  participation  would  have  been  impossible.  It 
could  hardly  have  affected  the  result  very  much  in  either  direction. 

67 


Whether  or  not  the  President  had  intended  to  turn  over  the 
Government  to  Hughes  in  November,  1916,  he  did  nothing  so 
unkind  to  Harding  in  November,  1920.  The  President-elect  was 
allowed  plenty  of  time  to  try  to  choose  his  Cabinet  and  his  policies, 
but  die  Administration  had  gradually  withdrawn  from  all  con 
nection  with  European  affairs,  and  it  was  made  known  soon  after 
Congress  met  in  December  that  nothing  would  be  done  which 
might  embarrass  the  new  Administration  in  its  handling  of  foreign 
relations  and  interrelated  problems. 

Fhe  history  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  Administration  virtually 
ends  with  the  rejection  of  the  treaty;  but  the  business  of  govern 
ment  had  to  be  carried  on  through  the  final  year.  During  1920 
old  issues  that  had  long  been  hidden  behind  the  war  clouds  came 
out  into  the  open  again.  Obregon  overthrew  Carranza  and 
entered  into  power  in  Mexico,  but  the  Wilson  Administration 
maintained  neutrality  during  the  brief  struggle.  Ambassador 
Fletcher  had  resigned,  but  Henry  Morgenthau,  appointed  to 
succeed  him,  did  not  obtain  the  confirmation  of  the  Senate,  and 
the  new  Administration  had  not  been  formally  recognized  at  the 
end  of  President  Wilson's  term.  A  controversy  over  the  status  of 
American  oil  rights  was  one  of  the  chief  impediments  to  recog 
nition,  though  Obregon's  general  attitude  was  far  more  friendly 
to  America  than  that  of  Carranza.. 

The  _  President  in  November  announced  the  boundaries  of 
Armenia,  which  he  had  drawn  at  the  request  of  the  European 
Allies.  But  these  boundaries  were  of  no  particular  interest  by 
that  time,  since  the  Turks  and  the  Bolsheviki  were  already  par 
titioning  Armenia;  and  the  mediation  between  the  Turks  and 
Armenians  which  the  Allies  requested  the  President  to  undertake 
was  forestalled  by  the  Bolshevist  conquest  of  the  remnant  of  the 
country.  The  Adriatic  dispute,  in  which  the  President  had  taken 
such  a  prominent  part  in  1919,  was  finally  settled  without  him 
by  direct  negotiation  between  Italy  and  Jugoslavia.  In  one  other 
international  problem,  however,  that  of  Russia,  the  United  States 
Government  still  exerted  some  influence.  The  President  during 
1918  had  showed  more  willingness  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of 
some  good  coming  out  of  Bolshevist  Russia  than  most  of  the 
European  Governments,  and  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces 
in  Siberia  took  no  active  part  in  the  fighting  there.  At  the  Peace 
Conference  the  President  had  been  willing  to  call  the  various 
Russian  parties  to  the  Prinkipo  conference,  but  nothing  came  of 
this;  ^  and  America  eventually  took  up  a  middle  ground  toward 
Russia.  While  the  British  seemed  ready  to  make  friends  with 
the  Bolsheviki  and  the  French  remained  irreconcilably  hostile, 
the  American  Government — whose  policy  was  fully  set  forth  in  a 
note  of  August  10,^1920 — refused  to  attack  them,  but  also  to 
have  any  dealings  with  them.  This  policy  was  much  criticised  as 
being  purely  negative,  but  toward  the  end  of  Mr.  W7ilson's  Ad- 

68 


ministration  both  England  and  France  were  tending  to  follow 
it  through  the  force  of  circumstances,  England's  effort  to  find  a 
basis  of  trade  relations  with  Bolshevist  Russian  being  as  futile  as 
France's  support  of  anti-Bolshevist  revolutionary  movements. 

The  Republicans  and  their  Irish  supporters  in  the  1920  cam 
paign  revived  the  old  demand  for  the  exemption  of  American 
shipping  from  the  Panama  Canal  tolls,  but  this  and  various  other 
differences  with  Engknd  which  arose  toward  the  end  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  Administration  were  left  over  for  settlement  by  the  new 
President.  More  urgent,  however,  was  another  ancient  issue  now 
revived — the  California  land  question.  In  1917,  when  America 
was  just  entering  the  war  and  could  not  aftorcf  any  dangerous 
entanglements  on  the  Pacific,  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  was 
negotiated  with  Japan.  By  this  the  United  States  recognized 
Japan's  "special  interests"  in  China,  particularly  in  "the  parts 
to  which  her  territory  is  contiguous,"  while  both  powers  professed 
agreement  on  the  principles  of  Chinese  independence  and  terri 
torial  integrity,  and  the  open  door.  However  necessary  this  con 
cession  in  order  to  protect  an  exposed  flank  in  time  of  war,  it  was 
regarded  with  much  alarm  by  friends  of  China,  whose  wrath  was 
later  aroused  by  the  action  of  the  President  at  the  Peace  Con 
ference  in  agreeing  to  the  cession  of  Shantung  to  Japan.  There 
was  a  renewed  antagonism  between  American  and  Japanese 
interests  in  certain  quarters,  and  the  American  Army  in  Siberia, 
if  it^did  nothing  else,  at  least  kept  the  Japanese  from  seizing 
Vladivostok  until  the  Americans  had  left. 

With  this  background,  the  situation  created  by  the  revival  of 
anti-Japanese  agitation  in  California  seemed  more  or  less  dis 
quieting,  but  when  a  more  stringent  land  law  was  enacted  by 
the  Californians  in  November  negotiations  between  the  two 
Governments  began  at  once  and  are  still  going  on  at  the  close  of 
the  Administration  with  good  prospect  of  agreement. 

The  President's  unpopularity  had  been  so  violently  expressed 
by  the  election  of  November  2  that  it  was  bound  to  be  mitigated 
soon  after,  and  this  natural  reaction  was  aided  by  the  failure  of 
the  Republican  Congress  to  accomplish  anything  in  the  short 
session  and  by  President-elect  Harding's  slowness  in  deciding 
among  candidates  offered  for  the  Cabinet  and  policies  put  forward 
for  his  attention.  As  President  Wilson  prepared  to  turn  over  the 
executive  duties  to  his  successor  there  was  already  evidence  that 
the  American  public  was  returning  to  a  greater  appreciation  of 
his  services.  As  a  token  of  the  estimation  in  which  he  was  still 
held  by  the  more  intelligent  circles  abroad,  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize 
was  awarded  to  him  in  December,  1920;  and  European  statesmen 
who  had  opposed  him  at  the  Peace  Conference  were  already 
expressing  surprise  at  learning  that  Mr.  Harding  believed  that 
the  League  of  Nations  was  dead. 

Copyright  New  York  Times. 

Published  through  the  courtesy  of  the  New  York  Times. 

69 


Xieut. 


In  Flanders  fields  the  poppies  grow 
Between  the  crosses,  row  on  row, 
That  mark  our  place,  and  in  the  sky 
The  larks  still  bravely  singing,  fly, 
Scarce  heard  amid  the  guns  below. 

We  are  the  dead.     Short  days  ago 
We  lived,  felt  dawn,  saw  sunset  glow, 
Loved  and  were  loved,  and  now  we  li« 
In  Flanders  fields. 

Take  up  our  quarrel  with  the  foe! 
To  you  from  failing  hands  we  throw 
The  torch.     Be  yours  to  lift  it  high ! 
If  ye  break  faith  with  us  who  die 
We  shall  not  sleep,  tho  poppies  blow 
In  Flanders  fields. 


*  X.  W.  lillar* 


Rest  ye  in  peace,  ye  Flaftders  dead! 

The  fight  thf?.t  ye  so  bravely  Jed 
We've  taken  up!     And  we  will  keep 

True  faith  with  you  who  lie  asleep, 
With  each  a  cross  to  mark  his  bed, 

And  poppies  blowing  overhead 
Where  once  his  own  life  blood  ran  red! 

So  let  your  rest  be  sweet  and  deep 
In  Flanders,  fields ! 

Fear  not  that  ye  have  died  for  naught, 
The  torch  ye  threw  to  us  we  caught! 

Ten  million  hands  will  hold  it  high, 
And  Freedom's  light  shall  never  die! 

We've  learned  the  lesson  that  ye  trine-lit 
In  Flanders  fields! 

70 


I 

The  tide  is  at  the  ebb,  as  if  to  mark  < 

Our  turning  backward  from  the  guiding  light; 
Grotesque,  uncertain  shapes  infest  the  dark 

And  wings  of  bats  are  heard  in  aimless  flight; 
Discordant  voices  cry  and  serpents  hiss, 

No  friendly  star,  no  beacon's  beckoning  ray; 
We  follow,  all  forsworn,  with  steps  amiss, 

Envy  and  Malice  on  an  unknov/n  way. 
But  he  who  bore  the  light  in  night  of  war, 

Swiftly  and  surely  and  without  surcease, 
Where  other  light  was  not,  save  one  red  star, 

Treads  now,  as  then,  the  certain  path  to  peace; 
Wounded,  denied,  but  radiant  of  soul, 
Steadfast  in  honor,  marches  toward  the  goal. 

II 

The  spirit  that  was  Peace  seems  but  a  wraith, 

The  glory  that  was  ours  seems  but  a  name, 
And  like  a  rotten  reed  our  broken  faith, 

Our  boasted  virtue  turned  to  scarlet  shame 

By  the  low,  envious  lust  of  party  power; 

While  he  upon  the  heights  whence  he  had  led, 
Deserted  and  betrayed  in  victory's  hour, 

Still  wears  a  victor's  wreath  on  unbowed  head. 
The  Nation  gropes — his  rule  is  at  an  end, 

Immortal  man  of  the  transcendent  mind, 
Light-bearer  of  the  world,  the  loving  friend 

Of  little  peoples,  servant  of  mankind! 
O  land  of  mine!  how  long  till  you  atone? 
How  long  to  stand  dishonored  and  alone . 

To  Woodrow  Wilson,  March  4,  1921. 


71 


THE  FOUNDERS  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


B ALf -RIDGE  IN  Stars  end  Stripes 


Make  firm,  O  God,  the  peace  our  dead  have  won. 

For  folly  shakes  the  tinsel  on  her  head 
And  points  us  back  to  darkness  and  to  hell. 

Cackling,  "Beware  of  Visions,"  while  our  dead 
Still  cry,  "It  was  for  visions  that  we  fell. 

— Alfred  Noyes 


Workmen's  Compensation 

VL  TE  must  hearten  and  quicken  the 
» V  spirit  and  efficiency  of  labor 
throughout  our  whole  industrial  sys 
tem  by  everywhere  and  in  all  occupa 
tions  doing  justice  to  the  laborer,  not 
only  by  paying  a  living  wage  but  also 
by  making  all  the  conditions  that  sur 
round  labor  what  they  ought  to  be. 
And  we  must  do  more  than  justice. 
We  must  safeguard  life  and  promote 
health  and  safety  in  every  occupation 
in  which  they  are  threatened  or  im 
periled.  That  is  more  than  justice, 
and  better,  because  it  is  humanity  and 
economy.— From  President  Wilsons 
Speech  of  Acceptance  at  Shadow  Lawn, 
September  2, 1916. 


I 

ail 


©  Harris  &•  Ewing 

President  Wilson  as  he  looked  during  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris 


tf^ilsons  Tlace  in  History 

By  General  the  Right  Honorable  Jan  Christian  Smuts,  Premier  of 
the  Union  of  South  Africa 

General  the  Right  Honorable  Jan  Christian  Smuts,  premier  of  the^Union  . 
of  South  Africa,  served  with  President  Wilson  on  the  League  of  Nations 
commission  of  the  peace  conference. 

Gen.  Smuts  was  an  active  leader  of  the  Boer  Army  in  the  field  in  the  Boer 
war.  He  is  a  graduate  of  Cambridge  University  in  England,  served  as 
state  attorney  for  the  South  African  Republic,  and  was  known  as  a  member 
of  the  bar  at  Cape  Town. 

Accepting  the^  outcome  of  the  Boer  war,  he  entered  the  service  of  the 
British  Government,  becoming  colonial  secretary  for  the  Transvaal  in 
1907  and  exercising  a  leading  influence  as  a  delegate  in  the  national  con 
vention  in  1910,  which  drew  up  the  constitution  for  the  present  Union  of 
South  Africa.  He  was  minister  of  the  defense  of  the  South  African  Govern 
ment  and  commanded  the  troops  in  the  campaign  against  the  Germans  in 
East  Africa  in  1916-17.  Promoted  to  be  an  honorary  lieutenant-general,  he 
was  the  South  African  representative  in  the  imperial  war  cabinet  in  1917-18. 


This  led  to  his  prominence  in  the  peace  conference  and  to  his  close  contact 
jident  Wilson.    On  February  8,  of  this  year,  Premier  Smuts  and  the 
South  African  party  won  a  decisive  victory  at  the  polls  over  Gen.  Hertzcg 


\v 


and  those  who*  advocated  the  secession  of  South  Africa  from  the  British 
Empire. 

WRITTEN  FOR  THE  NEW  YORK  EVENING  POST  AND  THE  WASHINGTON  HERALD 

Pretoria,  South  Africa,  January  8,  1921. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  I  should  write  a  short  estimate  and 
appraisal  of  the  work  of  President  Wilson  on  the  termination  of  his 
Presidency  of  the  United  States  of  America.  _  I  feel  I  must  comply 
with  the  suggestion.  I  feel  I  may  not  remain  silent  when  there  is 
an  opportunity  to  say  a  word  of  appreciation  for  the^work  of  one 
with  whom  I  came  into  close  contact  at  a  great  period  and  who 
rendered  the  most  signal  service  to  the  great  human  cause. 

There  is  a  great  saying  of  Mommsen  (I  believe)  in  reference  to 
the  close  of  Hannibal's  career  in  failure  and  eclipse:  "On  those 
whom  the  gods  love  they  lavish  infinite  joys  and  infinite  sorrows. " 
It  has  come  back  to  my  mind  in  reference  to  the  close  of  Wilson's 
career.  For  a  few  brief  moments  he  was  not  only  the  leader  of 
the  greatest  State  in  the  world;  he  was  raised  to  far  giddier  heights 
and  became  the  center  of  the  world's  hopes.  And  then  he  fell, 
misunderstood  and  rejected  by  his  own  people,  and  his  great 
career  closes  apparently  in  signal  and  tragic  defeat. 


I 


Position  of  Terrible  Greatness 

What  is  the  explanation  for  this  tremendous  tragedy,  which  is 
not  solely  American,  which  closely  concerns  the  whole  world? 
Of  course,  there  are  purely  American  elements  in  the  explanation 
which  I  am  not  competent  to  speak  on.  But  besides  the  American 
quarrel  with  President  Wilson  there  is  something  to  be  said  on 
the  great  matters  in  issue.  On  these  I  may  be  permitted  to  say 
a  few  words. 

The  position  occupied  by  President  Wilson  in  the  world's 
imagination  at  the  close  of  the  great  war  and  at  the  beginning  of 
the  peace  conference  v/as  terrible  in  its  greatness.  It  was  a  terrible 
position  for  any  mere  man  to  occupy.  Probably  to  no  human 
/being  in  all  history  did  the  hopes,  the  prayers,  the  aspirations  of 
|  many  millions  of  his  fellows  turn  with  such  poignant  intensity 
as  to  him  at  the  close  of  the  war.  At  a  time  of  the  deepest  dark 
ness  and  despair,  he  had  raised  aloft  a  light  to  which  all  eyes 
had  turned.  He  had  spoken  divine  words  of  healing  and  con 
solation  to  a  broken  humanity.  His  lofty  moral  idealism  seemed 
for  a  moment  to  dominate  the  brutal  passions  which  had  torn 
the  Old  World  asunder.  And  he  was  supposed  to  possess  the 
secret  which  would  remake  the  world  on  fairer  lines.  TJie  peace 
which  W7ilson  was  bringing  to  the  world  was  expected  to  be  God's 
peace.  Prussianism  lay  crushed;  brute  force  had  failed  utterly. 
The  moral  character  of  the  universe  had  been  signally  vindicated. 
There  was  a  universal  vague  hope  in  a  great  moral  peace,  of  a  new 
world  order  arising  visibly  and  immediately  on  the  ruins  of  the 
old.  This  hope  was  not  a  mere  superficial  sentiment.  It  was  the 
intense  expression  at  the  end  of  the  war  of  the  inner  moral  and 
spiritual  force  which  had  upborne  the  peoples  during  the  dark 
night  of  the  war  and  had  nerved  them  in  an  effort  almost  beyond 
human,  strength.  Surely,  God  had  been  with  them  in  that  long 
night  of  agony.  His  was  the  victory;  His  should  be  the  peace. 
And  President  Wilson  was  looked  upon  as  the  man  to  -make  this 
great  peace.  He  had  voiced  the  great  ideals  of  the  new  order; 
his  great  utterances  had  become  the  contractual  basis  for  the 
armistice  and  the  peace.  The  idealism  of  Wilson  would  surely 
become  the  reaMty  of  the  new  order  of  things  in  the  peace  treaty. 

Saved  the  "Little  Child" 

In  this  atmosphere  of  extravagant,  almost  frenzied  expectation 
he  arrived  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  Without  hesitation  he 
plunged  into  that  inferno  of  human  passions.  He  went  down  into 
the  Pit  like  a  second  Heracles  to  bring  back  the  fair  Alcestis  of 
the  world's  desire.  There  were  six  months  of  agonized  waiting, 
during  which  the  world  situation  rapidly  deteriorated.  And  then 
he  emerged  with  the  peace  treaty.  It  was  not  a  Wilson  peace, 


and  he  made  a  fatal  mistake  in  somehow  giving  the  impression 
that  the  peace  was  in  accord  with  his  Fourteen  Points  and  his 
various  declarations.  Not  so  the  world  had  understood  him. 
This  was  a  punic  peace,  the  same  sort  of  peace  as  the  victor  had 
dictated  to  the  vanquished  for  thousands  of  years.  It  was  not 
Alcestics;  it  was  a  haggard,  unlovely  woman  with  features  dis 
torted  with  hatred,  greed  and  selfishness,  and  the  little  child  that 
the  woman  carried  was  scarcely  noticed.  Yet  it  was  for  the  saving 
of  the  child  that  Wilson  had  labored  until  he  was  a  physical  wreck. 
Let  our  other  great  statesmen  and  leaders  enjoy  their  well-earned 
honors  for  their  unquestioned  success  at  Paris.  To  Woodrow 
Wilson,  the  apparent  failure,  belongs  the  undying  honor,  which 
will  grow  with  the  growing  centuries,  of  having  saved  the  "little 
child  that  shall  lead  them  yet."  No  other  statesman  but  Wilson 
could  have  done  it.  And  he  did  it. 

People  T)id  3^ot  Understand 


The  people,  the  common  people  of  all  lands,  did  not  understand 
the  significance  of  what  had  happened.  They  saw  only  that 
hard,  unlovely  Prussian  peace,  and  the  great  hope  died  in  their 
hearts.  The  great  disillusionment  took  its  place.  The  most  recep 
tive  mood  for  a  new  start  the  world  had  been  in  for  centuries  passed 
away.  Faith  in  their  governors  and  leaders  was  largely  destroyed 
and  the  foundations  of  the  human  government  were  shaken  in  a 
way  which  will  be  felt  for  generations.  The  Paris  peace  lost  ark 
opportunity  as  unique  as  the  great  war  itself.  In  destroying  the) 
moral  idealism  born  of  the  sacrifices  of  the  war  it  did  almost  asl 
much  as  the  war  itself  in  shattering  the  structure  of  Westernj 
civilization. 

And  the  odium  for  all  this  fell  especially  on  President  Wilson. 
Round  him  the  hopes  had  centered;  round  him  the  disillusion  and 
despair  now  gathered.  Popular  opinion  largely  held  him  respon-  j 
sible  for  the  bitter  disappointment  and  grievous  failure.  The 
cynics  scoffed;  his  friends  were  silenced  in  the  universal  disap 
pointment.  Little  or  nothing  had  been  expected  from  the  other 
leaders;  the  whole  failure  was  put  to  the  account  of  Woodrow 
Wilson.  And  finally  America  for  reasons  of  her  own  joined  the 
pack  and  at  the  end  it  was  his  own  people  who  tore  him  to  pieces. 

<L%Cust  Wait  for  Judgment 

Will  this  judgment,  born  of  momentary  disillusion  and  dis 
appointment,  stand  in  future,  or  will  it  be  reversed?  The  time 
has  not  come  to  pass  final  judgment  on  either  Wilson  or  any  of  the 
other  great  actors  in  the  drama  at  Paris.  The  personal  estimates 
will  depend  largely  on  the  interpretation  of  that  drama  in  the 
course  of  time.  As  one  who  saw  and  watched  things  from  the 
inside,  I  feel  convinced  that  the  present  popular  estimates  are 

77 


largely  superficial  and  will  not  stand  the  searching  test  of  time. 
And  I  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  Wilson  has  been  harshly, 
unfairly,  unjustly  dealt  with,  and  that  he  has  been  made  a  scape 
goat  for  the  sins  of  others.  Wilson  made  mistakes,  and  there  were 
occasions  when  I  ventured  to  sound  a  warning  note.  But  it  was 
not  his  mistakes  that  caused  the  failure  for  which  he  has  been 
held  mainly  responsible. 

Let  us  admit  the  truth,  however  bitter  it  is  to  do  so,  for  those 
who  believe  in  human  nature.  It  was  not  Wilson  who  failed. 
The  position  is  far  more  serious.  It  was  the  human  spirit  itself 
that  failed  at  Paris.  It  is  no  use  passing  judgments  and  making 
scapegoats  of  this  or  that  individual  statesman  or  group  of  states 
men.  Idealists  make  a  great  mistake  in  not  facing  the  real  facts 
sincerely  and  resolutely.  They  believe  in  the  power  of  the  spirit, 
in  the  goodness  which  is  at  the  heart  of  things,  in  the  triumph 
which  is  in  store  for  the  great  moral  ideals  of  the  race.  But  this 
faith  only  too  often  leads  to  an  optimism  which  is  sadly  and 
fatally  at  variance  with  actual  results. 

Says  Humanity  Failed 

It  is  the  realist  and  not  the  idealist  who  is  generally  justified  by 
events.  We  forget  that  the  human  spirit,  the  spirit  of  goodness 
and  truth  in  the  world,  is  still  only  an  infant  crying  in  the  night, 
and  that  the  struggle  with  darkness  is  as  yet  mostly  an  unequal 
struggle. 

Paris  proved  this  terrible  truth  once  more.  It  was  not  W7ilson 
who  failed  there,  but  humanity  itself.  It  was  not  the  statesmen 
that  failed  so  much  as  the  spirit  of  the  peoples  behind  them.  The 
hope,  the  aspiration  for  a  new  world  order  of  peace  and  right  and 
justice — however  deeply  and  universally  felt — was  still  only 
/  feeble  and  ineffective  in  comparison  with  the  dominant  national 
V^passions  which  found  their  expression  in  the  peace  treaty.  Even 
if  Wilson  had  been  one  of  the  great  demi-gcds  of  the  human  race, 
he  could  not  have  saved  the  peace.  Knowing  the  Peace  Con 
ference  as  I  knew  it  from  within,  I  feel  convinced  in  my  own  mind 
that  not  the  greatest  man  born  of  woman  in  the  history  of  the 
race  would  have  saved  that  situation.  The  great  hope  was  not 
the  heralding  of  the  coming  dawn,  as  the  peoples  thought,  but 
only  a  dim  intimation  of  some  far-off  event  toward  which  we  shall 
yet  have  to  make  many  a  long,  weary  march.  Sincerely  as  we 
believed  in  the  moral  ideals  for  which  he  had  fought,  the  tempta 
tion  at  Paris  of  a  large  booty  to  be  divided  proved  too  great.  And 
in  the  end  not  only  the  leaders  but  the  peoples  preferred  a  bit 
of  booty  here,  a  strategic  frontier  there,  a  coal  field  or  an  oil  well, 
an  addition  to  their  population  or  their  resources — to  all  the  faint 
allurements  of  the  ideal.  As  I  said  at  the  time,  the  real  peace 
was  still  to  come,  and  it  could  only  come  from  a  new  spirit  in  the 
peoples  themselves. 

78 


Wilson  Had  to  *Be  Conciliated 

CWhat  was  really  saved  at  Paris  was  the  child — the  covenant  of 
he  League  of  Nations.  The  political  realists  who  had  their  eye 
on  the  loot  were  prepared — however  reluctantly — to  throw  up  that 
innocent  little  sop  to  President  Wilson  and  his  fellow  idealists. 
After  all,  there  was  not  much  harm  in  it,  it  threatened  no  present 
national  interest,  and  it  gave  great  pleasure  to  a  number  of  good 
unpractical  people  in  most  countries.     Above  all,  President  Wil 
son  had  to  be  conciliated,  and  this  was  the  last  and  the  greatest 
of  the  fourteen  points  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart  and  by  which 
/he  was  determined  to  stand  or  fall.    And  so  he  got  his  way.    But 
I  it  is  a  fact  that  only  a  man  of  his  great  power  and  influence  and 
\  dogged  determination  could  have  carried  the  covenant  through 
that   Peace   Conference.     Others   had  seen   with   him   the  great 
vision;  others  had  perhaps  given  more  thought  to  the  elaboration 
of  the  great  plan.    But  his  was  the  power  and  the  will  that  carried 
it  through.     The  covenant  is  Wilson's  souvenir  to  the  future  of 
the  world.    No  one  will  ever  deny  that  honor. 

Cjreat  Creative  ^Document 

The  honor  is  very  great,  indeed,  for  the  covenant  is  one  of  the 
great  creative  documents  of  human  history.  The  peace  treaty 
will  fade  into  merciful  oblivion  and  its  provisions  will  be  gradually 
obliterated  by  the  great  human  tides  sweeping  over  the  world. 
But  the  covenant  will  stand  as  sure  as  fate.  Forty-two  nations 
gathered  round  it  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  League  at  Geneva. 
And  the  day  is  not  far  off  when  all  the  free  peoples  of  the  world 
will  gather  around  it.  It  must  succeed,  because  there  is  no  other 
\way  for  the  future  of  civilization.  It  does  not  realize  the  great 
hopes  born  of  the  war,  but  it  provides  the  only  method  and 
instrument  by  which  in  the  course  of  time  those  hopes  can  be 
realized.  Speaking  as  one  who  has  some  right  to  speak  on  the 
fundamental  conceptions,  objects  and  methods  of  the  covenant, 
I  feel  sure  that  most  of  the  present  criticism  is  based  on  mis 
understandings.  These  misunderstandings  will  clear  away,  one 
by  one  the  peoples  still  outside  the  covenant  will  fall  in  behind 
this  banner,  under  which  the  human  race  is  going  to  march  for 
ward  to  triumphs  of  peaceful  organization  and  achievements 
undreamt  of  by  us  children  of  an  unhappier  era.  And  the  leader 
who,  in  spite  of  apparent  failure,  succeeded  in  inscribing  his  name 
on  that  banner  has  achieved  the  most  enviable  and  enduring 
/immortality.  Americans  of  the  future  will  yet  proudly  and 
/  gratefully  rank  him  with  Washington  and  Lincoln,  and  his  name 
i  will  have  a  more  universal  significance  than  theirs. 


79 


THE  NOBI  E  PEACE  PRIZE  1920 


WITHOUT  THE  ADVICE  AND  CONSENT  OF  THE  SENATE. 
KIRBY  INT  THC  NEW  YORK  World 


"  We  die  without  distinction  if  we  are  not  willing  to  die  tne 
death  of  sacrifice.  Do  you  covet  nonor  ?  You  will  never  get  it 
by  serving  yourself.  Do  you  covet  distinction  ?  You  will  get  it 
only  as  a  servant  of  mankind." 

— Woodrow  Wilson's  Address 
at  Swarthmore  College 

Oct.  5,  1913. 


80 


Pf^ilson 


AN  INTERPRETATION 


PUBLISHED  THROUGH  THE  COURTESY  OF  THE  NEW  YORK  World 

No  other  American  has  made  so  much  world  history  as  Woodrow  Wilson,  who 
retires  at  noon  today  from  the  office  of  President  of  the  United  States.  No  other 
American  has  ever  bulked  so  large  in  the  affairs  of  civilization  or  wielded  so  com 
manding  an  influence  in  shaping  their  ends. 

The  great  outstanding  figure  of  the  war,  Mr.  Wilson  remains  the  great  outstand 
ing  figure  of  the  peace.  Broken  in  health  and  shattered  in  body,  Mr.  Wilson  is 
leaving  the  White  House,  but  his  spirit  still  dominates  the  scene.  It  pervades 
every  chancellery  in  Europe.  It  hovers  over  every  capital.  Because  Woodrow 
Wilson  was  President  of  the  United  States  during  the  most  critical  period  of  modern 
history  international  relations  have  undergone  their  first  far-reaching  moral 
revolution. 

Mr.  Harding  is  assuming  the  duties  of  the  Presidency,  but  the  main  interest  in 
Mr.  Harding  is  still  a  reflected  interest,  which  is  concerned  chiefly  with  the  efforts 
that  his  Administration  may  make  to  adjust  itself  to  the  forces  that  Mr.  Wilson 
has  set  in  motion.  Stripped  of  all  the  paraphernalia  of  his  office,  Mr.  Wilson,  by 
virtue  of  his  achievements,  remains  the  most  potent  single  influence  in  the  modern 
world;  yet  after  this  eight  years  in  the  White  House  it  may  be  doubted  if  even  the 
American  people  themselves  know  him  better  or  understand  him  better  than  they 
did  the  day  he  was  first  inaugurated. 

Neither  Mr.  Wilson's  friends  nor  his  enemies  have  ever  succeeded  in  interpreting 
him  or  in  explaining  him,  nor  can  any  interpretation  or  explanation  be  satisfactory 
which  fails  at  the  outset  to  recognize  in  him  the  simplest  and  at  the  same  time  the 
most  complex  character  in  the  greatest  drama  ever  played  on  the  stage  of  human 
history.  Even  his  closest  associates  have  never  found  it  easy  to  reconcile  a  fervent 
political  democracy  with  an  unbending  intellectual  aristocracy,  or  to  determine 
which  of  those  characteristics  was  dominant  in  his  day-to-day  decisions. 

No  man  ever  sat  in  the  President's  chair  who  was  more  genuinely  a  democrat  or 
held  more  tenaciously  to  his  faith  in  democracy  than  Woodrow  Wilson,  but  no  other 
man  ever  sat  in  the  President's  chair  who  was  so  contemptuous  of  all  intellect 
that  was  inferior  to  his  own  or  so  impatient  with  its  laggard  processes. 

81 


^President  Who  "Dealt  in  Ideas 

Mr.  Wilson  was  a  President  who  dealt  almost  exclusively  in  ideas.  H°  cared 
little  or  nothing  about  political  organization  and  rarely  consulted  the  managing 
politicians  of  his  party.  When  they  conferred  with  him  it  was  usually  at  their 
request  and  not  at  his  request.  Patronage  hardly  entered  into  his  calculations  as 
an  agency  of  government.  He  disliked  to  be  troubled  about  appointments,  and 
when  he  had  rilled  an  office  he  was  likely  to  be  indifferent  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
that  office  was  subsequently  administered,  unless  his  own  measures  were  antag 
onized  or  his  policies  obstructed. 

No  man  was  ever  more  impersonal  in  his  attitude  toward  government,  and  that 
very  impersonality  was  the  characteristic  which  most  baffled  the  American  people. 
Mr.  Wilson  had  a  genius  for  the  advocacy  of  great  principles,  but  he  had  no  talent 
whatever  for  advocating  himself,  and  to  a  country  that  is  accustomed  to  think  in 
headlines  about  political  questions  his  subtlety  of  mind  and  his  careful,  precise 
style  of  expression  were  quite  as  likely  to  be  an  obstacle  to  the  communication  of 
thought  as  a  medium  for  the  communication  of  thought.  That  is  how  such 
phrases  as  "too  proud  to  fight"  and  "peace  without  victory"  were  successfully 
wrested  from  their  context  by  his  critics  and  twisted  into  a  fantastic  distortion  of 
their  true  meaning. 

Mr.  Wilson  was  likewise  totally  deficient  in  the  art  of  advertising,  and  advertis 
ing  is  the  very  breath  of  American  politics.  He  held  himself  aloof  from  all  these 
points  of  public  contact*  The  World's  relations  with  him  have  certainly  been  as 
close  and  intimate  as  those  of  any  other  newspaper;  yet  during  the  eight  years  in 
which  Mr.  Wilson  has  been  in  the  White  House  he  never  sought  a  favor  from  The 
World,  he  never  asked  for  support  either  for  himself  or  any  of  his  policies,  he  never 
complained  when  he  was  criticised,  he  never  offered  to  explain  himself  or  his  attitude 
on  any  issue  of  government.  In  the  troublesome  days  of  his  Administration  he 
often  expressed  his  gratitude  for  services  that  The  World  had  rendered  in  the 
interpretation  of  his  policies,  but  he  never  solicited  such  interpretation  or  took 
measures  to  facilitate  it.  He  was  an  eloquent  pleader  for  the  principles  in  which  he 
believed,  but  he  had  no  faculty  whatever  for  projecting  himself  into  the  picture. 

The  Sxperience  of  History 

Mr.  W7ilson's  enemies  are  fond  of  calling  him  a  theorist,  but  there  is  little  of  the 
theorist  about  him,  otherwise  he  could  never  have  made  more  constructive  history 
than  any  other  man  of  his  generation.  What  are  commonly  called  theories  in  his 
case  were  the  practical  application  of  the  experience  of  history  to  the  immediate 
problems  of  government,  and  in  the  experience  of  history  Mr.  Wilson  is  an  expert. 
With  the  exception  of  James  Madison,  who  was  called  "the  Father  of  the  Constitu 
tion,"  Mr.  Wilson  is  the  most  profound  student  of  government  among  all  the 
Presidents,  and  he  had  what  Madison  conspicuously  lacked,  which  was  the  faculty 
to  translate  his  knowledge  of  government  into  the  administration  of  government- 

When  Mr.  Wilson  was  elected  President  he  had  reached  the  conclusion  which 
most  unprejudiced  students  of  American  government  eventually  arrive  at — that  the 
system  of  checks  and  balances  is  unworkable  in  practice  and  that  the  legislative 
and  executive  branches  cannot  be  in  fact  coordinate,  independent  departments. 
Other  Presidents  have  acted  on  that  hypothesis  without  daring  to  admit  it,  and 

82 


endeavored  to  control  Congress  by  patronage  and  by  threats.  Mr.  Wilson 
without  any  formality  established  himself  as  the  leader  of  his  party  in  Congress, 
Premier  as  well  as  President,  and  the  originator  of  the  party's  program  of 
legislation. 

Senators  and  Representatives  denounced  him  as  an  autocrat  and  a  dictator. 
Congress  was  described  as  the  President's  rubber  stamp,  but  Mr.  Wilson  established 
something  that  more  nearly  resembled  responsible  government  than  anything  that 
had  gone  before,  and  Congress  under  his  direct  leadership  made  a  record  for  con 
structive  legislation  for  which  there  is  no  parallel.  It  was  due  to  this  kind  of 
leadership  that  such  measures  as  the  Federal  Reserve  Banking  Law  were  enacted, 
which  later  proved  to  be  the  one  bulwark  between  the  American  people  and  a 
financial  panic  of  tragic  proportions. 

But  Mr.  Wilson's  domestic  policies  in  spite  of  their  magnitude  have  been  ob 
scured  by  his  foreign  policies.  Had  there  been  no  war,  these  policies  in  themselves 
would  have  given  to  the  Wilson  Administration  a  place  in  American  history  higher 
than  that  of  any  other  since  the  Civil  War.  What  some  of  his  predecessors  talked 
about  doing  he  did,  and  he  accomplished  it  by  the  process  of  making  himself  the 
responsible  leader  of  his  party  in  Congress  —  a  process  that  is  simple  enough  but 
capable  of  fulfillment  only  in  the  hands  of  a  man  with  an  extraordinary  capacity 
for  imposing  his  will  on  his  associates.  Mr.  Wilson's  control  over  Congress  for  six 
years  was  once  described  as  the  most  impressive  triumph  of  mind  over  matter 
known  to  American  politics. 


Wilson  s  Foreign  Policies 


When  we  begin  the  consideration  of  Mr.  Wilson's  foreign  policies  we  are  entering 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  chapters  in  all  history,  and  one  which  will  require  the 
perspective  of  history  for  a  true  judgment. 

The  first  step  in  the  development  of  these  foreign  policies  came  in  Mr.  Wilson's 
refusal  to  recognize  Huerta,  who  had  participated  in  the  plot  to  murder  President 
Madero  and  made  himself  the  dictator  of  Mexico  by  reason  of  this  assassination. 
The  crime  was  committed  during  Mr.  Taft's  Administration.  When  Mr.  Wilson 
came  into  office  he  served  notice  that  there  would  be  no  recognition  of  Huerta  and 
no  recognition  of  any  Mexican  Government  which  was  not  established  by  due 
process  of  law. 

What  was  plainly  in  Mr.  Wilson's  mind  was  a  determination  to  end  political 
assassination  in  Latin  America  as  a  profitable  industry,  and  compel  recognition, 
to  some  extent  at  least,  of  democratic  principles  and  constitutional  forms.  On  this 
issue  he  had  ro  face  the  intense  opposition  of  all  the  financial  interests  in  the  United 
States  which  had  Mexican  holdings,  and  a  consolidated  European  opposition  as 
well.  Every  dollar  of  foreign  money  invested  in  Mexico  was  confident  that  what 
Mexico  needed  most  was  such  a  dictatorship  as  that  of  Huerta  or  American  inter 
vention.  Mr.  Wilson's  problem  was  to  get  rid  of  Huerta  without  involving  the 
United  States  in  war,  and  then  by  steady  pressure  bring  about  the  establishment  of 
a  responsible  government  that  rested  on  something  at  least  resembling  the  consent 
of  the  governed.  Only  a  statesman  of  high  ideals  would  ever  have  attempted  it, 
and  only  a  statesman  of  almost  infinite  patience  would  have  been  able  to  adhere 
to  the  task  that  Mr.  Wilson  set  for  himself. 

83 


Mexico  is  not  yet  a  closed  incident,  but  Mr.  Wilson's  policy  has  been  vindicated 
in  principle.  For  the  first  time  since  Mr.  Roosevelt  shocked  the  moral  sense  and 
aroused  the  political  resentment  of  all  the  Latin-American  states  by  the  rape  of 
Panama,  faith  in  the  integrity  and  friendship  of  the  United  States  has  been  restored 
among  the  other  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Of  equal  or  even  greater  ethical  importance  was  Mr.  Wilson's  insistence  on 
the  repeal  of  the  Panama  Canal  Tolls  Act,  which  discriminated  in  favor  of  American 
ships  in  spite  of  the  plain  provisions  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  This  was  the 
more  creditable  on  Mr.  Wilson's  part  because  he  himself  had  been  tricked  during 
the  campaign  into  giving  his  support  to  this  measure.  When  he  began  to  perceive 
the  diplomatic  consequences  of  this  treaty  violation  Mr.  Wilson  reversed  himself 
and  demanded  that  Congress  reverse  itself.  Had  he  done  otherwise,  the  American 
people  would  have  had  scant  opportunity  to  protest  against  the  German  perfidy 
which  turned  a  treaty  into  "a  scrap  of  paper." 

When  Germany,  at  the  beginning  of  August,  1914,  declared  war  successively  on 
Russia,  France  and  Belgium,  thereby  bringing  Great  Britain  into  the  most  stu 
pendous  conflict  of  all  the  centuries,  Mr.  Wilson  did  what  every  President  has  done 
when  other  nations  have  gone  to  war.  He  issued  a  proclamation  of  neutrality.  He 
then  went  futher,  however,  than  any  of  his  predecessors  had  done  and  urged  the 
American  people  to  be  not  only  neutral  in  deed  but  "impartial  in  thought."  Mr. 
Wilson  has  been  severely  criticised  for  this  appeal.  The  more  violent  pro-Germans 
and  the  more  violent  pro-French  and  pro-British  regarded  it  as  a  personal  insult 
and  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  President  to  stifle  what  they  were  pleased  to 
regard  as  their  conscience. 

Mr.  Wilson  asked  the  American  people  to  be  impartial  in  thought  because  he  knew 
as  a  historian  the  danger  that  threatened  if  the  country  were  to  be  divided  into 
two  hostile  camps,  the  one  blindly  and  unreasoningly  applauding  every  act  of  the 
Germans  and  the  other  blindly  and  unreasoningly  applauding  every  act  of  the 
Allies.  In  the  early  years  of  his  life  the  Republic  was  all  but  wrecked  by  the 
emotional  and  political  excesses  of  the  pro-French  Americans  and  the  pro-British 
Americans  in  the  war  that  followed  the  French  Revolution.  The  warning  against 
a  passionate  attachment  to  the  interests  of  ether  nations  which  is  embodied  in 
Washington's  Farewell  Address  was  the  first  President's  solemn  admonition  against 
the  evils  of  a  divided  allegiance.  Mr.  Wilson  had  no  desire  to  see  the  country  drift 
into  a  similar  situation  in  which  American  rights,  American  interests  and  American 
prestige  would  all  be  sacrificed  to  gratify  the  American  adherents  of  the  various 
European  belligerents.  Moreover,  he  understood  far  better  than  his  critics  that 
issues  would  soon  arise  between  the  belligerents  and  the  United  States  which  would 
require  on  the  part  of  the  American  people  that  impartiality  of  thought  that  is 
demanded  of  the  just  and  upright  judge.  He  knew  that  the  American  people 
might  ultimately  become  the  final  arbiters  of  the  issues  of  the  conflict. 

The  United  States  was  the  only  great  nation  outside  the  sphere  of  conflict.  It 
was  the  only  great  nation  that  had  no  secret  diplomatic  understandings  with  either 
set  of  belligerents.  It  was  the  only  great  nation  that  was  in  a  position  to  uphold 
the  processes  of  international  law  and  to  use  its  good  offices  as  a  mediator  when  the 
opportunity  arose. 

For  two  years  Mr.  Wilson  genuinely  believed  that  it  would  be  possible  for  the 
United  States  to  fulfill  this  mission,  and  he  never  fully  lost  hope  until  that  day  in 

84 


January,  1917,  when  the  German  Government  wantonly  wrecked  all  the  informal 
peace  negotiations  that  were  then  in  progress  and  decided  to  stake  the  fate  of  the 
empire  on  a  single  throw  of  the  U-boat  dice. 


United  Country  First 

Mr.  Wilson  perceived  quite  as  quickly  and  quite  as  early  as  anybody  the  possi 
bility  that  the  United  States  would  be  drawn  into  the  war,  but  he  perceived  also 
what  most  of  his  critics  failed  to  perceive,  that  the  immediate  danger  of  the  country 
was  not  war  but  a  divided  people.  While  he  was  engaging  in  framing  the  first 
Lusitania  note  he  discussed  the  situation  with  one  of  his  callers  at  the  White  House 
in  words  that  have  since  proved  prophetic: 

I  do  not  know  whether  the  German  Government  intends  to  keep  faith  with 
the  United  States  or  not.    It  is  my  personal  opinion  that  Germany  has  no  su 
intention,  but  I  am  less  concerned  about  the  ultimate  intentions  of  Germany 
than  about  the  attitude  of  the  American  people,  who  are  alread^ 
into  three  groups:    those  who  are  strongly  pro-German,  those  who  are^ 
pro-Ally,  and  the  vast  majority  who  expect  me  to  find  a  way  to  keep  t, 
United  States  out  of  war.    I  do  not  want  war,  yet  I  do  not  know  mat  J 
keep  the  country  out  of  the  war.    That  depends  on  Germany,  and  I 
control  over  Germany.    But  I  intend  to  handle  this  situation  in  such  a  manner 
that  every  American  cithen  will  know  that  the  United  States  Government  has  done 
everything  it  could  to  -prevent  war.    Then  if  war  comes  we  shall  have  a  united  coun 
try  ,  and  with  a  united  country  there  need  be  no  fear  about  the  result. 

Mr.  Wilson's  policy  from  that  day  to  April  2,  1917,  must  be  read  in  the  light  of 
those  words.     He  plunged  forthwith  into  that  extraordinary  debate  i 
German  Government  over  the  submarine  issue—  the  most  momentous  debate  ever 
held—  but  he  was  only  incidentally  addressing  himself  to  the  rulers  of  ( 
He  was  talking  to  the  conscience  of  the  civilized  world,  but  primarily  to  the  con 
science  of  the  United  States,  explaining,  clarifying,  elucidating  the  issue. 
reluctance  to  countenance  any  extensive  measures  of  preparedness  was  the  prc 
of  a  definite  resolution  not  to  give  Germany  and  her  American  support 
opportunity  to  declare  that  the  United  States,  while  these  issues  were  pending,  was 
arming  for  war  against  the  Imperial  Government. 

When  Mr.  Wilson  began  this  debate  he  knew  something  which  his 
not  know  and  which  for  reasons  of  state  he  did  not  choose  to  tell  them.     Weeks 
before  the  destruction  of  the  Lusitania  two-thirds  of  the  German  General 
were  in  favor  of  war  with  the  United  States  as  a  military  measure  in  the  mteres 
Germany.     They  were  under  the  spell  of  Tirpitz.     They  believed  that  the 
marine  could  do  all  that  the  Grand  Admiral  said  it  could  do. 
inasmuch  as  the  Allies  were  borrowing  money  in  the  United  States,  obtaining 
from  the  United  States  and  purchasing  great  quantities  of  munitions  i: 
States  Germany,  by  restricting  submarine  warfare  in  answer  to  Americs 
was  paying  an  excessive  price  for  what  was  in  effect  a  fictitious  neutrality.   In  then 
opinion  the  United  States  as  a  neutral  was  already  doing  more  f< 
it  could  do  as  an  active  belligerent  if  free  scope  were  given  to  the  I 
American  Navy,  they  said,  could  be  safely  disregarded,  because  with  Germany 
already  blockaded  by  the  British  Navy,  and  the  Genr,m  Gran.:  Fleet 
the  addition  of  the  American  Navy,  or  a  dozen  navies  f  r 

85 


little  difference  in  respect  to  the  actual  facts  of  sea  power.  On  the  other  hand 
there  was  not  enough  shipping  available  to  feed  the  Allies  and  enable  the  United 
States  to  send  an  army  to  Europe.  If  the  United  States  tried  to  provide  troops, 
the  British  would  starve.  If  the  United  States  could  not  send  troops,  Germany 
would  be  just  as  well  off  with  the  United  States  in  the  war  as  out  of  the  war,  and 
would  have  the  priceless  additional  advantage  of  being  able  to  employ  her  sub 
marines  as  she  saw  fit,  regardless  of  the  technicalities  of  international  law. 

In  the  fall  of  1916  Mr.  Wilson  decided  definitely  that  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany  were  approaching  a  climax.  If  the  war  continued 
much  longer  the  United  States  would  inevitably  be  drawn  in.  There  was  no 
prospect  of  a  decision.  The  belligerent  armies  were  deadlocked.  Unwilling  to 
wait  longer  for  events,  Mr.  Wilson  made  up  his  mind  that  he  would  demand  from 
each  side  a  statement  of  its  aims  and  objects  and  compel  each  side  to  plead  its 
own  cause  before  the  court  of  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.  This  was  done  on 
December  18,  1916,  in  a  joint  note  which  was  so  cold  and  dispassionate  in  its  terms, 
that  its  import  was  hardly  understood. 

With  Clean  Hands 

The  President  said  that  the  aims  and  objects  of  the  war  on  both  sides  "  as  stated 
in  general  terms  to  their  own  people  and  the  world"  seemed  to  be  "virtually  the 
same,"  and  he  asked  for  a  bill  of  particulars.  Instantly  there  was  wild  turmoil 
and  recri'mination  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  and  their  friends  in  the  United  States. 

The  President  had  declared,  they  said,  that  the  Germans  and  the  Allies  were 
fighting  for  the  same  thing.  Mr.  Wilson  had  expressed  no  opinion  of  his  own  one 
way  or  the  other  and  the  obvious  discovery  was  soon  made  in  London  and  Paris 
that  the  President  had  given  to  the  Allies  the  opportunity  which  they  needed  of 
officially  differentiating  their  war  aims  from  those  of  the  Germans.  The  German 
Government  missed  its  opportunity  completely,  and  by  their  own  answer  to  the 
President's  note  the  Allies  succeeded  in  consolidating  their  moral  positions,  which 
was  something  they  had  never  previously  been  able  to  do  in  spite  of  all  their 
propaganda. 

Informal  peace  negotiations  were  still  in  progress,  although  conducted  in  secret 
and  carefully  screened  from  the  knowledge  of  all  peoples  involved  in  the  conflict. 
On  January  22,  1917,  Mr.  Wilson  made  his  last  attempt  at  mediation  in  the  "peace 
without  victory"  address  to  the  Senate  in  which  he  defined  what  he  regarded  as 
the  fundamental  conditions  of  a  permanent  peace.  Most  of  the  basic  principles 
of  this  address  were  afterward  incorporated  into  the  Fourteen  Points.  Here  again 
Mr.  Wilson  was  the  victim  of  his  own  precision  of  language  and  of  the  settled  policy 
of  his  critics  of  reading  into  his  public  utterances  almost  everything  except  what  he 
actually  said.  He  himself  has  insisted  on  giving  his  own  interpretation  of  "peace 
without  victory,"  and  this  interpretation  was  instantly  rejected  by  the  super- 
patriots  who  regarded  themselves  as  the  sole  custodians  of  all  the  issues  of  the  war. 
When  the  armistice  was  signed  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  living  British  states 
men  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  war  had  lasted  two  years  too  long,  and  that 
the  task  of  salvaging  an  enduring  peace  from  the  wreck  had  become  well-nigh 
insuperable.  It  will  always  be  one  of  the  fascinating  riddles  of  history  to  guess 
what  the  result  would  have  been  if  Mr.  Wilson's  final  proposals  for  mediation 

86 


©  Underwood  &  Under-wood 

1919:  On  the  bridge  of  the  George  Washington  on  the  return  from  the 
Peace  Conference 


The  President  and  the  Treaty 

President  Wilson  sails  for  Europe,  December  4-,  1918. 
Fisits  to  England,  France  and  Italy,  December-January, 

1918-19. 

Peace  Conference  opened,  January  18,  1919. 
League  Covenant  adopted,  February  14,  1919. 
President  Wilson's  trip  home,  February  24-March  5,  1919. 
The  treaty  signed,  June  28,  1919. 
Submission  to  the  Senate,  July  10,  1919. 
The  President's  speaking  tour,  September  3-26,  1919. 
Adoption  of  the  Lodge  reservations,  November  16,  1919. 
Final  defeat  of  the  treaty  in  the  Senate,  March  20,  1920. 


©  Edmonston 

February  15,  1921 :  Mr.  Wilson's  latest  photograph — made  at  a  meeting 

of  the  Cabinet 


TWO    PICTURES 

By  Joseph  P.  Tumulty 

Two  pictures  arc  in  my  mind.  First,  the  Hall  of  Representa 
tives  crowded  from  floor  to  gallery  with  expectant  throngs. 
Presently  it  is  announced  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
will  address  Congress.  There  steps  out  to  the  Speaker's  desk  a 
straight,  vigorous,  slender  man,  active  and  alert.  He  is  sixty 
years  of  age,  but  he  looks  not  more  than  forty-five,  so  lithe  of 
limb,  so  aiert  of  bearing,  so  virile.  It  is  Woodrow  Wilson  read 
ing  his  great  war  message.  The  other  picture  is  only  three  and 
a  half  years  later.  There  is  a  parade  of  Veterans  of  the  Great 
War.  They  arc  to  be  reviewed  by  the  President  on  the  east 
terrace  of  the  White  House.  In  a  chair  sits  a  man,  your  Presi 
dent,  broken  in  health,  but  still  alert  in  mind.  His  hair  is  white, 
his  shoulders  bowed,  his  figure  bent.  He  is  sixty-three  years  old, 
but  he  looks  older.  It  is  Woodrow  Wilson.  Presently,  in  the 
procession  there  appears  an  ambulance  laden  with  wounded  sol 
diers,  the  maimed,  the  halt  and  the  blind.  As  they  pass  they 
salute,  slowly  reverently.  The  President's  right  hand  goes  up  in 
answering  salute.  I  glanced  at  him.  There  were  tears  in  his 
eyes.  The  wounded  is  greeting  the  wounded;  those  in  the  ambu 
lance,  he  in  the  chair,  are,  alike,  casualties  of  the  Great  War. 

From  address  by  Joseph  P.  Tumulty 

ThiivrJn^      D/-/       ?JP       1O?f) 


had  been  accepted.  The  United  States  would  not  have  entered  the  war,  and  a 
less  violent  readjustment  of  the  internal  affairs  of  Europe  would  probably  have 
resulted.  There  would  have  been  no  Bolshevist  revolution  in  Russia  and  no  eco 
nomic  collapse  of  Europe.  Nor  is  it  certain  that  most  of  the  really  enduring  bene 
fits  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  could  not  have  been  as  well  obtained  by  negotia 
tion  as  they  were  finally  obtained  through  a  military  victory  which  cost  a  price 
that  still  staggers  humanity. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  German  Government,  now  fighting  to  maintain  the  dy 
nasty  and  the  Junker  domination,  took  the  issue  out  of  Mr.  Wilson's  hands.  Ten 
days  after  his  "peace  without  victory"  address  the  German  autocracy  put  into 
effect  its  cherished  programme  of  ruthless  submarine  warfare.  The  only  possible 
answer  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  was  the  dismissal  of  Count  von  Bernstorff 
the  German  Ambassador,  and  from  that  time  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany  was  only  a  matter  of  days.  But  Mr.  Wilson  had  achieved  the  great 
purpose  that  he  had  formulated  two  years  before.  He  had  been  balked  in  his  efforts 
at  mediation,  but  he  had  united  the  American  people  on  the  issues  of  the  conflict- 
He  had  demonstrated  to  them  that  their  Government  had  exerted  every  honorable 
means  to  avoid  war  and  that  its  hands  were  clean.  There  was  no  uncertainty  in 
their  own  minds  that  the  responsibility  for  the  war  rested  solely  on  Germany, 
and  Mr.  Wilson  now  purposed  to  write  the  terms  of  peace  with  the  sword. 

^A  £all  to  a  (Crusade 

Mr.  Wilson's  War  Address  on  the  night  of  April  2,  1917,  was  the  most  dramatic 
event  that  the  National  Capitol  had  ever  known.  In  the  presence  of  both  branches 
of  Congress,  of  the  Supreme  Court,  of  the  Cabinet  and  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps, 
Mr.  Wilson  summoned  the  American  people  not  to  a  war  but  to  a  crusade  in  words 
that  instantaneously  captivated  the  imagination  of  the  Nation: 

But  the  right  is  more  precious  than  peace,  and  we  shall  fight  for  the  things 
which  we  have  always  carried  nearest  our  hearts — for  democracy,  for  the  right 
of  those  who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  government,  for 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  dominion  of  right  by 
such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as  shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and 
make  the  world  at  last  free.  To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate  our  lives  and  our 
fortunes,  everything  that  we  are  and  everything  that  we  have,  with  the  pride 
of  those  who  know  that  the  day  has  come  when  America  is  privileged  to  spend 
her  blood  and  her  might  for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth  and  happiness 
and  the  peace  which  she  has  treasured.  God  helping  her,  she  can  do  no  other. 

This  was  not  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  intellectual  aristocrat,  who  was  speaking, 
but  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  fervent  democrat,  proclaiming  a  new  declaration  of 
independence  to  the  embattled  peoples. 

No  sooner  had  Congress  declared  war  than  Mr.  Wilson  proceeded  to  mobilize 
all  the  resources  of  the  Nation  and  throw  them  into  the  conflict.  This  war  was 
different  from  any  other  war  in  which  the  United  States  had  ever  engaged,  not 
only  by  reason  of  its  magnitude  but  by  reason  of  the  necessity  for  coordinating 
American  military  plans  with  the  military  plans  of  the  Allies.  The  Allies  were  not 
quite  agreed  as  to  what  they  desired  of  the  United  States,  aside  from  unlimited 
financial  assistance,  and  the  solution  of  the  general  problem  depended  more  or 
less  on  the  trend  of  events. 

89 


The  test  of  any  war  policy  is  its  success,  and  it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  enter  into  a 
vindication  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Wilson  Administration  made  war,  cr  to 
trouble  about  the  accusations  of  waste  and  extravagance,  as  if  war  were  an  eco 
nomic  process  which  could  be  carried  on  prudently  and  frugally.  The  historian 
is  not  likely  to  devote  serious  attention  to  the  partisan  accusations  relating  to 
Mr.  Wilson's  conduct  of  the  war,  but  he  will  find  it  interesting  to  record  the  manner 
in  which  the  President  brought  his  historical  knowledge  to  bear  in  shaping  the  war 
policies  of  the  country. 

The  voluntary  system  and  the  draft  system  had  both  been  discredited  in  the 
Civil  War,  so  Mr.  Wilson  demanded  a  Selective-Service  Act  under  which  the  coun 
try  could  raise  10,000,000  troops,  if  10,000,000  troops  were  needed,  without  de 
ranging  its  essential  industries.  It  had  taken  Mr.  Lincoln  three  years  to  find  a 
General  whom  he  could  intrust  with  the  command  of  the  Union  armies.  Mr- 
Wilson  picked  his  Commander  in  Chief  before  he  went  to  war  and  then  gave  to 
Gen.  Pershing  the  same  kind  of  ungrudging  support  that  Mr.  Lincoln  gave  to 
Gen.  Grant.  The  Civil  War  had  been  financed  by  greenbacks  and  bond  issues 
peddled  by  bankers.  Mr.  Wilson  called  on  the  American  people  to  finance  their 
own  war,  and  they  unhesitatingly  responded.  In  the  war  with  Spain  the  commis 
sary  system  had  broken  down  completely  owing  to  the  antiquated  methods  that 
were  employed.  No  other  army  in  time  of  war  was  ever  so  well  fed  or  so  well 
cared  for  as  that  of  the  United  States  in  the  conflict  with  Germany. 

Wilson  as  a  War  ^President 

Mistakes  there  were  in  plenty,  both  in  methods  and  in  the  choice  of  men,  and 
errors  of  judgment  and  the  shortcomings  that  always  result  from  a  lack  of  expe 
rience,  but  the  impartial  verdict  of  history  must  be  that  when  everything  is  set 
forth  on  the  debit  side  of  the  balance  sheet  which  can  be  set  forth  Mr.  Wilson 
remains  the  most  vigorous  of  all  the  war  Presidents.  Yet  it  is  also  true  that  history 
will  concern  itself  far  less  with  Mr.  Wilson  as  a  war  President  than  with  Mr.  Wilson 
as  a  peace-making  President.  It  is  around  him  as  a  peace-making  President  that 
all  the  passions  and  prejudices  and  disappointments  of  the  world  still  rage. 

Mr.  Wilson  in  his  "peace  without  victory"  address  to  the  Senate  previous  to 
the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  had  sketched  a  general  plan  of  a 
cooperative  peace.  "I  am  proposing,  as  it  were,"  he  said,  "that  the  nations  with 
one  accord  should  adopt  the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
world."  He  returned  to  the  subject  again  in  his  War  Address,  in  which  he  defined 
the  principles  for  which  the  United  States  was  to  fight  and  the  principles  on  which 
an  enduring  peace  could  be  made.  The  time  came  when  it  was  necessary  to  be 
still  more  specific. 

In  the  winter  of  1918  the  morale  of  the  Allies  was  at  its  lowest  ebb.  Russia 
had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  was  preparing  to  make  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany.  There  was  widespread  discontent  in  Italy,  and  everywhere 
in  Europe  soldiers  and  civilians  were  asking  one  another  what  they  were  really 
fighting  for.  On  January  8  Mr.  Wilson  went  before  Congress  and  delivered  the 
address  which  contained  the  Fourteen  Points  of  peace,  a  message  which  was  greeted 
both  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe  as  a  veritable  Magna.  Charta  of  the  nations. 
Mr.  Wilson  had  again  become  the  spokesman  of  the  aspirations  of  mankind,  and 

90 


from  the  moment  that  this  address  was  delivered  the  thrones  of  the  Hohenzolierns 
and  the  Hapsburgs  ceased  to  be  stable. 

Ten  months  later  they  were  to  crumble  and  collapse.  Before  the  armistice 
was  signed  on  Nov.  n,  1918,  Mr.  Wilson  had  overthrown  the  doctrine  of  Divine 
right  in  Europe.  The  Hapsburgs  ran  away.  The  Kaiser  was  compelled  to  abdicate 
and  take  refuge  in  exile,  justifying  his  flight  by  the  explanation  that  Wilson  would 
not  make  peace  with  Germany  while  a  Hohenzollern  was  on  the  throne.  This  was 
the  climax  of  Mr.  Wilson's  power  and  influence  and,  strangely  enough,  it  was  the 
dawn  of  his  own  day  of  disaster. 

For  nearly  six  years  Mr.  Wilson  had  manipulated  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  with  a  skill  that  was  almost  uncanny.  He  had  turned  himself  from  a  mi 
nority  President  into  a  majority  President.  He  had  so  deftly  outmanoeuvred  all 
his  opponents  in  Congress  and  out  of  Congress  that  they  had  nothing  with  which 
to  console  themselves  except  their  intensive  hatred  of  the  man  and  all  that  pertained 
to  him.  Then  at  the  very  summit  of  his  career  he  made  his  first  fatal  blunder. 

Every  President  in  the  off-year  election  urges  the  election  of  a  Congress  of  his 
own  party.  That  is  part  of  the  routine  of  politics,  and  during  the  campaign  of 
1918  Mr.  Wilson's  advisers  urged  him  to  follow  the  precedent.  What  they  forgot 
and  he  forgot  was  that  it  was  no  time  for  partisan  precedents,  and  he  allowed 
his  distruct  of  the  Republican  leaders  in  Congress  to  sweep  him  into  an  inexcusable 
error  that  he,  of  all  men,  should  have  avoided.  The  Sixty-fifth  Congress  was 
anything  but  popular.  The  Western  farmers  were  aggrieved  because  the  price  of 
wheat  had  been  regulated  and  the  price  of  cotton  had  not.  The  East  was  greatly 
dissatisfied  with  the  war  taxes,  which  it  regarded  as  an  unfair  discrimination, 
and  it  remembered  Mr.  Kitchin's  boast  that  the  North  wanted  the  war  and  the 
North  would  have  to  pay  for  it.  There  was  general  complaint  from  business 
interests  against  the  Southern  Democratic  control  of  the  legislative  department, 
and  all  this  sentiment  instantly  crystallized  when  the  President  asked  for  another 
Democratic  Congress.  Republicans  who  were  loyally  supporting  the  Adminis 
tration  in  all  its  war  activities  were  justly  incensed  that  a  party  issue  had  been 
raised.  A  Republican  Congress  was  elected  and  by  inference  the  President  sus 
tained  a  personal  defeat. 

Misfortunes  did  not  come  singly  in  Mr.  Wilson's  case.  Following  the  mistake 
of  appealing  for  the  election  of  a  Democratic  Congress  he  made  an  equally  serious 
mistake  in  the  selection  of  his  Peace  Commission. 

To  anybody  who  knows  Mr.  Wilson,  who  knows  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who 
knows  Mr.  Clemenceau,  nothing  could  be  sillier  than  the  chapters  of  Keynes  and 
Dillon  in  which  they  undertake  to  picture  the  President's  unfitness  to  cope  with 
the  European  masters  of  diplomacy.  Mr.  Wilson  for  years  had  been  playing  with 
European  masters  of  diplomacy  as  a  cat  plays  with  a  mouse.  To  assume  that  Mr. 
Wilson  was  ever  deceived  by  the  transparent  tactics  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr. 
Clemenceau  is  to  assume  the  impossible.  It  would  be  as  easy  to  conceive  of  his 
being  tricked  and  bamboozled  by  the  United  States  Senate. 

The  *Peace  Commission 

Mr.  Wilson  needed  strong  Republican  representation  on  the  Peace  Commission 
not  to  reinforce  him  in  his  struggles  with  his  adversaries  at  Paris  but  to  divide 

91 


with  him  the  responsibility  for  a  treaty  of  peace  that  was  doomed  in  advance  to 
be  a  disappointment.  Although  the  popular  sentiment  of  Europe  was  almost  pas 
sionate  in  its  advocacy  of  President  Wilson's  peace  program,  all  the  special 
interests  that  were  seeking  to  capitalize  the  peace  for  their  own  advantage  or 
profit  were  actively  at  work  and  were  beginning  to  swing  all  the  influence  that  they 
could  command  on  their  various  Governments.  It  was  inevitable  from  the  outset 
that  Mr.  Wilson  could  never  get  the  peace  that  he  had  expected.  The  treaty  was 
bound  to  be  a  series  of  compromises  that  would  satisfy  nobody,  and  when  Mr. 
Wilson  assumed  all  the  responsibility  for  it  in  advance  he  assumed  a  responsibility 
that  no  stateman  who  had  ever  lived  could  carry  alone.  Had  he  taken  Mr.  Root 
or  Mr.  Taft  or  both  of  them  with  him  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  might 
have  been  no  different,  but  the  Senate  would  have  been  robbed  of  the  partisan 
grievance  on  which  it  organized  the  defeat  of  ratification. 

Day  after  day  during  the  conference  Mr.  Wilson  fought  the  fight  for  a  peace 
that  represented  the  liberal  thought  of  the  world.  Day  after  day  the  odds  against 
him  lengthened.  The  contact  finally  resolved  itself  into  a  question  of  whether 
he  should  take  what  he  could  get  or  whether  he  should  withdraw  from  the  confer 
ence  and  throw  the  doors  open  to  chaos.  The  President  made  the  only  decision 
that  he  had  a  moral  right  to  make.  He  took  what  he  could  get,  nor  are  the  states 
men  with  whom  he  was  associated  altogether  to  blame  because  he  did  not  get 
more.  They  too  had  to  contend  against  forces  over  which  they  had  no  control. 
They  were  not  free  agents  either,  and  Mr.  Smuts  has  summed  up  the  case  in  two 
sentences: 

It  was  not  the  statesmen  that  failed  so  much  as  the  spirit  of  the  peoples 
behind  them.  The  hope,  the  aspiration,  for  a  new  .=-orld  order  ^f  peace  and 
right  and  justice,  however  deeply  and  universally  felt,  was  still  only  feeble 
and  ineffective  in  comparison  with  the  dominant  national  passions  which  found 
their  expression  in  the  peace  treaty. 

All  the  passions  and  hatreds  bred  of  four  years  of  merciless  warfare,  all  the 
insatiable  fury  for  revenge,  all  the  racial  ambitions  that  had  been  twisted  and  per 
verted  by  centuries  of  devious  diplomacy — these  were  all  gathered  around  the 
council  table,  clamorous  in  their  demand  to  dictate  the  terms. 

Mr.  Wilson  surrendered  more  than  he  dreamed  he  was  surrendering,  but  it  is 
not  difficult  to  follow  his  line  of  reasoning.  The  League  of  Nations  was  to  be  a 
continuing  court  of  equity,  sitting  in  judgment  on  the  peace  itself,  revising  its 
terms  when  revision  became  necessary  and  possible,  slowly  readjusting  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty  to  a  calmer  and  saner  state  of  public  mind.  Get  peace  first. 
Establish  the  League,  and  the  League  would  rectify  the  inevitable  mistakes  of 
the  treaty. 

It  is  a  curious  commentary  on  human  nature  that  when  the  treaty  was  completed 
and  the  storm  of  wrath  broke,  all  the  rage,  all  the  resentment,  all  the  odium  should 
have  fallen  on  the  one  man4who  had  struggled  week  in  and  week  out  against  the 
forces  of  reaction  and  revenge  and  had  written  into  the  treaty  all  that  it  contains 
which  makes  for  the  international  advancement  of  the  race. 

Why  The  Treaty  Was  ^Beaten 

Into  that  record  must  also  go  the  impressive  fact  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
was  rejected  by  the  United  States  Senate,  under  the  leadership  of  Henry  Cabot 

92 


Lodge,  not  because  of  its  acknowledged  defects  and  shortcomings,  not  because  it 
breathed  the  spirit  of  a  Carthaginian  peace  in  its  punitive  clauses,  but  because  of 
its  most  enlightened  provision,  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  which  is 
the  one  hope  of  a  war-racked  world. 

When  people  speak  of  the  tragedy  of  Mr.  Wilson's  career  they  have  in  mind  only 
the  temporary  aspects  of  it — the  universal  dissatisfaction  with  the  treaty  of  peace,, 
his  physical  collapse,  his  defeat  in  the  Senate  and  the  verdict  at  the  polls  in  No 
vember.  They  forget  that  the  end  of  the  chapter  is  not  yet  written.  The  League 
of  Nations  is  a  fact,  whatever  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  may  be  toward  it, 
and  it  will  live  unless  the  peoples  of  the  earth  prove  their  political  incapacity  to 
use  it  for  the  promotion  of  their  own  welfare.  The  principle  of  self-determination 
will  remain  as  long  as  men  believe  in  the  right  of  self-government  and  are  willing 
to  die  for  it.  It  was  Woodrow  Wilson  who  wrote  that  principle  into  the  law  of 
nations,  even  though  he  failed  to  obtain  a  universal  application  of  it.  Tacitus  said 
of  the  Catti  tribesmen,  "Others  go  to  battle;  these  go  to  war,"  and  Mr.  Wilson 
went  to  war  in  behalf  of  the  democratic  theory  of  government  extended  to  all  the 
affairs  of  the  nations.  That  war  is  not  yet  won,  and  the  Commander  in  Chief  is 
crippled  by  the  wounds  that  he  received  on  the  field  of  action.  But  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  future  does  not  rest  with  him.  It  rests  with  the  self-governing 
peoples  for  whom  he  has  blazed  the  trail.  All  the  complicated  issues  of  this  titanic 
struggle  finally  reduce  themselves  to  these  prophetic  words  of  Maximilian  Harden: 
"Only  one  conqueror's  work  will  endure — Wilson's  thought." 

Woodrow  Wilson  on  this  morning  of  the  fourth  of  March  can  say,  in  the  words 
of  Paul  the  Apostle  to  Timothy: 

"For  I  am  now  ready  to  be  offered,  and  the  time  of  my  departure  is  at  hand. 
"I  have  fought  a  good  fight,  I  have  finished  my  course,  I  have  kept  the  faith." 
Copyright  1921.  New  York  World. 


Covenant  of  tfyc  TCeague  of 

ADOPTED  BY  THE  PLENARY  SESSION  OP  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 
Paris,  April  28,  1919 


Preamble 

In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to  achieve  internationai 
peace  and  security,  by  the  acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the 
prescription  of  open,  just  and  honorable  relations  between  nations,  by  the  firm 
establishment  of  the  understandings  of  international  law  as  to  actual  rule  of  con 
duct  among  governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous 
respect  for  all  treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one 
another,  the  high  contracting  parties  agree  to  this  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

07 


Article  One 

[Membership] 

_The  original  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be  those  of  the  signatories 
which  are  named  in  the  annex  to  this  Covenant  and  also  such  of  those  other  states 
named  in  the  annex  as  shall  accede  without  reservation  to  this  Covenant.  Such 
accessions  shall  be  effected  by  a  declaration  deposited  with  the  Secretariat  within 
two  months  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Covenant.  Notice  thereof  shall  be 
sent  to  all  other  members  of  the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  state,  dominion,  or  colony  not  named  in  the  annex, 
may  become  a  member  of  the  League  if  its  admission  is  agreed  by  two-thirds  of 
the  assembly,  provided  that  it  shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention 
to  observe  its  international  obligations,  and  shall  accept  such  regulations  as  may 
be  prescribed  by  the  League  in  regard  to  its  military  and  naval  forces  and  arma 
ments. 

Any  member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years'  notice  of  its  intention  so  to 
do^withdraw^from  the  League,  provided  that  all  its  international  obligations  and 
all  its  obligations  under  this  Covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of  its 
withdrawal. 

Article  Two 
[Executive  and  Administration  Machinery] 

The  action  of  the  League  under  this  Covenant  shall  be  effected  through  the 
instrumentality  of  an  Assembly  and  of  a  Council,  with  a  permanent  Secretariat. 

Article  Three 

[The  Assembly] 

The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  members  of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from  time  to  time  as  occasion 
may  require,  at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided 
upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter  within  the  sphere  of 
action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly,  each  member  of  the  League  shall  have  one  vote, 
and  may  have  not  more  than  three  representatives. 

Article  Four 

[The  Council] 

The  Council  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
of  the  British  Empire,  of  France,  of  Italy,  and  of  Japan,  together  with  representa 
tives  of  four  other  members  of  the  League.  These  four  members  of  the  Leagu'" 
shall  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  from  time  to  time  in  its  discretion.  Until  tl*. 
appointment  of  the  representatives  of  the  four  members  of  the  League  first  selected 
by  the  Assembly,  representatives  of  Belgium,  Brazil,  Greece  and  Spain  shall  be 
members  of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly,  the  Council  may  name 
additional  members  of  the  League  whose  representatives  shall  always  be  members 
of  the  Council;  the  Council  with  like  approval  may  increase  the  number  of  mem 
bers  of  the  League  to  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  for  representation  on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require,  and  at  least 
once  a  year,  at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meethgs  with  any  matter  within  the  sphere  of 
action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Any  member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the  Council  shall  be  invited  to 
send  a  representative  to  sit  as  a  member  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council  during  the 
consideration  of  matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that  member  of  the 
League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council,  each  member  of  the  League  represented  on  the 
Council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than  one  representative. 

04. 


Article  Five 

[Decision  by  Unanimity  or  Majority;  Initial  Meetings] 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  Covenant,  or  by  the  terms 
of  this  treaty,  decisions  at  any  meeting  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  shall 
require  the  agreement  of  all  the  members  of  the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 
All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council,  the 
appointment  of  committees  to  investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated 
by  the  Assembly  or  by  the  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first  meeting  at  the  Council  shall 
be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Article  Six 

tThe  Secretariat] 

The  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  established  at  the  seat  of  the  League.  The 
Secretariat  shall  comprise  a  Secretary-General  and  such  secretaries  and  staff  as 
»iay  be  required. 

The  first  Secretary-General  shall  be  the  person  named  in  the  annex;  thereafter 
the  Secretary-General  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Council  with  the  approval  of  the 
majority  of  the  Assembly. 

The  Secretaries  and  the  staff  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secre 
tary-General  with  the  approval  of  the  Council. 

'The  Secretary-General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all  meetings  of  the  Assembly 
and  of  the  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the  members  of  tne  League 
in  accordance  with  the  apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau 
of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  Seven 
[League  Capital;  Status  of  Officials  and  Property;   Sex  Equality] 

The  seat  of  the  League  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  seat  of  the  League  shall  be  estab 
lished  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the  League,  including  the  Secretariat, 
shall  be  open  equally  to  men  and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  members  of  the  League  and  officials  of  the  League  when 
engaged  on  the  business  of  the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  i 
nities.  .  .  , 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the  League  or  its  offi 
representatives  attending  its  meetings  shall  be  inviolable. 

Article  Eight 

[Disarmament] 

The  members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the  maintenance  of  a  peace  requires 
the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  the  national 
safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  international  obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situation  and  circumstance 
of  each  state,  shall  formulate  plans  for  such  reduction  for  tne  consideratK 
action  of  the  several  governments.  .  . 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  revision  at  least  every  t. 

yCa After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several  governments,  limits 
of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence  , 

~°UThe  members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture  by  private  enterprise 

of  munitions  and  implements  of  war  is  open  to  grave  objections.     II 

shall  advise  how  the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such  manufactur  ea, 


due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  members  of  the  League  which  are 
not  able  to  manufacture  the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their 
safety. 

The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange  full  and  frank  informa 
tion  as  to  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  their  military  and  naval  programmes  and 
the  condition  of  such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to  warlike  purposes. 

Article  Nine 

[Disarmament  Commission] 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise  the  Councrl  on  the 
execution  of  the  provisions  of  Articles  One  and  Eight  and  on  military  and  naval 
questions  generally. 

Article  Ten 

[Territorial  and  Political  Guarantees] 

The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and  preserve  as  against 
external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of 
all  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat 
or  danger  of  such  aggression,  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which 
this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  Eleven 

[Joint  Action  to  Prevent  War] 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting  any  of  the  members 
of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  League, 
and  the  League  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to 
safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency  should  arise,  the 
Secretary-General  shall,  on  the  request  of  any  member  of  the  League,  forthwith 
summon  a  meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  fundamental  right  of  each  member  of  the  League 
to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance 
whatever  affecting  international  relations  which  threatens  to  disturb  either  the 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

Article  Twelve 

[Postponement  of  War] 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  if  there  should  arise  between  them  any 
dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  they  will  submit  the  matter  either  to  arbitration 
or  to  inquiry  by  the  Council,  and  they  agree  in  no  case  to  resort  to  war  until  three 
months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  report  by  the  Council. 

In  any  case,  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  shall  be  made  within 
a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report  of  the  Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months 
after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  Thirteen 

[Arbitration  of  Justiciable  Matters] 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  when  ever  any  dispute  shall  arise  between 
them  which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration  and  which 
cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  subject 
matter  to  arbitration.  Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any. 
question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any  fact  which  if  established 
would  constitute  a  breach  of  any  international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  extent  and 
nature  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach,  are  declared  to  be  among 
these  which  are  generally  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration.  For  the  con 
sideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of  arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred 
shall  be  the  court  agreed  on  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  con 
vention  existing  between  them. 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any 
award  that  may  be  rendered  and  that  they  will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  member 

96 


of  the  League  which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out 
such  an  award,  the  Council  shall  propose  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  give  effect 
thereto. 

Article  Fourteen 

[Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice] 

The  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  members  of  the  League  for 
adoption  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  court  of  international  justice. 
The  court  shall  be  competent  to  hear  and  determine  any  dispute  of  an  international 
character  which  the  parties  thereto  submit  to  it.  The  court  may  also  give  an 
advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or  question  referred  to  it  by  the  Council  or  by 
the  Assembly. 

Article  Fifteen 

[Settlement  of  Disputes  by  Council  or  Assembly;  Exclusion  of  Domestic  Questions 

If  there  should  arise  between  members  of  the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead 
to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above,  the  members  of  the 
League  agree  that  they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the  Council.  Any  party  to  the 
dispute  may  effect  such  submission  by  giving  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  dispute 
to  the  Secretary-General,  who  will  make  all  neceswiry  arrangements  for  a  full 
investigation  and  consideration  thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dis 
pute  will  communicate  to  the  Secretary-General,  as  promptly  as  possible,  state 
ments  of  their  case,  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers;'  the  Council  may  forthwith 
direct  the  publication  thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  settlement  of  any  dispute,  and  if  such 
efforts  are  successful,  a  statement  shall  be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  ex 
planations  regarding  the  dispute  and  terms  of  settlement  thereof  as  the  Council 
mav  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either  unanimously  or  by  a  majority 
vote  shall  make  and  publish  a  report  containing  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the 
dspute  and  the  recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and  proper  in  regard 
thereto. 

Any  member  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council  may  make  public  a 
statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  of  the  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof 
other  than  the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the 
members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party  to  the 
dispute  which  complies  with  the  recommendations  of  the  report. 

If  the  Council  faMs  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
members  thereof,  other  than  the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute,  the  members  of  the  League  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  take 
such  action  as  they  shall  consider  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of  them,  and  is  found  by  the 
Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and  shall  make  no 
recommendation  as  to  its  settlement. 

^  The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Assembly. 
The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  pro 
vided  that  such  request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the 
dispute  to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly  all  the  provisions  of  this  Article  and  of 
Article  Twelve  relating  to  the  action  and  powers  of  the  Council  shall  apply  to  the 
action  and  powers  of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made  by  the  Assembly, 
if  concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  those  members  of  the  League  represented 
on  the  Council  and  of  a  majority  of  the  other  members  of  the  League,  exclusive 
in  each  case  of  the  representatives  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  have  the  same 
force  as  a  report  by  the  Council  concurred  in  by  all  the  members  thereof  other  than 
the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

97 


Article  Sixteen 

[Sanctions] 

Should  any  member  of  the  League  resort  to  war  in  disregard  of  its  covenants 
under  Articles  Twelve,  Thirteen  or  Fifteen,  it  shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have 
committed  an  act  of  war  against  all  other  members  of  the  League,  which  hereby 
undertr.ke  immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  rela 
tions,  th'1  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between  their  nations  and  the  nationals  of 
the  covenant-breaking  state  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or 
personal  intercourse  between  the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  state  and  the 
national0  of  anv  other  state,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  rf  the  O>ur.ci!  in  such  case  to  recommend  to  the  several 
governments  concerned  what  tflVctivc  military  or  naval  forces  the  members  of  the 
League  shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armaments  offerees  to  be  used  to  protect 
the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that  they  will  mutually  support  one 
another  in  the  financial  and  economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  Article, 
in  order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from  the  above  measures, 
and  that  they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking  state,  and  that  they  will 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of 
any  of  the  members  of  the  League  which  are  cooperating  to  protect  the  covenants 
of  the  League. 

Any  member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any  covenant  of  the  League  may 
be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a  member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council  con 
curred  in  by  the  representatives  of  all  the  other  members  of  the  League  represented 
thereon. 

Article  Seventeen 
[Disputes  of  Non-Members] 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  member  of  the  League  and  a  state  which  is 
not  a  member  of  the  League,  or  betv/een  states  not  members  of  the  League,  the 
state  or  states  not  members  of  the  League  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such  conditions 
as  the  Council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invitation  is  accepted,  the  provisions  of 
Articles  Twelve  to  Sixteen  inclusive  shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as 
may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given,  the  Council  shall  immediately  institute  an 
inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may 
seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  state  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the 
League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  and  shall  resort  to  war  against  a  member 
of  the  League,  the  provisions  of  Article  Sixteen  shall  be  applicable  as  against  the 
state  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so  invited,  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Council  may 
take  such  measures  and  make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent  hostilities 
and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  Eighteen 

[Registration  of  International  Engagements] 

Every  convention  or  international  engagement  entered  into  henceforward  by  any 
member  of  the  League  shall  be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretariat  and  shall 
as  soon  as  possible  be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or  international  engage 
ment  shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

Article  Nineteen 

[Revision  of  Former  Treaties] 

The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the  reconsideration  by  members 
of  the  League  of  treaties  which  have  become  inapplicable,  and  the  consideration 

98 


of  international  conditions  of  which  the  con dsluants>  might  £n3kftgeVj  tli«  Jpeace  of 
the  world. 

Article  Twenty 

[Abrogation  of  Understandings  not  Consistent  with  the  Covenant] 
The  members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that  this  Covenant  is  accepted  as 
abrogating  all  obligations  or  understandings  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that  they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into 
any  engagements  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  members  of  the  League  shall,  before  becoming  a  member  of  the  League, 
have  undertaken  any  obligation  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  covenant,  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  such  member  to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release 
from  such  obligations. 

Article  Twenty-One 
[The  Monroe  Doctrine] 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity  cf  international 
engagements  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

Article  Twenty-Two 

[Mandatory  Tutelage  of  Colonies  and  Backward  Races] 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  consequence  of  the  late  war  have 
ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  which  formerly  governed  them  and 
which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  net  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the 
strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle 
that  the  well  being  and  development  of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civiliza 
tion  and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should  be  embodied  in 
this  covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  ta  this  principle  is  that  the  tutelage 
of  such  peoples  be  entrusted  to  advanced  nations  who,  by  reasons  of  their  resources, 
their  experience  or  their  geographical  position,  can  best  undertake  this  responsi 
bility,  and  who  are  willing  to  accept  it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised 
by  them  as  mandatories  on  behalf  of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to  the  stage  of  the  develop 
ment  of  the  people,  the  geographical  situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  con 
dition  and  other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire  have  reached 
a  stage  of  development  where  their  existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  pro 
visionally  recognized  subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and  assist 
ance  by  a  mandatory  until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes 
of  these  communities  must  be  a  principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the 
mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at  such  a  stage  that  the 
mandatory  must  be  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the  territory  under  con 
ditions  which  will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  religion  subject  only  to  the 
maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the 
slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and  the  liquor  traffic  and  the  prevention  of  the  estab 
lishment  of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  military  training  of  the 
natives  for  other  than  police  purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory  and  will  also 
secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa  and  certain  of  the  South  Pacific 
islands,  which,  owing  to  the  sparseness  of  their  population  or  their  small  size  or 
their  remoteness  from  the  centers  of  civilization  or  their  geographical  contiguity 
to  the  territory  of  the  mandatory  and  other  circumstances,  can  be  best  administered 
under  the  laws  of  the  mandatory  as  integral  portions  of  its  territory  subject  to  the 
safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests  cf  the  indigenous  population.  In 
every  case  of  mandate,  the  mandatory  shall  render  to  the  Cov.ncil  tin  annual  report 
in  reference  to  the  territory  committed  to  its  charge. 

99 


The  degree  of  authority,  control"  or  administration  to  be  exercised  by  the 
mandatory  shall,  if  not  previously  agree  upon  by  the  members  of  the  League,  be 
explicitly  denned  in  each  case  by  the  Council. 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to  receive  and  examine  the  annual 
reports  of  the  mandatories  and  to  advise  the  Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the 
observance  of  the  mandates. 

Article  Twenty-Three 
[Humanitarian  Provisions;  Freedom  of  Transit] 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  international  conventions 
existing  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the  members  of  the  League  (a)  will  endeavor 
to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women  and 
children  both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which  their  commercial 
and  industrial  relations  extend,  and  for  that  purpose  will  establish  and  maintain 
the  necessary  international  organizations;  (b)  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment 
of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories  under  their  control;  (c)  will  entrust  the 
League  with  the  general  supervision  over  the  execution  of  agreements  with  regard 
to  the  traffic  in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dangerous 
drugs;  (d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision  of  the  trade  in 
arms  and  ammunition  with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  to  this  traffic  is 
necessary  in  the  common  interest;  (e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain 
freedom  of  communication  and  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  com 
merce  of  all  members  of  the  League.  In  this  connection  the  special  necessities  of 
the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918  shall  be  in  mind;  (f)  will  en 
deavor  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  international  concern  for  the  prevention  and 
control  of  disease. 

Article  Twenty-  Four 

[Control  of  International  Bureaus  and  Commissions] 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League  all  international  bureaus 
already  established  by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  All 
such  international  bureaus  and  all  commissions  for  the  regulation  of  matters  of 
international  interest  hereafter  constituted  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of 
the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are  regulated  by  general  conventions 
but  which  are  not  placed  under  the  control  of  international  bureaus  or  commissions, 
the  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall,  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  Council  and  if 
desired  by  the  parties,  collect  and  distribute  all  relevant  information  and  shall 
render  any  other  assistance  which  may  be  necessary  or  desirable. 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  the  expenses 
of  any  bureau  or  commission  which  is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

Article  Twenty-  Five 

[The  Red  Cross  and  International  Sanitation] 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  to  encourage  and  promote  the  establishment 
and  cooperation  of  duly  authorized  voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organizations 
having  as  purposes  improvement  of  health,  the  prevention  of  disease  and  the 
mitigation  of  suffering  throughout  the  world. 

Article  Twenty-  Six 

[Amendments  of  the  Covenant;  Right  of  Dissent] 

Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will  take  effect  when  ratified  by  the  members  o  c 
the  League  whose  representatives  compose  the  Council  and  by  a  majority  of  the1 
members  of  the  League  whose  representatives  compose  the  Assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  member  of  the  League  which  signifies  its 
dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that  case  it  shall  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  League. 


100 


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